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SUMMARY 
This thesis contends that Oakeshott’s political philosophy contributes to 
constructivism in International Relations by identifying the moral foundations of 
international society and law. The epistemological basis of this contribution is a 
methodological holism that is defended through arguments developed within 
British Absolute idealism. The opposition between concrete and abstract concepts 
grounds a theory in which knowledge is conditional because it is constructed on 
certain assumptions or postulates. Philosophy identifies and interrogates the 
postulates, exposes their limited value and maintains the logical autonomy of the 
various forms of knowledge, from a universal point of view. The concepts of 
tradition and moral practice are central in Oakeshott’s political philosophy, and 
indicate a theory of normativity in which moral reasoning and political activity are 
a form of argumentative discourse constructed by starting from the assumptions 
shared within a certain community. In this light, Oakeshott is compared to the 
exponents of the English School and to constructivism because of his definition of 
an interpretative approach, in which world politics is a normative engagement and 
the role of theory is to consider its presuppositions as well as its universal meaning. 
Moreover, it is shown that he offers a comprehensive theory of the evolution of 
international society and of the role of war that is consistent with his broader 
political philosophy. The theory of ‘civil association’ is the ground for an 
understanding of international society as an association between states constituted 
by the recognition of moral constraints on the actions of states. These constraints 
are institutionalised in customary international law, which is understood as a moral 
practice. Therefore, international society is grounded on an evolving morality 
resulting from the historical conduct of states. As such, Oakeshott’s political 
philosophy provides an understanding of international relations that is distinct from 
both Realism and Universalism.
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this thesis is to identify the implications of Michael Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy for international political theory and for the theory of 
international relations.1 It argues that it may provide the grounds for an 
understanding of international society as a rule-based form of moral association 
between states. 
Already, Oakeshott’s thought has been considered from a rich variety of 
perspectives and has been interpreted in many, often divergent, ways. For example, 
scholars have placed his works in the context of the history of philosophy and they 
have highlighted their relation with British and German idealism.2 His critique of 
Rationalism and the contraposition between civil association and enterprise 
association has also been considered as a contribution to contemporary Liberalism,3 
Conservatism,4 and Republicanism.5 However, little attention has been devoted to 
the influence of Oakeshott’s thought on the study of international relations, even 
though his work has occasionally been considered relevant to contemporary theory 
of international politics (especially through the works of Neo-English School 
thinkers such as Terry Nardin, Nicholas Rengger and Robert Jackson, as well as to 
                                                 
1
 In the text, I will follow the convention of indicating International Relations as the study 
of international relations. 
2
 Boucher 2001; 2012a; 2012b; Nardin 2001; Podoksik 2003; 2012. 
3
 Gray 1989, 1993; Franco 1990, 2004; Haddock 2005; Galston 2012; Gamble 2012. 
4
 Abel 2010; Devigne 2012. 
5
 Boucher 2005a; Coats 1992. 
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constitutive theorists such as Mervyn Frost).6 In many cases, even these theorists, 
who are all indebted to his thought, have failed to consider the broader implications 
of those of Oakeshott’s concepts they apply to their own field.  
The intention of this thesis is to consider Oakeshott’s thought from both these 
perspectives. It shows that in Oakeshott’s works there are systematic considerations 
for world politics. At the same time, the thesis will take Oakeshott’s theory as a 
background and will develop its implications for the theory of international 
relations, with particular reference to the nature of international society and to the 
relations between international law and morality. 
The distinction between political philosophy and International Relations Theory, in 
both its behaviourist and anti-behaviourist forms, started to collapse at the end of 
the twentieth century, when the critique of the positivist paradigm that had 
dominated International Relations gained momentum.7 Between the 1980s and the 
1990s, the so-called normative turn, with its emphasis on the moral nature of 
international politics, and the constructivist turn (which similarly focused on its 
ideational and interpretative nature) have indeed re-introduced philosophical 
reflection into the field of International Relations. 8  
One recent collection of essays, for example, discusses the importance of 
continental philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Ricoeur, Wittgenstein, 
Gramsci, and Habermas (among others), who might have said little of direct 
                                                 
6
 See: Nardin 1983; Jackson 2000; Frost 2002; Rengger 2013. See also Bain 2003; Astrov 
2005; Cotton 1999. 
7
 See, Brown 1992: 1-19. 
8
 Brown 2013: 485. 
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relevance to the conduct of states, but have exerted a considerable influence on 
contemporary theories of international relations. Nietzsche’s notion of genealogy, 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony or Habermas’s theory of communicative action – 
just to mention some among them – have had, for example, a profound impact on 
critical theory and constructivism.9  
In addition, classic and contemporary political philosophers’ considerations about 
international politics have been at the centre of scholars’ attention.10 David 
Boucher’s Political Theories of International Relations is of particular importance 
to the argument of the thesis, since it applies the Oakeshottian conception of the 
history of political philosophy to the identification of a tradition of texts in the 
political philosophical reflection on the conduct of states.11 Even though conceived 
as a unity, this history is regarded as animated by the dialectical relationship 
between three traditions of thought: Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order and 
Historical Reason. As part of this, contemporary reflection on International 
Relations was eventually reconnected to ‘the intellectual heritage of the political 
theory of international relations’.12 
Moreover, political theorists have extended their considerations to the international 
realm. An exemplar in this respect was of course John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples 
(1993), as were the works of Onora O’Neill, Charles Beitz, Brian Barry, Michael 
                                                 
9
 Farrands and Moore 2010. 
10
 See, among many others, Brown 1992; Williams 1992; Boucher 1998. 
11
 Boucher 1998. 
12
 Boucher 1998: 11, 375-405. 
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Walzer, and others, who acknowledged that issues in International Relations are 
indistinguishable from those of political theory.  
However, according to some scholars, International Relations as a discipline is now 
less concerned with ‘Grand Theory’ problems and more with action-guiding 
issues.13 It also seems that there is a vague consensus among scholars advocating a 
certain methodological eclecticism, which merges positivist and post-positivist 
approaches, without much concern for the great historical metatheoretical debates.14 
However, as Christian Reus-Smit has recently pointed out, the solution of 
epistemological, methodological, and ontological questions, addressed through a 
self-conscious theoretical approach, is still essential to the discipline, and also to its 
quest for significance. What occasionally makes International Relations less-than-
relevant is, Reus Smit argues, not just the lack of authoritative and charismatic 
public intellectual figures, or the loss of practical intents, but also the unawareness 
of the nature of practical reasoning and political action.15 
If regarded in the light of this debate, Oakeshott’s philosophy may appear 
idiosyncratic. The style of his writings and the intellectual heritage to which he 
refers are certainly very different from those dominating the current debate in 
International Relations. However, as I will argue, his ideas about the nature of 
normative reasoning and of political life, as well as its legal theory, may contribute 
to our understanding of world politics and international law. 
                                                 
13
 Brown 2013; Dunne et al. 2013; Weber 2014. 
14
 Lake 2013. 
15
 Reus-Smit 2012. 
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Design of the Thesis 
This study will reveal that Oakeshott’s theory of civil association offers an original 
analysis of the historical, social, and moral dimension of international society. It 
will demonstrate the contribution of Oakeshott’s political philosophy to 
constructivist theories of international relations. It argues that international society 
is constituted by an international rule of law, conceived as the codification of an 
existing international ‘moral practices’. 
In his ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, Oakeshott states that, to fully understand a 
philosophical text, one should consider it in the context of the whole history of 
political philosophy.16 Following this methodology, I delineate Oakeshott’s ideas 
through the identification of their relations with the history of the political theory 
of international relations, as it has been presented by David Boucher, elaborating 
on Oakeshott’s triadic conception of the history of political philosophy.17 
The argument of the thesis is as follows: the first two chapters aim at identifying 
the meaning of Oakeshott’s philosophical doctrine. To this end, his ideas are related 
to the philosophical tradition from which he developed his thought: that of British 
idealism. Chapter 1 focuses on the epistemological and methodological foundations 
of Oakeshott’s thought. It considers not just the widely debated issues of the 
consistency between Oakeshott and British idealism, but also lays the ground for 
the discussion of his political philosophy. In particular, it focuses on the relations 
that he identifies between different kinds of knowledge, and it discusses his 
                                                 
16
 Oakeshott 1991: 223-28. 
17
 Boucher 1998. 
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methodological holism. Chapter 2 continues this endeavour by focusing on 
Oakeshott’s metaphilosophy, again in relation to the British idealist conceptions. It 
considers the nature and role of philosophy, its relations with ordinary 
understanding and with various forms of knowledge.  
While the first two chapters are mainly devoted to the meaning and value of 
Oakeshott’s epistemology and methodology, chapter 3 addresses questions of 
political philosophy. In particular, it considers Oakeshott’s theory of normativity 
and practical discourse in the context of the logical-positivist critique of normative 
thought and of the consequent separation between empirical facts and normative 
values. In so doing, it examines Oakeshott’s well-known and controversial thesis 
about the relation between practical activity and political philosophy. 
With this discussion as a background, chapter 4 contends that Oakeshott’s thought 
is relevant to the Great Debates that have characterized International Relations since 
the end of World War II. It shows Oakeshott’s contribution to post-positivist 
International Relations Theory. In particular, it compares his critique of 
Rationalism in politics to the foremost exponents of the ‘classical’ and ‘scientific’ 
approaches. Its originality with respect to the methodological assumptions of the 
English School (with particular reference to Herbert Butterfield, Martin Wight, and 
Hedley Bull) are considered in the light of Oakeshott’s theory of historical 
knowledge. The chapter goes on to highlight the Oakeshottian contribution to the 
normative turn in International Relations, as well as raising a possible comparison 
with constructivist methodology.   
 7 
 
Thus, chapters 1 to 4 set out the epistemological, methodological and theoretical 
context for the analysis of Oakeshott’s contribution to a constructivist theory of 
international society and morality.  
In the light of this discussion, chapter 5 starts by presenting the Oakeshottian 
dichotomy between civil association and enterprise association, between 
nomocracy and teleocracy. In particular, it focuses on how political authority is 
understood in these two modes of political association. On this ground, the chapter 
turns to Oakeshott’s history of the modern European state as presented in On 
Human Conduct.18 It claims that it comprises a consistent reading of the evolution 
of international society – a reading that anticipates many constructivist concerns.  
It is on this ground that the chapter looks at how Oakeshott’s theory has been 
applied by neo-English School writers to interpret the nature of international 
society. In particular, it considers Terry Nardin’s Law, Morality and the Relations 
of States (1983),19 and Christian Reus-Smit’s criticism of it.20 Moving beyond 
Nardin’s theory and, in response to Reus-Smit, it emerges that Oakeshott’s theory 
of civil association may form the foundation for an understanding of international 
society conceived as a moral association constituted by customary international 
law. Elaborating on David Boucher’s Oakeshottian triadic conception, the chapter 
considers Oakeshott’s position in the context of the history of the political theory 
of international relations. It stresses the consistency between Oakeshott and the 
Historical Reason tradition, which is paradigmatically exemplified by Edmund 
                                                 
18
 Oakeshott 1975. 
19
 Nardin 1983. 
20
 Reus-Smit 1999. 
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Burke. Finally, the chapter shows the heuristic validity of this reading of the nature 
of international society by considering the current relevance of customs and of their 
codification in international law.  
While chapter 5 addresses the ontology of international society, chapter 6 examines 
the normative theme of the relations between morality and international law. 
Following Chris Brown, normative questions are not those concerned with the 
desirability of different practical options, but instead those that investigate the 
moral dimension of international politics.21 To identify how an Oakeshottian theory 
of international society sees the relations between morality and international law, 
that is to say, between moral values and international society, the chapter considers 
once again Oakeshott’s political philosophy in the context of the history of the 
political theory of international relations. It systematically compares Oakeshott to 
Realist, Universalist and Historical Reason thinkers. In spite of his many strong 
similarities with several of the classic realist theorists, the chapter suggests that 
Oakeshott identifies the central and fundamental constitutive value of moral 
practices, intended as the outcome of the actual discursive interaction between 
different international agents. As such, his position may be compared to that of neo-
Habermasian constructivism as well as to neo-Hegelian constitutive theory.
                                                 
21
 Brown 1992: 3. 
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CHAPTER 1 
EPISTEMOLOGY, ONTOLOGY, AND MODALITY 
Introduction 
Oakeshott’s works appear relevant for contemporary theories of international 
relations with respect to two main groups of ideas, principally developed in On 
Human Conduct.  
Firstly, the dichotomy between civil association and enterprise association 
(between a formal legal order constituted by non-instrumental rules and one 
grounded on a substantive state of affairs considered as a goal) has had a very 
considerable impact.1 Scholars such as Terry Nardin and Robert Jackson have 
indeed employed it to revitalize the English School’s notion of international 
society,2 while Nicholas Rengger has recently used it to interpret the evolution of 
the just war tradition.3  
Secondly, Oakeshott’s notion of moral practice has proved to be fruitful not just for 
an understanding of international institutions by neo-English School writers,4 but 
also for the development of constitutive theories of international relations. For 
example, Mervyn Frost has used it to define the normative framework constituting 
                                                 
1
 Oakeshott 1975: 111-22. 
2
 Nardin 1983; Jackson 2000. 
3
 Rengger 2013. 
4
 See: Keen-Sooper 1978; Bain 2003. 
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individual identities, human rights, and ethical reasoning in world politics.5 
Moreover, as argued by Cornelia Navari, Oakeshott’s idea of moral practice may 
be linked to the recent ‘practical turn’ in International Relations developed by post-
positivist, constructivist, theorists.6  
Notwithstanding this relatively significant influence, what is still missing from the 
debate is a thorough and comprehensive analysis of the relevance of Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy for an understanding of international relations. In other words, 
it still needs to be explored what are the implications of Oakeshott’s critique of 
rationalism, theory of civil association and the rule of law, as well as of his historical 
theory of the modern European state, for the theory of international politics. 
Even Nardin, Jackson and Rengger, who more than others apply Oakeshott’s 
categories to the analysis of international politics, do not in fact engage with the 
broad philosophical arguments that grounds Oakeshott’s theory. The categories of 
‘civil association’, ‘enterprise association’; those of ‘rationalism’ and 
‘individualism’; of ‘practice’ and ‘authority’ are taken prima facie without further 
investigation into their particular epistemological and ontological assumptions, and 
out of the context of Oakeshott’s broad philosophical theory. Even Terry Nardin – 
who has not only applied Oakeshott’s notions of civil association and the rule of 
law at the international level,7 but has also offered a comprehensive account of his 
philosophical arguments8 – does not show the relevance of the former for the latter.  
                                                 
5
 See, in particular Frost 2002: 40-47. 
6
 Navari 2011. See: Adler and Pouliot 2011, in particular Kratochwil 2011: 36. 
7
 Nardin 1983; 1998; 2008. 
8
 Nardin 2001. 
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On the other hand, those scholars such as Cornelia Navari, who see the relevance 
of Oakeshott’s notion of practice for the current ‘practical turn’ in International 
Relations,9 tend to find the epistemological and ontological grounding in other 
philosophical points of reference.10 For example, constructivist theorists – who, in 
the words of Christian Reus-Smit, share the notion that agents, identities and 
interests ‘are socially constructed’ and ‘are the product of intersubjective social 
structures’11 – see themselves as an outgrowth of critical theory and have focused 
on empirical analysis rather than on theoretical discussion.12 Those such as 
Kratochwil who base their arguments philosophically have mainly referred to 
Habermas’s theory of communicative action, and largely ignored Oakeshott’s 
contribution.13  
I argue in this thesis that Oakeshott’s political philosophy may be the ground for an 
understanding of international society as a rule-based form of moral association of 
states constituted by customary international law. More particularly, I claim that his 
political philosophy may contribute to contemporary constructivism, as it offers an 
original analysis of the historical, social, and moral dimension of international 
society. In contrast to Rengger, Nardin and Jackson, as well as to other neo-English 
                                                 
9
 See: Navari 2011. 
10
 Navari 2011: 615. 
11
 Reus-Smit 2003a: 188. Constructivism in IR is different from the version that dominates 
large part of Political Theory and which was inspired by Rawls’s philosophy. For an 
account of ‘political constructivism’ see Roberts 2007. I will return on this aspect in chapter 
4. 
12
 Reus-Smit 2003a: 193-201. 
13
 Kratochwil 2000; Risse 2000. On this see: Reus-Smit 2003a. 
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School writers and to constitutive theorists, I claim that to appreciate in full the 
relevance and implications of Oakeshott’s thought for the understanding of 
international relations it is first necessary to step back and define its broader 
epistemological and methodological framework. It is only on the basis of this 
analysis that the place of Oakeshott’s political philosophy in the context of post-
positivist theory of international relations may be understood. The objective of this 
chapter is to consider Oakeshott’s theory of knowledge as developed throughout all 
his main works.  
Educated in Cambridge in the 1920s by J.M.E. McTaggart and W.R. Sorley in the 
philosophical school of British idealism, Oakeshott wrote his first monograph 
(Experience and Its Modes, 1933) under the influence of F.H. Bradley’s 
Appearance and Reality and Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.14 The aim of that 
book was indeed to offer an overarching vision of the nature and role of 
philosophical experience and of the relations between different forms of 
knowledge.15  
Philosophical and epistemological concerns are also central in the celebrated 
introduction to Hobbes’s Leviathan,16 in some of the pieces collected in 
                                                 
14
 Oakeshott 1933: 6. 
15
 Oakeshott 1933: 4. Even at the risk of not being completely loyal to the many 
terminological nuances of Idealists’ and Oakeshott’s thought, I will use as synonymous 
‘forms of understanding’, ‘spiritual forms’, ‘modes of experience’, ‘modalities of thought’, 
‘forms of knowledge’, etc., to indicate the differentiation of the concrete whole. 
16
 There are two different versions of this text. The first is Oakeshott 1946. The second was 
in a 1975 collection entitled Hobbes on Civil Association (Oakeshott 2000), and later 
collected in the expanded version of Rationalism in Politics (Oakeshott 1991: 221-294). 
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Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays,17 as well as in On History and Other 
Essays.18 In this regard, On Human Conduct (which is the source of those ideas that 
are more relevant for the understanding of international affairs) is of particular 
relevance. As we see in the preface, it is a work in ‘philosophical reflection’, which 
devotes a large section to metaphilosophical discussion.19 
However, the relevance of these idealist credentials, which were so apparent in 
Experience and Its Modes and in other writings of the thirties,20 is more opaque in 
later works and is very much contested by many commentators such as Steven 
Gerencser,21 Terry Nardin,22 Paul Franco,23 Luke O’Sullivan,24 Efraim Podoksik,25 
and James Alexander.26 
Elaborating on David Boucher’s interpretation – which, instead, stresses the 
continuities in Oakeshott’s philosophy27 – in the following I will contend that 
Oakeshott consistently defended an original version of Absolute idealism grounded 
on a methodological holism, according to which the various forms of knowledge 
                                                 
17
 For example: ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ (Oakeshott 1991: 
488-541). The text was originally published in 1959. 
18
 Oakeshott 1999.  
19
 Oakeshott 1975: vii. 
20
 See, for example, the essay ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’, Oakeshott 
2007: 154-83. 
21
 Gerencser 2000. 
22
 Nardin 2001. 
23
 Franco 2004. 
24
 L. O’Sullivan 2010. 
25
 Podoksik 2003. 
26
 Alexander 2012. 
27
 See, in particular, Boucher 1984; 1991a; 2001; 2012a; 2012b. 
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(history, science, practice, and art) are partial views of reality, as they are based on 
incommensurable and autonomous logical presuppositions. The structure of the 
present chapter is as follows. First, I will contend that Oakeshott maintained an 
idealist theory of knowledge that was articulated through a critique of philosophical 
realism as presented by logical positivism. I will then focus on Oakeshott’s theory 
of modality as firstly presented in Experience and Its Modes and I will argue that it 
is further interpreted in On Human Conduct. Thus, I show that it represents the 
ground for his political philosophy as it is developed in later stages of his career. If 
the various forms of knowledge are considered as abstractions, the question that 
needs to be addressed is that of the role of the Absolute, what is concrete. In contrast 
to some recent interpretations (such as those of Efraim Podoksik and Luke 
O’Sullivan),28 I will contend that Oakeshott’s idea of the Absolute or 
unconditionality is indebted to that of F.H. Bradley and plays an important role 
which is consistent with his wider theory. 
It is on this basis that in chapter 2 I will explain Oakeshott’s understanding of the 
nature and role of philosophy and, in the following chapters, the nature of normative 
thinking and political philosophy, and then continue with his contribution to post-
positivist theories of international relations. 
Idealism and Truth 
The first points that I wish to investigate are the logical and epistemological 
foundations of Oakeshott’s political thought. As already mentioned, if it is an 
incontrovertible fact that the purpose of Experience and Its Modes was a 
                                                 
28
 Podoksik 2005; 2010; L. O’Sullivan 2010. 
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restatement of the ‘first principles’ of idealism,29 what needs to be discussed is 
whether this may also be true of later works, where his political philosophy is more 
fully developed. 
Before beginning the comparison between Oakeshott and British idealism, it is 
necessary to pose three main caveats. Firstly, for the idealists, logic is not the 
science of the validity of inferences represented by symbols (as it is for a large part 
of contemporary philosophy), but it is rather the study of thought and knowledge. 
It is to this idea that Oakeshott still refers in one his latest works, On History and 
Other Essays (1983).30 
Secondly, in British idealism there was not a set of principles to which all its 
exponents subscribed. What characterized that philosophical movement was rather 
a group of interrelated ideas, often inspired by classical German philosophy, 
interpreted with a certain degree of liberty by its main exponents. As argued by 
David Boucher and Andrew Vincent, the movement had a historical unity despite 
the diversity, which is recognizable in the discussion of some fundamental 
questions and themes.31  
Finally, neither the British idealists nor Oakeshott elaborated a philosophical 
system to match that of Hegel. Though profoundly influenced by Hegelianism and 
notwithstanding the coherence of their thinking, they never presented anything like 
a philosophical encyclopaedia. 
                                                 
29
 Oakeshott 1933: 7. 
30
 Oakeshott 1999: 6. 
31
 Boucher and Vincent 2012: 38-42. 
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The most important among the constellation of ideas that defines British idealism 
was the polemic against empiricism and philosophical realism, which developed 
through a critique of the assumed dualism between the knowing mind and its 
objects. As T.H. Green, E. Caird, and Henry Jones refuted the positions of British 
empiricists (from Locke to Spencer and Lewes),32 so later exponents of that 
movement, such as R.G. Collingwood and Oakeshott, argued against the realism of 
Logical positivism.33 
The defence of the unity of mind with reality and of the interrelatedness of subject 
and object, that is, the identity between reality and rationality, is indeed one of the 
main concerns of Experience and Its Modes, which starts by identifying reality with 
thought and with the synthesis between ‘experiencing’ and ‘what is experienced’. 
Experience is a ‘single whole’ that admits no ‘final or absolute division’.34   
Far from being abandoned in the essays written after World War II – where analytic 
philosophy was already hegemonic in British universities – this fundamental 
principle was reiterated in ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ 
(1959), which is often considered as Oakeshott’s departure point from Absolute 
idealism.35 Even though, in this text, Oakeshott seems to place more emphasis on 
the role of the knowing subject, reality is still defined as a ‘world of experience’. 
The distinction between the ‘self’ and the ‘not-self’ is considered as ‘unstable’, 
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insofar as they ‘generate one another’.36 They are not independent but, instead, 
aspects of a single reality. 
Thus, in both Experience and Its Modes and in ‘The Voice of Poetry in the 
Conversation of Mankind’, Oakeshott defends the idealist logical principle 
according to which nothing is outside thinking and prior to reason. This is what is 
still defended at the outset of On Human Conduct, where we read that no reality 
can be considered ‘independent from reflective consciousness’.37 As already stated 
in Experience and Its Modes,38 even though an ‘it’ may temporally precede its 
‘interpretation’, and a ‘fact’ may be antecedent to a ‘theorem’, the difference 
between the former and the latter is merely contingent: it is the recognition of 
something as an ‘invitation’ to further thinking and not a ‘verdict’.39 In short, like 
other idealists Oakeshott argued that experience is a factum – the result of the active 
character of mind – rather than a datum, an external object apprehended or reflected 
by intelligence.40  
The most important implication of this fundamental principle is that ideas do not 
refer to anything outside of themselves. Therefore, they are always known in 
relation to other ideas and significant only within a world of ideas.41 In this regard, 
Experience and Its Modes may be considered in the context of the debate between 
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Bernard Bosanquet and F.H. Bradley about ‘concrete universal’ and ‘floating 
ideas’.42 Oakeshott indeed denies the possibility of an ‘idea without a world’.43 He 
recalls also Bradley’s rejection of the existence of ‘mere ideas’,44 devoting several 
paragraphs of Experience and Its Modes to a refutation of the notion that an idea 
may stand in isolation.45 This same position is presented, and indeed further 
clarified, in ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ where we read 
that ‘an image is never isolated and alone’, belonging to ‘the world or field of 
images which on any occasion constitutes the not-self’.46 Once again, this same 
logical principle is reiterated in On Human Conduct. There, ideas construct 
‘platforms of conditional understanding’, which are themselves constructed around 
certain postulates and ideas.47 
From the synthesis between subject and object, and from the relatedness of all ideas 
it follows that, as for T.H. Green, F.H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, Henry Jones, 
and H.H. Joachim before him, for Oakeshott the correspondence theory of truth 
must be rejected. Instead, coherence and comprehensiveness are the criterion of 
truth. The main elements of the coherence theory of truth were already outlined in 
Bernard Bosanquet’s contribution to the intellectual manifesto of British idealism, 
Essays in Philosophical Criticism (1883).48 The most systematic presentation of 
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this theory is, however, in H.H. Joachim’s The Nature of Truth (1906), which 
shaped the subsequent debate between idealist philosophers and the logical realist 
school, who, with Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, took truth and falsity to be 
immediate characteristics of objective universals.49 Mainly in opposition to this, 
Joachim asserts that something is true insofar as it belongs to a ‘significant whole’, 
one in which ‘all its constituent elements reciprocally involve one another, or 
reciprocally determine one another’s being as contributory features in a single 
concrete meaning’.50 The relationship between judgments is internal, and they 
compose a whole system of knowledge. 
Experience and Its Modes and subsequent works are predicated on this theory of 
truth, which posits the coherence of a world of ideas as the criterion of truth, and 
not the conformity of ideas to any external object. 51 Truth is a property of the ideas 
that compose a system and depends on the relations between its different parts.52 
This position can be interpreted as a critique of all forms of realism and 
foundationalism, which base knowledge either on the perception of an external 
reality, or on objectivity.53 
                                                 
49
 A second edition of the book was published in 1939 with a preface by R.G. Collingwood. 
Joachim, W.R. Sorley and J.S. Boy-Smith are thanked in the preface of Experience and Its 
Modes. 
50
 Joachim 1906: 66. 
51
 Oakeshott 1933: 37. Elaborating on W.H. Greenleaf’s interpretation, David Boucher 
argues that Oakeshott followed Collingwood and radically expanded Joachim’s theory of 
truth by claiming the non-propositional character of statements. See: Boucher and Vincent 
2012: 271. 
52
 Boucher 2012b: 258. 
53
 On this see, Stern 2009: 177-208. 
 20 
 
To sum up, Oakeshott grounds his works on a philosophical idealism that asserts 
that there is no knowledge of reality independent of our understanding it. Object 
and subject are mutually constituted by their reciprocal relations. For this reason, 
as argued by the British idealist Henry Jones, for Oakeshott also there is no 
distinction between ontology and epistemology, between the question about the 
nature of reality and those concerned with our manner of knowing it.54 As opposed 
to the realist epistemology developed since Descartes, the question of the object of 
knowledge is not separated from that of the manner in which it is known. This does 
not mean, however, that knowledge is arbitrary, that it is the construction of a 
solipsistic mind. Instead, insofar as the test of the validity of truth is coherence and 
comprehensiveness, the criterion rests on the reciprocal relations between ideas.  
Modes of Experience and Orders of Inquiry 
From the assumption that knowledge is the synthesis between the knower and what 
is known, between subject and object, idealist philosophy attempted to explain the 
differentiation of our understanding.55 The epistemological question – that for the 
idealists is at the same time ontological – is about the relationship between different 
forms of knowledge, different forms of reality. As Oakeshott claims in On History 
and Other Essays, to reflect on knowledge is to reflect on the modality in which it 
is constructed: ‘the conditions of understanding specify what is to be understood’.56 
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It is in this regard that G.R.G. Mure notes that British idealism does not attempt to 
articulate the Hegelian dialectical structure of development in systematic detail. 57 
It is indeed the influence of the Italian idealists, and in particular Croce, Gentile and 
De Ruggiero, that leads R.G. Collingwood to elaborate in Speculum Mentis (1924), 
in Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), as well as in his moral philosophy 
lectures, a system based on the hierarchy of overlapping forms.58 In Speculum 
Mentis he sees art, religion, science, history and philosophy as different kinds of 
knowledge, arranged in ascending logical order. None of these forms is self-
sufficient, and each tends to transform itself into the form above it, which has a 
higher degree of coherence and unity. 
Oakeshott’s understanding of the different ways in which we experience reality, as 
presented in Experience and Its Modes, shares some aspects of R.G. Collingwood’s 
Speculum Mentis. Like Collingwood, Oakeshott also explores the reciprocal logical 
relationship between different spiritual forms and between these and the Absolute. 
In spite of this broad similarity, he proposes a rather different interpretation of this 
relationship, inspired by F.H. Bradley.59 In Appearance and Reality Bradley 
affirmed that the various forms of experience – which he named pleasure and pain, 
feeling and will – are autonomous and equally necessary. There is not a hierarchy 
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between all these aspects according to their proximity with the Absolute, and they 
are all abstractions and appearances.60  
Oakeshott’s notion of modality develops this position and conceives the various 
modes as grounded in different categories or postulates, which are independent 
from one another. The modes are the whole of reality from a particular point of 
view, specified by their postulates.61 They are autonomous in relation to each other, 
though abstract in respect of the whole. As such, Experience and Its Modes is 
opposed to the hierarchical version inaugurated by Hegel and reinterpreted by 
Collingwood. According to Oakeshott, reality is differentiated or abstracted in a 
potentially infinite number of modes.62 However, the most important and highly 
developed are history (grounded on the category of the past), science (on quantity), 
practice (on will), and, from ‘The Voice of Poetry’, art (on delight).63  
It is important to underline that Oakeshott does not offer a speculative philosophical 
interpretation of the historical emergence of the various modes of experience. Even 
though he may once again be considered alongside Croce and Collingwood to the 
extent in which the various forms of experience are activities that develop 
throughout history, Oakeshott does not see any logical necessity in their emergence. 
Their presuppositions or categories the result of human intelligence and not, as in 
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Kantian philosophy, something that is presupposed by the mind. Exemplary in this 
approach is, of course, Collingwood’s The Idea of History, where the development 
of history as an autonomous form of knowledge is presented.64 Similarly, for 
Oakeshott, past, quantity, will, and delight – the points of arrests of experience from 
which history, science, practice and poetry respectively arise – are not metaphysical 
forms independent from actual experience and outside of the relation between 
subject and object,65 but emerge historically and are the result of the activity of the 
mind. 
As for Bradley,66 however, for Oakeshott there is not a connection between 
historical and logical development. The various modes of experience are not 
‘moments indispensable to the completeness of a dialectic (or logical 
development)’,67 and philosophy or the Absolute, as I shall discuss below, is not its 
‘historical end’.68 Although Oakeshott is not ‘disposed to deny that this is a possible 
view of the character of experience’, he underlines how it does not logically explain 
modality and abstractions, dismissing it as fundamentally irrelevant. 69 Even 
though, for instance, practice may have a genealogical or existential priority, or 
history may have appeared earlier than science, there is not a logical connection in 
this historical evolution. 70 
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Once again, far from being a question that he addressed only in his early writings, 
in the later works he also underlines the contingent nature of the arrests and their 
not being the result of a logical necessity. In his peculiar style, in ‘The Activity of 
Being an Historian’ (1958) Oakeshott affirms that modes of experience ‘emerge 
like games that children invent for themselves’.71 In a similar stance, in On History 
and Other Essays the various modes emerge ‘without premonition from the 
indiscriminate groping of human intelligence’.72 
The lack of relations between historical and logical development of the various 
forms of knowledge and the notion of modality as a whole represent a constant 
feature of Oakeshott’s reflection and the logical standpoint from which all his 
subsequent thought is developed. In the text considered by many as the moment of 
departure from idealist logic – ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of 
Mankind’ – the idea of modality is still present. There is indeed a correspondence 
between the notion of modes of experience and that of modes of imagining or 
universes of discourses, presented in ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of 
Mankind’.73 Among the significant elements that indicate its persistent centrality is 
that, in ‘The Voice of Poetry’, he wanted to improve his theory by adding poetry as 
an autonomous mode.74 As in Experience and Its Modes, and again in ‘The Voice 
of Poetry’, he discusses the postulates on which the modes are grounded. Finally, 
as in Experience and Its Modes, in one of his last works (On History and Other 
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Essays), Oakeshott still talks about ‘modes of understanding’: each of them is ‘an 
autonomous manner of understanding, specifiable in terms of exact conditions, 
which is logically incapable of denying or confirming the conclusions of any other 
mode of understanding, or indeed of making any relevant utterance in respect of 
it’.75 
In On Human Conduct, however, Oakeshott once again expresses this notion 
through a very different approach. There, he theorizes the existence of two ‘orders 
of inquiry’ constructed upon unambiguous categories. The first understands going-
on as ‘expression of intelligence’;76  the second as ‘process’, in terms of causal 
conditions.77 Each of these two orders generates autonomous and distinct ‘idioms 
of inquiry’, capable of their own ‘conditional perfection’.78 As it was for the modes, 
orders and idioms of inquiry are abstract and conditional. 
A possible reason for this change may be the increasing influence of neo-Kantian 
philosophies and in particular of Dilthey. It is often remarked that Oakeshott is 
particularly scant in his references to other thinkers, and he indeed left much to the 
expertise of his readers. However, as I have already mentioned, in the preface to 
Experience and Its Modes he mentions Bradley and Hegel as his own sources of 
inspiration. It is significant, then, that in another later text – his reply to D.D. 
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Raphael’s review of Rationalism in Politics – he indicates Dilthey (along with 
Aristotle and Hegel) as one of his points of reference.79 
Moreover, the affinity between Oakeshott and neo-Kantianism, in regard to the 
above-mentioned distinction between the two orders of inquiry, is also indicated by 
some loose notes preserved at the Oakeshott Archive at the British Library of 
Political Science.80 In some of these papers, we find handwritten study notes about 
the distinction between natural and cultural sciences that are relevant to an 
understanding of Oakeshott’s interpretation. They show his reflection on the 
exponents of the so-called South-Western or Baden School (in particular, 
Windelband, Dilthey, and Rickert), who were concerned with the identification of 
the conditions for the possibility of historical knowledge and moral experience. 
From these notes we may deduce that, like R.G. Collingwood in The Idea of 
History,81 Oakeshott considers their thoughts as an attempt to identify a mode of 
knowledge autonomous from the method of the natural sciences as depicted by 
positivism   
To sum up so far, starting from the assumption that reality and knowledge are not 
objects independent from the knowing mind, Oakeshott addresses the question 
regarding the relations between various forms of knowledge. In particular, I have 
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emphasised that Oakeshott argues for the autonomy of the various modes, as each 
is grounded on incommensurable presuppositions. Moreover, I have also stressed 
that, in On Human Conduct, he temporarily abandons the conceptions of modality 
and subscribes to the neo-Kantian distinction between cultural and natural sciences, 
which, however, are interpreted as two incommensurable ways of conceiving 
reality. Throughout this discussion, Oakeshott identifies the conditions of logical 
possibility of the various modes of experience, or, as they are later called, universes 
of discourse, orders of inquiry, or modes of understanding. In so doing, as I will 
further explore in chapter 2 with reference to the idea of ‘conversation of mankind’, 
he defends the legitimacy of various approaches to reality and denies the possibility 
of any reductionism to a single, dominant, knowledge. It is this element that, as I 
will argue in chapter 3 and 4, represents the basis for Oakeshott’s understanding of 
normative thought and of the philosophical understanding of politics.  
Individuality and the Absolute 
In Experience and Its Modes, and in subsequent works, the various modes of 
experience are therefore autonomous from each other and abstractions of the 
concrete whole. What needs to be clarified is therefore the logical difference 
between abstract and concrete concepts, between single ideas within the various 
modes and the whole. For the concern of my argument, it is on this basis that, in 
subsequent parts of the thesis, it will be possible to understand the value of practical 
and political concepts and their relation to historical knowledge and philosophical 
activity. 
In Experience and Its Modes, this issue is addressed through a theory of 
individuality articulated in the opposition between particularity and universality. 
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Indeed, as David Boucher suggests, the problem of individuality is crucial in 
Experience and Its Modes, where the question continuously asked was what for 
each of the modes, and for philosophy as a whole, constituted the individual, or 
individuality.82  
In this regard, Podoksik has claimed that the notion of the Absolute, which was 
central in previous British idealists, is irrelevant to Oakeshott’s philosophy and that 
his focus is rather on particularity and on the pluralism of the forms of knowledge.83 
Similarly, Luke O’Sullivan identifies in Experience and Its Modes an ambiguous 
and contradictory metaphysics of the Absolute, which is eventually overcome in his 
later works, and particularly in On Human Conduct, where the Absolute is no longer 
a concern.84 On the contrary, in my view, the idea of the Absolute as the condition 
of the possibility of all forms of experience and understanding is central to both 
Oakeshott’s early and later works.  
It is worth considering that Bernard Bosanquet and F.H. Bradley define 
individuality as a unity within itself.85 Both defend an absolute monism in which 
the whole is the only substance and reality, whilst finite individualities are 
adjectival and apparent. The opposition between abstractness and concreteness is a 
matter of degree. ‘Finite individuality’ is an abstraction, a set of determinations of 
properties that cannot stand as the ultimate subject of a proposition. Only the whole, 
or concrete individuality, is real and true. What is true of a certain finite 
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individuality is ultimately true only to a certain degree, and can be affirmed – with 
the highest degree of coherence – of the ‘infinite individual’, reality as a whole.86 
For Absolute idealism, as interpreted by F.H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet, there 
is a logical hierarchy between different sorts of individuality: abstract and 
concrete.87 Concrete individuality is a many in one, it is the universal that can be 
reached through a progressive process in which the shortcomings and the 
contradictions of abstract individuality are overcome.88 
What characterizes F.H. Bradley’s Absolute idealism and defines him as a sceptic 
is that the Absolute or Truth is not achievable through reason, but instead only 
through a form of direct, immediate, supra-personal perception.89 However, this 
does not mean that it is completely unrelated to our thinking. Instead, it is present 
in all appearances, which point forwards beyond themselves. From this point of 
view, Appearance and Reality may be read as a critique of all knowledge on the 
ground of this logically necessary Absolute, the holistic undifferentiated whole in 
which all relations and differences are unified. A positive metaphysical knowledge 
is not considered possible and the system-construction pursued by F.H. Bradley 
self-limits itself to assign to all forms of existence a position according to their 
degree of truth and reality, which is to say, of realization of this ‘idea of perfection 
or individuality’.90  
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Similarly to these Absolute idealist positions, and in the attempt to explain to what 
extent ‘individuality is the criterion of experience’, Oakeshott refutes the 
conception that considers individuality as what is separated and self-sufficient. 
According to his argument, ‘what is individual is what is specific and distinct, 
individuality is a matter of degree and circumstance’. 91 The difference is then not 
between an individual and its environment, but between what is ‘permanently 
distinct and able to maintain its explicitness without qualification’ and what is not.92 
In Oakeshott’s theory, the individual points beyond itself, towards its environment, 
and is ‘powerless to resist inclusion in what is more individual than itself’, concrete 
individuality.93 Finite individuality, or particularity, is designated: it is merely 
experience arrested at the point which appears to be satisfactory. As it was for F.H. 
Bradley, it ‘only exists through an intellectual construction’.94 Therefore, concepts 
within the various modes of experience are finite individualities as they are based 
on foundations that cannot be refuted without refuting, at the same time, all the 
modes. They take the part for the whole, elucidating an aspect of reality at the 
expense of comprehensiveness, and of other elements of concrete reality. On the 
other hand, the universal or the whole, because completely united with its context, 
is fully individual and completely substantive. 95  
To show that this notion of individuality nourished in the British idealist tradition 
is at the root of Oakeshott’s political philosophy and is, as I shall discuss in the final 
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chapter of this work, central to his understanding of the moral criteria of the conduct 
of states, it is once again necessary to show that he remained consistent with this 
position in his later works where his political philosophy is developed. 
In this regard, On Human Conduct is particularly relevant. In that text, the activity 
of understanding is still described as the ‘recognition’ of ‘something in particular’ 
distinct from ‘all that may be going on’.96 This engagement proceeds from the 
indistinctness of the whole towards a more and more recognized ‘thing’, which is a 
unity of ‘characteristics’, or, as it is called,97 an ‘ideal character’. Similarly to what 
is expressed in Experience and Its Modes, the identity of an ideal character is the 
unity of ‘particularity and genericity’, it is the coming together of a group of 
characteristics and postulates. Individual ideas are not distinct substances: their 
meaning and value are limited and derive from their relations with other ideas of 
the same kind.  
As I will discuss further in chapter 6, this theory of individuality indicates that 
Oakeshott cannot be considered as a subscriber to methodological individualism. 
Individual concepts are not the logical starting point of knowledge, but their 
meaning is instead derived from the whole to which they are related. Indeed, for 
Oakeshott our thinking is always relational. Ideas belong indeed to a certain, more 
or less well defined, world of ideas or – as they are named in On Human Conduct 
– ‘platforms of conditional understanding’. These are abstractions of the whole 
based on assumptions or postulates, to which they are related, and in which they 
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find their meaning.98 Concepts are abstract individualities as they are grounded on 
certain presuppositions. At the same time, however, they point beyond themselves 
to a higher degree of unity. 
The concrete individual – that is self-sufficient as it does not presuppose anything 
outside of itself – is what the idealist philosophical tradition calls the Absolute. 
Oakeshott follows F.H. Bradley by claiming that the Absolute is not the final end 
of knowledge, an ultimate final coherent body of knowledge. It is rather the totality 
from which all modes are abstracted: ‘it is not something to come; it is the ground 
not the hope of experience’.99 The key point here is to highlight that Oakeshott 
consistently and continuously maintains that the Absolute is the regulative ideal, 
the criterion of experience.100 
Contra Podoksik and Luke O’Sullivan, this position is maintained not just in 
Experience and Its Modes, but also in On Human Conduct. As we have discussed, 
in Experience and Its Modes the Absolute is ‘the concrete and complete whole 
implied and involved in every modification of experience’.101 In On Human 
Conduct, Oakeshott explains how knowledge emerges from the undifferentiated 
whole, which is logically prior to it. Ideas and concepts are ‘something in particular’ 
which, emerge ‘from the unconditional (and, therefore, unrecognizable) confusion 
of all that may be going on’.102  
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In other words, the unconditional or the whole in which all relations are overcome 
is still considered, in On Human Conduct, the presupposition of all possible 
understandings. A notion of ‘unconditional or definitive understanding’ has indeed 
‘no part in the adventure’, but it may still ‘hover in the background’.103 In short, 
neither in Experience and Its Modes nor in On Human Conduct is unconditionality 
or Absolute experience irrelevant to the logic of the Oakeshottian notion of 
philosophy and experience. At the same time, in neither works does Oakeshott 
believe that it could be conceived as a final stage of knowledge. 
To recapitulate, Oakeshott remained in the idealist tradition as he considered that 
the various forms of experience or orders of inquiry are partial and abstracted from 
the unconditional, and as he claimed that nothing is independent of reflective 
consciousness. In this, he may be considered a further interpreter of F.H. Bradley’s 
notion of the Absolute and of its relations to its abstractions. Indeed, they both 
contended that, although complete coherence is the presupposition of any form of 
thinking, reasoning is always partial and conditional. However, even more than 
F.H. Bradley, he does not claim that even our best thinking can ever reach or 
conceive the Absolute, which is the regulative ideal of our knowledge and not a 
final and ultimate body of knowledge. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted Oakeshott’s logic, that is to say his theory about the 
conditions of possibility of knowledge. More particularly, I have illustrated that, 
following the idealist principle of the unity between mind and objects, there is not 
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a radical distinction between our understanding and reality; there is not an objective 
reality outside of the knowing mind. Ontological questions are the same as 
epistemological ones. This, however, does not equate with saying that truth is 
merely what one happens to believe. Instead, while denying that truth is the correct 
representation of an external objectivity (as it is for the realist paradigm), Oakeshott 
subscribes to the coherence theory of truth according to which the validity of an 
idea is given by its relation to ideas of the same sort.  
As other idealists, Oakeshott offers an account for the variety of knowledge. As I 
have shown, it is the answer to this question that represents one of the main elements 
of originality in Oakeshott’s idealism. Following F.H. Bradley, and in opposition 
to the hierarchical neo-Hegelian model of R.G. Collingwood, Oakeshott argues that 
our knowledge is based on autonomous and incommensurable presuppositions or 
postulates. As a consequence, there are different forms of knowledge that are 
autonomous from one another and in respect of the whole. The concepts of the 
various modes of experience, universes of discourse, orders of inquiry, and modes 
of understanding are true insofar as they are coherent with the presuppositions on 
which they are grounded and with the other concepts to which they are related. 
Individual concepts that are relevant within one of these modes (such as practical 
concepts) are irrelevant for others. Even though Oakeshott does not offer a 
speculative philosophy that gives reasons for their emergence, these 
presuppositions, I have illustrated, are the result of the activity of mind throughout 
history. 
I will discuss in chapter 3 the relevance of these principles for Oakeshott’s 
conception of political activity, and in chapter 4 I will look at how these 
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fundamental epistemological tenets may be placed in the context of the 
metatheoretical debate in International Relations. What is for the moment important 
to underline is that, through a reinterpretation of F.H. Bradley’s notion of Absolute, 
Oakeshott subscribes to a methodological holism or monism according to which the 
whole is logically prior to the individual. The meaning of individual concepts is 
derived from the context in which they are situated and from the postulates or 
presupposition on which they are grounded.  
However, by denying any hierarchy among forms of knowledge as well as any 
teleology in their historical development, he also denies the Hegelian notion that 
the Absolute is the historical and logical end of knowledge to be reached by 
philosophy. Instead, as I will further discuss in chapter 2, there is not a final state 
of knowledge or reality that might be reached and that represents the teleological 
end of current experience. At the same time, he contends that all of the various 
modalities of experience, all forms of knowledge, are equally legitimate. 
In sum, Oakeshott’s denial of the distinction between the subject and object, as well 
as his emphasis upon conditional knowledge (where the conditions are the 
postulates upon which a world of ideas rests and generates the reality of which it is 
conscious), show the epistemological grounds of my main contention, that is that 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy of international relations may be considered a 
form of constructivism.
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CHAPTER 2 
PHILOSOPHY AND CRITICISM 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 has shown that Oakeshott’s theory of modality and individuality 
contributes to constructivist approaches in International Relations by providing a 
theory in which epistemological and ontological questions are the same. As subject 
and object are interrelated, to ask what is reality is posing a question about our 
understanding of it. Oakeshott’s philosophical idealism suggests that knowledge 
and reality are based on certain historically emerging postulates, which generate 
reciprocally autonomous modes of conceiving the world. 
Moreover, I contended that Oakeshott’s theory is based on a methodological holism 
that he defends through arguments he developed within the British idealist tradition. 
More precisely, by conceiving the opposition between particularity and universality 
in the same terms as Bernard Bosanquet and F.H. Bradley, Oakeshott argued that 
individual concepts derived their meaning and validity from their relationship with 
other concepts of the same kind, and with their presuppositions.  
As such, Oakeshott’s philosophy contributes to recent constructivist theories of 
international relations, which have shown that the ground of any possible answer to 
practical concerns is the awareness that social reality, as well as our possibility of 
changing it, are the result of our understanding.1 Therefore, to answer 
                                                 
1
 Reus-Smit 2012. 
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metatheoretical and epistemological questions increases our awareness of the nature 
of world politics and of political action.  
That this is one of the essential elements in International Relations is also shown by 
its history as an academic discipline in the twentieth century, which is shaped by 
metatheoretical debates. Similarly, the recent emphasis upon the relevance of 
philosophical reflection for the understanding of the relations of states, as well as 
the contestation of the divide between political theory and International Relations, 
have emphasised the relevance of philosophical reflection to world politics. In this 
last regard, despite the dominance of the analytic paradigm for a large part of post-
World War II political philosophy, the theory of international relations has also 
been influenced by the Continental style of philosophizing. For example, critical 
theorists have developed the positions of Habermas, Foucault and Gramsci; 
whereas constitutive theorists have elaborated on those of Hegel (albeit without his 
metaphysics or philosophy of history). More important to the argument of this thesis 
Nardin’s and Rengger’s works (among others) have shown the relevance of 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy for the understanding of international society and 
of its evolution. However, as I already have already suggested, they have not 
explicitly appealed to the philosophical background theory that sustains his 
arguments. 
To show Oakeshott’s contribution to constructivism in International Relations, it is 
necessary to discuss his conceptions of the nature of philosophy. It is indeed only 
by doing this that it is possible to understand the value of the ideas elaborated by 
Oakeshott in his political philosophy and, by implication, in his international 
theory.  
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In this chapter I will argue that Oakeshott conceives philosophy as a critical activity 
that identifies the postulates or presuppositions of various concepts and, at the same 
time, attempts to define their universal, concrete or unconditional, meaning. 
However, I will contend that for Oakeshott, philosophical criticism does not aim at, 
nor achieve, a definitive and ultimate body of knowledge and all its results are 
conditional. 
This discussion constitutes the condition for the understanding of his philosophy of 
international relations, which I will examine in the rest of the thesis. It is indeed on 
this ground that in chapter 3 I will discuss the relations between philosophy and 
normativity, and in chapter 4 the Oakeshottian contribution to post-positivist and 
constructivist theories of international relations. 
Criticism and the Method of Philosophy 
In chapter 1, I contended that Oakeshott may be considered to contribute to 
constructivism in International Relations because he claims that no knowledge is 
independent of the knowing subject and that there are no criteria of objectivity 
external to the mind. Thinking does not start from a blank slate but instead from a 
given set of more or less coherent concepts or ideas constructed on certain 
postulates. It is the attempt to move from what is already known towards a more 
coherent knowledge. What characterises the various modes of experience or (as 
they are called in subsequent Oakeshott’s works) universes of discourse, or orders 
of inquiry, is that even though they are activities that try to achieve a higher degree 
of coherence, they never criticise the assumptions on which they are based. It is for 
this reason that they are always conditional, they are abstractions of the concrete 
whole. 
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On the contrary, philosophical activity is defined as the ‘unremitting pursuit of 
concrete individuality’,2 of a concept which is not related to anything external. This 
notion is summarised in Experience and Its Modes as follows: 
Philosophy, for me and for others, means experience without reservation or 
presupposition, experience which is self-conscious and self-critical throughout, in 
which the determination to remain unsatisfied with anything short of a completely 
coherent world of ideas is absolute and unqualified.3 
It is indeed clear who shared this notion. For example, F.H. Bradley conceives 
philosophy as ‘the attempt to know reality...not simply as piecemeal or by 
fragments, but somewhat as a whole’.4 Similarly, Bernard Bosanquet defines 
philosophy as ‘the studying of the whole, as it is, and for its own sake, without 
reservation or presupposition’.5 He also suggests that it explains the significance of 
what is already known.6 That this notion of philosophy as self-critical activity is 
relevant to Oakeshott’s later writings is clear in On Human Conduct, where we read 
that it is 
A special engagement where postulates are identities waiting to be understood and 
not instruments of understanding, and in which questions are asked not in order to 
be answered but so that they may themselves be interrogated in respect of their 
                                                 
2
 Oakeshott 1933: 45. 
3
 Oakeshott 1933: 82. 
4
 Bradley 1946: 1. 
5
 Bosanquet 1923: 2. 
6
 Bosanquet 1903: 166. 
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conditions ... Here, theorizing has revealed itself as an unconditional adventure in 
which every achievement of understanding is an invitation to investigate itself.7 
In Experience and Its Modes, the method through which rethinking and re-
understanding take place is that of ‘refutation’, which is the exhibition of  
The principle of the fallacy or error in virtue of which a form of experience falls 
short of complete coherence; it is to discover both the half-truth in the error, and 
the error in the half-truth’.8  
In other words,  consistent with earlier British idealists,9 for Oakeshott philosophy 
is the criticism of categories, leading to the discovery of the conditions of their 
existence that are, at the same time, the principles of their fallacy.10 Philosophy has 
the aim of identifying the postulates or presuppositions at the ground of each world 
of ideas and of each mode of experience or understanding. 
At the same time, however, philosophy aims to identify the universal, or concrete, 
value of the concepts of the various modes, that is to say, in relation to a context as 
universal as possible. In this last regard, Luke O’Sullivan has recently contended 
that Oakeshott ‘gradually gave up the notion that philosophy understood 
phenomena in relation to the logical whole of the universe and that philosophical 
judgment could give a final and real meaning to things by the discovery of their 
                                                 
7
 Oakeshott 1975: 10-11. 
8
 Oakeshott 1933: 4. 
9
 See for example: Pringle-Pattison Seth 1883; Caird 2004. I have discussed the relations 
between Oakeshott and the British idealist notion of philosophy in Orsi 2012. 
10
 Oakeshott 1933: 86-87; 1991: 151-83, 491; 1975: 9; 1999: 3-6. 
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final and real content and value’.11 In this light, in On Human Conduct philosophy 
may be considered as unconditional simply because it is a ceaseless process of 
questioning and not because of any unconditional understanding to be achieved.  
However, this interpretation is not coherent with what we read in Experience and 
Its Modes, where philosophy does not reach final and ultimate knowledge, but is 
rather defined by the nature of its engagement. There we may read that: 
It is not in virtue of its actual achievement that an experience may be called 
philosophical; rather, philosophy should be regarded as the determination to be 
satisfied only with a completely coherent world of experience. For it is not merely 
its actual achievement which differentiates philosophical from abstract experience, 
it is its explicit purpose.12 
In Experience and Its Modes, considered the text in which Oakeshott would have 
defended the idea that philosophy is the achievement of absolute knowledge,13 what 
differentiates philosophy from abstract experiences is only its being ‘critical 
throughout’.14 It is the ‘the attempt to realize the character of experience 
absolutely’.15 In short, there is no textual evidence in Experience and Its Modes that 
the Absolute (i.e. an absolutely coherent and satisfactory world of ideas) is, or will 
ever be, reached. 
                                                 
11
 L. O’Sullivan 2010: 30.   
12
 Oakeshott 1933: 347. 
13
 Franco 2004: 142.  
14
 Oakeshott 1933: 347. 
15
 Oakeshott 1933: 347. Italics mine. 
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That philosophy does not aim to an absolute objectivity is also demonstrated in a 
passage from a 1938 essay, entitled ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’. 
There, Oakeshott identifies his philosophical point of reference and writes: 
The Socratic method is an example, though an imperfect example, of the process I 
have been trying to describe; so also is the method of enquiry pursued by Kant and 
Hegel; so also, though more obscurely, is the method characteristic of Scholastic 
philosophy.16  
These thinkers appear very often to indicate the salient moments of idealist histories 
of philosophy. Indeed, Plato is frequently considered as the first idealist; Medieval 
Aristotelians are regarded as the prosecutor of ancient dialectic; Kant and Hegel are 
usually seen as the fathers of modern idealism, as stated also by Henry Jones in 
‘Idealism and Epistemology’.17 R.G. Collingwood in his An Essay on Philosophical 
Method (1933) sees Socrates as at the one who stated for ‘the first time that 
knowledge is within the mind and brought to birth by a process of questioning’. He 
is considered the one that inaugurated that ‘important group of methodological 
conceptions’ that owes its origin to a ‘technique in philosophical discussion’, which 
is the ‘dialectic’.18  
                                                 
16
 Oakeshott 2007: 172. See also: Oakeshott 1933: 37. A comparison between Oakeshott’s 
and Socrates’s method is presented in Greenleaf 1966: 14-15. 
17
 H. Jones 2004. 
18
 Collingwood 2005: 10. It is interesting to observe that in his 1938 review of 
Collingwood’s Principles of Art (the same year in which the ‘The Concept of Philosophical 
Jurisprudence’ was published) Oakeshott described the method there used as ‘Socratic’. 
According to Oakeshott, Collingwood raises a large sort of ‘philosophical questions to be 
investigated’, showing the inconsistencies of current beliefs. However, their ‘destruction is 
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In the above text, Oakeshott seems to adhere to those idealist interpretations, such 
as Caird’s, 19 that found the limits of Plato and Aristotle in the assumption of an 
external and independent object as a criterion of truth. Though eternal and beyond 
becoming, the Absolute constitutes an object independent from spiritual activity. 
For them, Ancient dialectic was therefore a process of increasing correspondence 
between mind and Absolute reality, considered distinct and separate. In this 
understanding the role of Kant and Hegel was to overcome these hindrances, 
starting to recognize that thought presupposes nothing outside itself and that its 
criteria are within mind. This understanding of the dialectic asserts the ultimate 
character of philosophy but also the absence of a final body of knowledge as an 
external criterion. This view is shared by Collingwood in The New Leviathan, 
where he follows Plato’s Meno20 in considering dialectic to be conversational and 
not eristic, which is to say, to be not oriented towards the achievement of a final 
body of ultimate truths.  
In a similar manner, also in On Human Conduct, in philosophy ‘what is important 
is the critical inquiry into the conditions of conditions’.21 The denial that philosophy 
can be associated with a final and fully coherent world of ideas is clearly stated in 
                                                 
followed by construction’ and Collingwood produces a new theory regarding the nature of 
Art (Oakeshott 2007: 185; See: Connelly 2003: 16). Oakeshott’s high opinion of the 
Principles of Art is shown also in a letter that he addressed to Collingwood in May 1938 in 
which he praised the book as a ‘miracle’ (See: Oakeshott 1938). The letter is in Theresa 
Smith’s private collection. I thank David Boucher for providing me with a copy.  
19
 Caird 1865: 351-84; Mander 2011: 73-87. 
20See, Collingwood 1992: XXIV. 57. Oakeshott refers to this passage in one of his 
notebooks see, Oakeshott 2014: 309. 
21
 Oakeshott 1975: 29. 
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the rewriting of Plato’s ‘cave allegory’.22 There, the possibility of an effective 
achievement of an unconditional knowledge is considered irrelevant to 
philosophical activity: 
I shall pass over the difficulties entailed in the notion of an unconditional 
understanding, which are, perhaps recognized in the visionary quality attributed to 
this final achievement; what is important is the critical inquiry into the conditions 
of conditions in which it is reached.23 
Again, what does count is philosophical activity in itself, both as the creator of the 
criterion of thought and as the continuous overcoming of partiality through the 
unremitting research into an ultimate meaning of concepts. This critical role of 
philosophy is once more defended in On History and Other Essays. There, the 
philosopher’s concern is the ‘logical’ examination of current concepts and forms of 
understanding, and not the construction of a final body of knowledge.24 
To sum up, in contrast to what is defended by Luke O’Sullivan, what I argue is that 
Oakeshott consistently contends that philosophy is an unremitting process of 
criticism of current knowledge and, at the same time, the progressive and always 
uncompleted attempt to reach a fully satisfactory, because universal, definition of 
concepts. Neither in Experience and Its Modes nor in On Human Conduct did 
Oakeshott believe that a final body of absolute and ultimately defined concepts was 
achievable. Instead, philosophy is the continuous critical assessment of concepts in 
the light of absolute or unconditional experience, which is, as I have just shown, the 
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 Oakeshott 1975: 27-31. 
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 Oakeshott 1975: 29. 
24
 Oakeshott 1999: 3-6. 
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ultimate presupposition of any form of experience or understanding, and not a final 
body of concepts. 
However, to say that the Absolute cannot be reached is not affirming that 
philosophical concepts do not possess a higher degree of universality. On the 
contrary, philosophy is the activity that attempts to define concepts that are valid 
outside of the relations from which they originated. It enlarges the context in which 
concepts are valid. As already discussed, in Experience and Its Modes philosophy 
is the unremitting pursuit of concrete individuality; it is the never fulfilled attempt 
to achieve a fully satisfactory definition of concepts.25 
In On Human Conduct, it is the notion of ideal character that, rather than refuting 
this interpretation, provides an example of this method. Ideal characters are indeed 
the result of the theoretical activity. They are defined as ‘composition of 
characteristics’, a coherent unity of particularities. Ideal characters offer a broader 
universality than the original starting point of thinking.  
For instance, in the first essay of that work the expression ‘human conduct’ denotes 
an ‘ideal character’. ‘Human conduct’ is not a particular or individual action, nor 
their mere generalization, nor an instrument for identifying ‘a family of goings-
on’.26 When individual performances are considered on the ground of their 
postulates, in terms as universal as possible, what emerges is the identity, the ideal 
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 Oakeshott 1933: 58. 
26
 Oakeshott 1975: 31. On the similarity between Oakeshott’s ‘ideal characters’ and Max 
Weber’s ‘ideal types’ see: Turner 2014. 
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character: ‘human conduct’.  As such, it is a universal concept because it relates to 
a wider context than the particulars. 
I will explore in chapters 5 and 6 the implications and the relevance of this notion 
for Oakeshott’s political philosophy of international relations, but a further example 
is provided by the two ideal characters that are examined in the second essay of On 
Human Conduct: civil association and enterprise association. They are not 
particular models of political community that it is possible to find in certain 
circumstances or that may be achieved in the world. Instead they represent the 
universalisation of two opposite modalities of human relationship, when ‘the 
existence of intelligent and free agency’ is taken as a presupposition. 
In short, rather than being the text in which the notion of philosophy as the search 
for universality is abandoned, On Human Conduct is rather the one in which it finds 
a new interpretation. Even though limited to a particular subject matter (i.e. human 
action), in that work philosophy attempts (as I will further discuss in chapter 3) to 
identify concepts as universal and satisfactory as possible.  
To sum up, for Oakeshott philosophy is animated by a method that has the aim of 
defining concepts by refuting the inconsistencies and dogmatism of current ideas. 
Having as its starting point abstract individuality, and by means of progressive 
refutations, philosophy defines a more and more complete individuality, endowed 
with a higher degree of unity with its related ideas and its context. However, 
philosophy cannot be identified with this final unity – an Absolute which is never 
reached – but rather with the radical critical activity of thinking without 
presuppositions. 
 47 
 
The Conversation of Mankind 
In the previous section, I have illustrated that Oakeshott follows other idealists in 
claiming that philosophy discovers the postulates of each world of ideas. In so 
doing, it shows their conditionality. However, for British idealists ‘philosophical 
criticism’ is not only the clarification of the categories or conditions on which 
different forms of experience are grounded, but also the process through which their 
‘dialectical connections’ are identified and constructed. For Andrew Seth Pringle-
Pattison, for example, the survey of the categories of thought and of their dialectical 
connections leads to a ‘complete notion of experience’.27  
Philosophy cannot be satisfied with the mere critique of partial truths, but has to 
overcome their partiality by considering them in the light of the substantial unity of 
human reason.28 This constructive side of philosophical criticism is defended by E. 
Caird’s Hegelianism.29 Caird sees philosophy not only as the process through which 
presuppositions of thought are shown, but also as the development of an ‘absolute 
and objective synthesis’. In other words, philosophy reflects the unity among all 
different spiritual forms. It organises them according to their own logical categories.  
Similarly, one of the latest exponents of the British idealist movement, R.G. 
Collingwood, conceived his work as a reaction to what was perceived as a crisis of 
European culture; a crisis involving the system of knowledge and, at the same time, 
                                                 
27
 Pringle-Pattison Seth 1883: 21, 40. 
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 Pringle-Pattison Seth 1883: 42. 
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 Caird 2004: 26-44 
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the whole civilization.30 In Speculum Mentis (1924), this malaise is identified with 
the dissolution of the unity of knowledge, and of its self-consciousness, caused by 
Naturalism and Positivism.31 According to this account, the process started during 
the Renaissance, when each knowledge ‘tended more and more to lead its followers 
into some desert where the world of human life was lost and the very motive for 
going on disappeared’.32 Philosophy, for Collingwood, has to reconstruct a 
philosophical encyclopaedia in which all forms of knowledge are hierarchically 
classified according to their degree of adequacy in regard of absolute knowledge. 
As already discussed in chapter 1, Oakeshott opposes the post-Hegelian theory, 
according to which the various spiritual forms are in a dialectical relationship in 
which they overcome one another, with one in which the modes are autonomous 
from one another because based on irreducible postulates. 
Far from being the point at which Oakeshott abandoned his idealism, as argued by 
Gerencser,33 the essay ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ 
represents instead the text in which the conception about the relations of the various 
modes is synthesized through the image of ‘conversation’.34  
With regard to previous British Idealist positions – such as those of Caird and 
Collingwood – conversation seems, in the first place, to indicate a more faded 
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 Collingwood 1998: 343. A comparison between Oakeshott and Collingwood on this 
point is in Podoksik 2003: 9-34. 
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 Collingwood 1924: 15-38. 
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 Collingwood 1924: 34. 
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 Gerencser 2000. 
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 Oakeshott 1991: 489. 
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judgment on modernity, expressing a different role for philosophy. The use of the 
word ‘conversation’ itself, as revealed by the cursory reference to Montaigne,35 is 
taken from the humanist model. In so doing, Oakeshott underlines that the plurality 
of perspectives on human experience can be considered an enriching aspect of the 
self-understanding of mankind as a whole.36  
Therefore, the prime objective of Oakeshott’s critique is not the fragmentation of 
knowledge, but those hierarchical conceptions of the relation between disciplines 
such as those attributing the supremacy to philosophy, or, conversely, attempting 
to reduce culture to nature, history or philosophy to science.37 Oakeshott delineates 
a model of the unity of culture in which all different voices contribute according to 
the limited boundaries guaranteed by their postulates, without overwhelming other 
partial perspectives of the whole. There is not a privileged mode of thinking or a 
single unified method that may lead to truth. Instead, the idea of conversation 
suggests that all the various forms of knowledge are equally legitimate and that they 
all contribute to the conversation of mankind.  
What is important to underline, however, is that in contrast with previous idealist 
models, philosophy does not construct a positive synthesis between different modes 
of experience. Instead, by identifying their presuppositions or postulates, it 
delineates not just the conditions of logical possibility of the modes, but also the 
limit of their validity. What the interpretations that see in the image of conversation 
a turnaround in Oakeshott’s thought seem to miss is that, as in Experience and Its 
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Modes, the aim of philosophy was to avoid the confusion between different and 
autonomous modes (ignoratio elenchi) – insofar as postulates and conclusions of 
one form are irrelevant to the other – so in ‘The Voice of Poetry’ philosophy limits 
the dogmatic pretensions (superbia) of the various universes of discourse.38  
More relevant to the argument of this thesis, it is in the light of the idea of 
conversation that Oakeshott’s critique to Rationalism in politics – which was 
developed in a series of articles published in the ‘Cambridge Journal’ in the late 
1940s and then collected in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays in 1962 in 
may be understood39 – may be best understood. Indeed, the model of conversation 
criticises all theories of knowledge that assert the predominance of one form of 
knowledge over the other. For example, it is against the idea that practical reasoning 
should aim at certainty, by means of the method of scientific inquiry. According to 
Oakeshott’s notion of modality, this is a fallacy: a case of ignoratio elenchi. Indeed, 
conclusions that are reached from certain assumptions (in this case those of 
scientific inquiry) are not relevant in a world of ideas constructed on different 
assumptions. As I will further discuss in the next chapter, practical reasoning and 
political activity at both the domestic and the international level have their own 
autonomous criteria, and concepts from other modes are therefore irrelevant. 
A Sceptical Notion of Philosophy 
This reinterpretation of the idealist conception of philosophy cannot be associated 
with a dogmatic attitude. Instead, with reference to his conception of philosophical 
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method, and the notion of conversation, Oakeshott does not hesitate to call himself 
a ‘sceptic’.40 Unless we consider this self-description as a statement of intellectual 
humility and detachment, it must indicate a certain philosophical position 
coexisting with his broader epistemological and metaphysical commitments.41  
The just examined model of conversation suggests that Oakeshott reinterpreted 
some of the arguments taken from the sceptical tradition. In particular, he takes 
from the humanistic and sceptical model of conversation as described by Montaigne 
the notion that knowledge is not eristic, it is not teleologically oriented toward a 
final absolute truth. In ‘The Voice of Poetry’ we read that in conversation there is 
‘no proposition to be proved and no conclusion sought’.42 The different voices of 
the ‘conversation of mankind’ are the different ‘modes’ or ‘forms’ of experience or 
imaginings. They are neither hierarchically nor teleologically organized.43 
Secondly, as was the case in the sceptical ideal, each of these modes poses truths 
that have no absolute claim; their certainties are mere opinions and ‘are shown to 
be combustible… by being brought in contact with the presence of ideas of another 
order’.44 Thirdly, as already discussed, in Oakeshott’s logic there are no voices with 
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superior value, and philosophy is merely a ‘parasitic’ second-order discourse and 
not the dialectical supersession or a final body of knowledge that asserts an ultimate 
Truth.45 Philosophy itself is therefore a conversational voice. As is significantly 
claimed in Experience and Its Modes, philosophy does not consist in ‘persuading 
others’, but in making ‘our mind clear’.46  
That it is from the sceptical tradition that Oakeshott takes these arguments is shown 
not just by the cursory reference to Montaigne in ‘The Voice of Poetry’, or by the 
approving way in which he refers to the French essayist elsewhere in his works,47 
but also by the many references to the Essays in Oakeshott’s notebooks and 
typescripts.48   
In addition to the influence of Montaigne, it is of course that of Hobbes that 
characterizes Oakeshott’s definition of philosophy. Indeed, in contrast to those who 
associate Hobbes with modern rationalism, Oakeshott reads his philosophy as an 
expression of the modern sceptic movement, also influenced by Scholastic 
nominalism.49 In particular, Oakeshott considers Hobbes’s notion of philosophy as 
a ‘movement’ and as a ‘conversation with himself’.50 Even though Hobbes’s 
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philosophy is, for Oakeshott, animated by a ferocious scepticism in which ‘the 
prime mover was doubt’,51 he nevertheless interprets it as systematic.52 The core of 
this system is, however, a notion of philosophy as conditional knowledge.53 It is 
difficult not to read in these descriptions of the Leviathan a summary of the 
Oakeshottian understanding of philosophical thinking, in which, as I have argued, 
criticism is accompanied by the ever-failing search for ultimate coherence. 
Having established that Oakeshott knew and referred to the arguments of the 
sceptical tradition as represented by Montaigne and Hobbes, it is now time to 
consider, contra Gerencser’s interpretation,54 the broad consistency between this 
scepticism and Oakeshott’s Absolute idealism. In so doing, it will appear that the 
methodological holism at the foundation of Oakeshott’s epistemology does not 
imply the notion that philosophy reach a final and absolute truth that ‘overcomes’ 
those of the various modes. Therefore, as it will appear below in the thesis, political 
activity maintains its own autonomous criteria, which are independent from the 
universals defined through philosophical criticism. 
As I have argued in chapter 1, Oakeshott reinterprets F.H. Bradley’s positions with 
particular regard to the role of the Absolute as a regulative ideal and not as a final 
body of ultimate concepts. Indeed, Bradley confines thought to uncertainty and 
defectiveness by doubting all preconceptions, and by refuting our relational and 
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immediate experience.55 Positive metaphysical knowledge is not possible: thought 
is always relational, abstract, it cannot be experience of the unconditional.56 While 
remaining within an idealist framework (which assumes the transcendental unity 
between subject and object and the spiritual nature of experience), F.H. Bradley 
may be considered as a sceptic, who claims that ultimate reality or the Absolute is 
beyond our reach. These two different positions, which are apparently 
irreconcilable, coexist in Bradley. On the one hand, as other idealists, he constructs 
a system in which all forms of thought are criticized as insufficient and partial from 
the standpoint of the Absolute. On the other hand, departing in this from the 
Hegelian tradition, he does not think that this Absolute could be reached through 
reason, which is an inadequate instrument for knowing the ultimate reality. The 
ultimate reality is beyond reach of discursive, relational, thinking. The Absolute is 
neither specified directly, nor described, and reasoning is a means for its ‘negative’ 
definition only.57 If the ultimate coherence of this reconciliation between sceptical 
epistemology and constructive metaphysics may be contested, what does matter is 
the extent to which Oakeshott reinterpreted this synthesis. 
For my argument, it suffices to point out that in Oakeshott’s texts it is indeed 
possible to find a similar understanding. As for F.H. Bradley, for Oakeshott all 
forms of thinking are defective and the result of philosophical activity is always 
provisional. Like Bradley, Oakeshott considers philosophical reflections as the 
instrument to show the partial value of all forms of knowledge, by assessing the 
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ability of each mode to offer us an ultimately satisfactory view of reality. At the 
same time, he is even more radical than Bradley in denying that ultimate reality 
may ever be reached. While Bradley admitted the possibility of a direct, non-
cognitive grasp of the ultimate reality, Oakeshott is clear in his denial of anything 
external to or different from judgment or thinking. Again, this is true not just in 
Experience and Its Modes, where a few pages are devoted to the criticism of this 
position,58 but also in On Human Conduct, which begins significantly with the 
assertion that ‘understanding is not such that we either enjoy it or lack it 
altogether.’59 Thus, while remaining within an idealist framework, Oakeshott 
considers that thinking, and philosophy in particular, cannot reach a final stage in 
which understanding is definitive. In contrast to Gerencser’s interpretation, (as I 
have illustrated above) neither in his early nor his later works does Oakeshott ever 
defend the possibility of having a full and definitive grasp of reality. 
A second element that demonstrates the synthesis between idealism and scepticism 
in Oakeshott’s thought is shown by his theory of modality. I have highlighted in 
chapter 1 that the modes are autonomous from each other and abstract in respect of 
the whole, as their criterion of truth is the coherence with mutually 
incommensurable postulates or presuppositions. In contrast to the hierarchical neo-
Hegelian model, for Oakeshott there is not a logical succession between different 
types of mode. History, science, practice and poetry are partial views of reality; at 
the same time, what is true in one of these modes is irrelevant to the others. On the 
other hand, throughout this chapter I have presented Oakeshott’s philosophical 
                                                 
58
 Oakeshott 1933: 21-25. 
59
 Oakeshott 1975: 1. 
 56 
 
critical method. Philosophy is a critical activity that attempts to show the 
presuppositions of concepts as well as their universal meaning.  
What characterises Oakeshott’s position is that philosophical concepts, because of 
their higher degree of universality, are irrelevant to the various modes, which 
maintain their autonomy in regard to philosophical activity. In other words, there is 
a necessary conflict between philosophical results and abstract concepts. Although 
the achieved world of ideas has a higher degree of coherence, it cannot be 
considered a substitute for previous concepts, which maintain the limited validity 
guaranteed by their postulates. In other words, philosophy does not construct a body 
of rectified concepts and, in respect of the various modes, its role is merely negative.  
As I will further discuss in the next chapter, the irrelevance of philosophy for the 
various modes, and the practical in particular, represents a radical innovation with 
particular regard to the British Idealist tradition. Many of its exponents – with the 
notable exceptions of McTaggart and F.H. Bradley60 – were indeed deeply 
committed to social problems and reforms. From a theoretical point of view, Caird, 
for instance, considers philosophy as a response to the needs of the ‘present time’: 
the separation between secular and religious self-consciousness and the consequent 
alienation of mankind from its spiritual and rational nature.61 Similarly, in R.G. 
Collingwood ‘all thought is for the sake of actions’:62 philosophical activity arises 
from circumstantial needs and ends, producing changes in our self-understanding 
and conduct. Very differently, for Oakeshott philosophical criticism has no 
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relevance to the various modes and, in particular, ‘the practical’. Overall, in 
philosophy we do not have a passage from doubts – determined by the partiality of 
categories – to a certainty granted by a presuppositionless knowledge. In short, in 
addition to the impossibility to reach a definitive understanding, a second element 
that shows that Oakeshott defended a sceptical conception of philosophy, while 
remaining within an idealist framework, is suggested by his claim of the irrelevance 
of philosophy to other activities. 
Conclusion 
At the beginning of chapter 1, I illustrated that current neo-English School thinkers 
or constitutive theorists that have employed Oakeshott’s categories for the 
understanding of international relations have substantially ignored the 
philosophical reflection that unites all his works. Even though the legal theory and 
the notion of practice presented in On Human Conduct and in other works, such as 
the essay ‘The Rule of Law’, have had a considerable relevance for the ‘normative’ 
and ‘practical’ turns in International Relations, little attention has been devoted to 
analysis of the relevance of the epistemological, ontological and philosophical 
theory that grounds these ideas.  
The analysis that I have conducted over the last two chapters has revealed that, in 
contrast with the prevalent anti-metaphysical concerns of the large part of post-
World War II reflection on politics and international relations, Oakeshott presents 
an articulated epistemological and metaphilosophical theory. While in chapter 1 I 
have shown that Oakeshott remained consistent with an Absolute idealist 
epistemology and ontology, this chapter has focused instead on the nature and role 
of philosophy.  
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What has emerged is that Oakeshott reinterprets the idealist notion of philosophy 
as critical activity. Firstly, he considered philosophy as the activity of refutation and 
criticism of current concepts. This is the discovery of the conditions of their 
existence and fallacy: their postulates or unavoidable assumptions. Secondly, 
philosophy aims to reach a higher unity or concrete individuality. Thirdly, 
Oakeshott interprets the idealist conception of the synthesis between different forms 
of knowledge through the image of conversation, which is grounded on the 
conception of modality defended since Experience and Its Modes.  
In addition, in contrast to those interpreters who have either argued that Oakeshott 
was too sceptical to be an idealist or too much of an idealist to be regarded as a 
sceptic, the chapter has also shown that Oakeshott’s reinterpretation of the idealist 
arguments coexisted with a sceptical notion of philosophy. In particular, I have 
argued that philosophy is not eristic: it does not aim to persuade, for its role is 
merely critical. As I will further discuss in the next chapter, even though it shows 
the abstractness of the various world of ideas, they maintain their validity.  
Moreover, philosophy is always conditional as a final and ultimate truth cannot be 
reached. All result of the activity of theorizing are therefore provisional and 
abstract. 
In contrast with the claims of many other idealists, Oakeshott believes that 
philosophy cannot be considered as the final end of experience, but it has rather the 
negative and limited role of maintaining each mode within its own limit. In so 
doing, he proposes a model that defends each form of knowledge, and philosophy 
itself, from any reductionism. In this regard, the irrelevance for politics of any 
scientific or historical theory as well as any philosophical conceptions – which 
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constitutes the kernel of the critique to Rationalism that animates some of his most 
famous essays written during the 40s and the 50s – is indeed consistent with this 
idea of the relation between disciplines represented through the image of 
conversation. Moreover, as I will further discuss in the next chapter, he defends 
philosophy, history and poetry against the risk of reduction to scientific knowledge 
represented especially by neo-Positivism. Apart from their common logical ground 
(that is to say, their being abstractions of the totality) different disciplines do not 
have a shared epistemological foundation, be it methodological or ontological. 
Overall, even though this sceptical idealist notion of philosophy may be in conflict 
with the prevailing practical concerns of a large part of current theory of 
international relations and may be associated with a too speculative approach 
towards the world, it has profound methodological implications for the theory of 
international relations.  
As I have illustrated in chapter 1, Oakeshott’s contribution to constructivism is a 
methodological holism defended through Absolute idealist arguments in which 
individual concepts are meaningful only in relation to a given context. In this 
chapter, I have shown that the purpose of philosophy is to relate these concepts to 
a context as universal as possible through a critical method. It also identifies the 
conditions of the possibility of different, autonomous, and equally legitimate 
perspectives on human experience. Moreover, philosophy defines the autonomy of 
political criteria from any other considerations (as suggested by the notion of 
modality and the image of conversation), it shows their limited value and partiality. 
In sum, over the last two chapters, I have discussed Oakeshott’s epistemological 
and (meta)philosophical theory. This discussion represents the necessary 
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background for the analysis of Oakeshott’s understanding of the nature of political 
activity and for his broad contribution to the post-positivist debate in International 
Relations.  
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CHAPTER 3 
NORMATIVITY, PRACTICES, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY  
Introduction 
Over the last two chapters I have discussed the epistemological and 
metaphilosophical foundations of his Oakeshott’s work as a necessary prelude to 
identifying his international theory and to develop the implications of his 
philosophy for understanding the idea of an international society. I have identified 
a substantial continuity in his interpretation of idealist principles; of the notion of 
modality, as well as in a sceptical idealist idea of philosophy as a critical activity. 
With this discussion as a background, to identify Oakeshott’s conception of 
political activity (and, by implication, of world politics) and his contribution to 
constructivism in International Relations, I want in this chapter to look at his theory 
of normative thought and practical reasoning.  
As in previous chapters, I have considered Oakeshott’s thought in the context of the 
history of British idealism, in this I will look at the philosophical debates in which 
he was developing his ideas. Firstly, this chapter outlines how analytic philosophy 
and positivism – with particular reference to A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic 
(1936) – undermined the conditions of the possibility of political philosophy as a 
normative enterprise. Secondly, it presents Oakeshott’s discussion of practical 
experience and human conduct. It will emerge that he defends the legitimacy and 
the rationality of normative thinking. In so doing, it will highlight the Oakeshottian 
conception of normative reasoning and moral practice. It is on the ground of this 
discussion of the normative nature of human conduct and of the role of political 
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philosophy that, in the next chapters, I will consider the Oakeshottian contribution 
to the understanding of international relations. 
The Analytic Critique of Normative Thought 
Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic (1936) represents a landmark in the English 
language twentieth century debates on the nature and aim of philosophy, and it had 
incredibly broad implications for the development of ethics, political philosophy, 
and political science. In this book, Ayer extends the Analytic critique of 
metaphysics already advanced by the exponents of the Vienna Circle to ethical and 
normative statements. As metaphysical propositions are nonsensical because they 
are neither true by definition (as analytic statements), nor subject to verification (as 
synthetic statements), ethical statements and value judgments are utterances 
without meaning; nothing more that the expression of moral approval and 
disapproval.1   
Moral exhortations, for instance, are not propositions but ‘ejaculations or 
commands which are designed to provoke the reader to action of a certain sort’.2 
Ethical judgments are ‘emotions’, they are expression of feelings about certain 
objects.3 There can be no logical argument about these sorts of statements, but 
rather mere agreement or disagreement.4 Consequently, Ayer says that ethical 
conflicts are without rational and final solution.5 Ethical philosophy should make 
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neither ‘exhortation of moral virtue’, nor ‘description of moral phenomena’, nor 
‘ethical judgments’. It should instead limit itself to the analysis of ethical terms, by 
showing the categories to which they belong.6 
If Ayer and the other early analytics produced little in political philosophy,7 the 
implications of their positions were further explored by T.D. Weldon in his The 
Vocabulary of Politics8 and, even more sharply, in the contribution to the first 
volume of Philosophy, Politics and Society, which was entitled ‘Political 
Principles’. Subscribing to Ayer’s theory of truth (according to which truth and 
falsehood are categories relevant only to verifiable statements), Weldon claims the 
impossibility of normative political theory and affirmed that ‘questions put by 
traditional political philosophy are wrongly posed’.9 Indeed, he contends that 
normative questions as well as political principles are nothing more than prejudice 
and emotions.10 Political principles are grounded on ‘practical reason’ and are a 
matter of decision.11  
Therefore, what Weldon considers as the traditional problems of political 
philosophy – which is to say, normative pronouncements regarding the State, 
political obligation, and so on – are, in fact, the results of political conflicts and of 
empirical decisions. For Weldon, philosophy has no first-order contribution and its 
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problems are concerned with the ‘language in which facts are described and 
explained’.12 Its aim is to ‘expose and elucidate linguistic muddles’ and to examine 
the meaning and logical force of concepts.13  
The first series of Philosophy, Politics and Society contained another fundamental 
contribution that draws consequences from Ayer’s distinction between analytic, 
synthetic and value statements: M. Macdonald’s essay ‘Natural Rights’.14 
Originally written in 1947, this piece summarizes the political implications of the 
analytic position.15 Once again, judgments about good and evil, right and wrong 
have a ‘fundamentally emotive character’.16 The performative character of value 
judgments – already intimated by Ayer and later fully theorized by J. L. Austin17 –  
is particularly underlined by Macdonald, who states that value assertions are 
‘records of decisions’ and that, for instance, ‘to state that “all men are of equal 
worth” is not to state a fact but to choose a side’.18 
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From the assertion that the only legitimate form of knowledge is the one composed 
of verifiable empirical statements, it follows that sciences informed by the empirical 
method are considered as the only fully legitimate approach towards politics. The 
possibility of a naturalistic study of human actions was already intimated in Ayer’s 
theory, which attributed to psychology the role of describing ethical phenomena 
and to social sciences that of studying moral habits.19 The success of behaviourism 
in the social sciences and of its attempt to consider agents’ motives, social 
interactions and legal orders according to the causal categories taken from natural 
sciences, represented the other side of the logical positivist challenge to classical 
normative philosophy.20  
To sum up, Logical Positivism reduced normativity to non-rationality and classical 
political philosophy, and its theories about the just political order, to normative 
utterances. As a consequence, the study of politics has to be transformed in a more 
rational enterprise. In particular, philosophy should avoid normative engagement 
and should either be limited to ‘second-order’ considerations about the logical 
status of ethical and political utterances or provide the theoretical framework in 
which the science of politics can apply its causal categories. 
Whether these radical critiques caused the ‘death of political philosophy’ as 
famously declared by Laslett,21 or may be considered the symptom of the 
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‘putrefaction’ as seen by Strauss,22 is controversial.23 What is certain is that in the 
second series of Philosophy, Politics and Society in 1962 things were already 
different, even within what may be broadly considered as analytic philosophy. In 
his ‘Does Political Theory Still Exist?’, Isaiah Berlin criticized the verification 
principle as the only criterion of meaningfulness for statements. Indeed, there are 
some concepts such as ‘rights’ and ‘justice’ that are meaningful, albeit not clearly 
defined and not empirically testable. Philosophy is particularly relevant for these 
sorts of (normative) concepts. The role of political theory is that of analysing these 
fundamental concepts, improving human self-understanding.24 Be that as it may, 
Oakeshott addressed the issues advanced by the analytic and positivist critiques of 
normative thought and of classical political philosophy.  
Although, as argued by Podoksik,25 in his account of the scientific mode of 
experience, Oakeshott was influenced by continental scientific positivism, it is clear 
that in Experience and Its Modes, published in Cambridge in 1933, he does not 
consider directly the work of logical positivists. Instead, as I will show, he presented 
an account of the nature of normative thinking that is radically opposed to theirs. 
Consistent with his notion of modality – according to which each form of 
                                                 
22
 Strauss 1959: 17. 
23
  This account is contested by Vincent (2004: 91-95) who see a persistence of classical 
political philosophy also after the Analytic attack. On the other hand, Wolff still sees only 
in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice a resurrection of political philosophy (2013: 816). 
24
 Berlin 1962. Neill 2013: 71-73. It is also worth noting that, in the same volume, Rawls 
(1962) presented one of the first accounts of his definition of justice as fairness. Oakeshott 
praises this contribution as ‘the most brilliant essay in the book’, Oakeshott 2008: 191. 
25
 Podoksik 2004. 
 67 
 
experience is grounded on more or less well defined logical presuppositions – 
practical experience is experience sub specie voluntatis, the whole of experience 
from the point of view of volition. The unavoidable normativity of our practical 
reasoning lies in its value-oriented nature. Practical experience is defined by 
Oakeshott as the transformation of ‘what is’ according to a normative ideal, which 
is ‘not yet’ and ‘ought to be’.26  
Oakeshott makes clear that this form of thinking is as rational as any other mode 
(e.g. history, science, and poetry) and, at the same time, radically different and 
abstract with regard to philosophy. At the outset of the chapter on practical 
experience in Experience and Its Modes, Oakeshott affirms the identity between 
rationality and will. Consistent with the idealist principle according to which 
nothing is irrational and everything is identifiable with the activity of mind, ‘action’ 
is ‘a form of thought’.27 Volition itself, the category that grounds practical 
experience, is thought and, as a consequence, ‘practice is itself a form of experience, 
a world of ideas’.28 As other forms, the practical is also a unity of related and 
coherent ideas. At the same time, however, full coherence and complete consistency 
is never achieved because ‘the presupposition of practical experience is that “what 
is here and now” and “what ought to be” are discrepant’.29 In this lies the ultimate 
abstract character of practical experience: a complete coherence between actual 
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experience and what has not yet come about is impossible. Achieving this unity 
would be to overcome practical experience.  
It is important to point out that the normative nature of practical thinking is 
reiterated in On Human Conduct. As is also indicated by its title, this may be 
considered as one of the main purposes of that work, albeit often obscured by the 
more celebrated and influential theory of the history of the modern European state 
and the model of civil association. On Human Conduct may indeed be interpreted 
as an attempt to claim and defend a specific normative understanding of human 
actions and political life. ‘Value-judgments’ and the ‘creation of norms’, we read 
in that work, are not feelings or ‘organic tensions’, but rather ‘expression of 
intelligence capable of being investigated’.30 
More specifically, the first essay of On Human Conduct defends the autonomy of 
an understanding of human actions in terms of their normative character as opposed 
to those through causal categories of natural sciences.31 The ground of this is the 
already recalled distinction between two incommensurable ‘orders of inquiry’: the 
first conceives ‘goings-on’ as causal processes. In this case, actions are observable 
processes and ‘are not themselves exhibitions of understanding’.32 The second sees 
‘goings-on’ as the result of ‘an intelligent agent responding to an understood 
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(misunderstood) situation’.33 As I have already pointed out in chapter 1, as it was 
for the modes in Experience and Its Modes, these two orders are both abstractions 
and mutually exclusive, though equally legitimate.  
In other words, the distinction does not deny the legitimacy of a purely causal study 
of human actions.34 Instead, the aim is once again to criticize ignoratio elenchi, any 
‘categorial confusion’.35 When science wants to understand the result of human 
freedom and intelligence (which is human conduct), confusion intervenes and 
beliefs are reduced to the component of a process and deprived of their proper 
character.36 Addressing in his trenchant style some of the discussed positivist 
attempts to provide a science of society and of politics, Oakeshott claims that these 
should be considered as a ‘masquerade of categories’.37 
In the light of this survey, it is now possible to stress again some important 
differences with those that originated from analytic philosophy. Whereas for 
Logical positivists, normative utterances were the expression of ‘emotions’ and 
were not fully rational, for Oakeshott there is no difference of nature between 
‘normative concepts’ and those that are empirically testable. A political concept is 
not something resulting from a not-fully rational sphere of human intelligence. 
Instead, both scientific and practical concepts are grounded on certain categorical 
assumptions, they have the same degree of truth, both falling short of full coherence.   
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So far, I have discussed Oakeshott’s notion of practical or political experience. It 
has emerged that, in contrast from the analytic conception, normative thinking 
cannot be reduced to a mere feeling or emotion. One of the purposes of Oakeshott’s 
theory is to identify the rationality and the validity of practical thinking, as well as 
of a legitimate non-causal manner of understanding it. 
The Nature of Normative Reasoning and Moral Practices 
I have established that Oakeshott declares the autonomy and the legitimacy of 
practical thinking, I want now to consider more specifically how he theorises the 
nature of normativity. If practical experience is the transformation of ‘what is’ into 
‘what ought to be’, how then do we identify these normative ideals and criteria? 
The most famous and controversial solution to this problem is offered in ‘Political 
Education’, the inaugural lecture at the LSE in 1951. As is well known, in that text 
Oakeshott considers that in politics and in practical experience, reasoning is not ‘a 
consequential enterprise’ or the attempt to apply a ‘general principle’. Instead, it is 
the ‘pursuit of the intimations of a tradition of behaviour’.38 What I want to suggest 
is that this notion describes the forms of argument and criteria relevant in political 
and practical activity both at the domestic and international levels.   
This aspect is fully intelligible only in the context of the doctrine of normative 
thinking that I have just presented, and which finds a further development in the 
texts on Rationalism and in an essay often considered on the margins of Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy: ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’. It is in 
this 1959 piece that the practical world is conceived not just as volition but also as 
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custom and tradition: it is not just reality sub specie voluntatis, but also sub specie 
moris.39 Political actions are not merely the expression of a desire for change 
according to a normative ideal, but also of ‘a traditional manner of behaviour’.40 In 
other words, will is educated and social life ‘is to be conscious that some desires 
are approved and other disapproved’.41 Custom, laws, and institutions are the 
concrete expression of this.  
This idea is then presented in On Human Conduct through the concept of ‘moral 
practice’. The correspondence between the two concepts is suggested by Oakeshott 
in his reply to some critical readings of On Human Conduct, contained in a 1976 
issue of the journal Political Theory. There, he claimed to have abandoned tradition 
as inadequate to express what he believed.42  
Kenneth McIntyre and Steven Gerencser identify the reason for this change of 
terminology with the movement from the essentialism of tradition to the formalism 
of moral practice.43 However, ‘Political Education’ seems to suggest that Oakeshott 
never had an essentialist view of tradition. There we read that a tradition is ‘neither 
fixed nor finished’ and is without ‘changeless centre’.44 It is an identity in difference 
and does not have a connecting core or essence.  
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Both tradition and moral practice indicate that human action presupposes the 
existence of a ‘durable relationship between agents’, which is understood as the 
conditional context of all actions.45 In short, Oakeshott’s traditionalism is a form of 
moral conventionalism in which actions and normative arguments derive their 
meaning from historically enacted practices. Tradition and moral practices provide 
the ‘background assumptions’ and the resources for the identification of normative 
ideals and of criteria for moral judgment.46 To judge a conduct or a proposal is to 
determine ‘the relative importance, in the given circumstances, of the numerous, 
competing normative and prudential considerations’ that compose our moral 
vocabulary and experience.47  
This conception of political activity and normative thought in which certainty plays 
no role has been at the centre of a considerable amount of criticism by Oakeshott’s 
contemporaries. Among these, Raphael’s review of Rationalism in Politics, 
published in ‘Political Studies’, identifies in Oakeshott’s antifoundationalism a 
radical inconsistency.48 For Raphael, Oakeshott’s traditionalism would deprive us 
of a criterion of choice between different practical options. If politics is ‘the pursuit 
of intimations’, Raphael asks, how can we choose between conflicting ones? 
To the question about the ground of our normative decisions, Oakeshott answers by 
recalling that the foundations of the solutions of normative dilemma can only be 
circumstantial considerations about which there can be no final solution but only 
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more or less persuasive argument. In short, normative arguments are possible only 
when their ground is a belief that is ‘familiar to us and is appropriate enough to be 
capable of engaging our sympathy while we listen’.49 This has the aim of 
identifying and justifying an ideal according to which promote changes in a society 
and it presupposes the moral vocabulary of a certain political association, a 
vocabulary composed of ‘images’ that are myths, representations, institutions.  
This aspect is further clarified by an examination of some of Oakeshott’s loose 
notes which are located in his archive at the British Library of Political Science, in 
which he summarized the Aristotelian distinction between dialectic, eristic and 
demonstrative discourse presented in the Posterior Analytics.50 Oakeshott writes 
that, for Aristotle, demonstrative discourse is the search for the causes and of the 
nature of things. Therefore, it generates true knowledge. The eristic, instead, is the 
search for shared premises. In contrast with these, dialectic is based on agreed 
premises that are shared by ‘all or most people’. Practical discourse would, 
therefore, be ‘dialectical’, as opposed to demonstrative in character, the appropriate 
idiom of scientific knowledge, and it starts from shared assumptions.  
An essay collected in the second edition of Rationalism in Politics, ‘Political 
Discourse’ demonstrates even more the Aristotelian root of Oakeshott’s notion of 
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practical discourse.51 In this piece, practical discourse is defined following 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. It aims to diagnose the situation and to identify a solution. The 
argument in support and defence of this identified solution is based on 
‘probabilities, signs and examples’ and is grounded on maxims, which are general 
statements considered to be shared. Insofar as their nature is dialectical, this sort of 
argument may be rebutted by similar circumstantial considerations. From the notion 
of the ‘pursuit of intimations’, and from the idea of the persuasive and dialectical 
character of practical argument, it follows that it is impossible to identify definitive 
and objective criteria that justify certain practical choices. In On Human Conduct, 
the nature of persuasive argument is further analysed, and it is identified with ‘a 
pragmatic argument’ as opposed to the demonstrative one.52 
Therefore, the notion of pursuit of intimations indicates a doctrine about the nature 
of normative thinking. The references to Aristotle and Oakeshott’s notes on his 
theory suggests that practical discourse is based on the subscription of shared 
assumptions that come from the conventional background provided by traditions 
and moral practices, and is structured through circumstantial considerations.53   
To highlight the peculiarities of Oakeshott’s conception of moral practice or 
tradition, it is now worth considering some comparative readings that have been 
recently proposed. 
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In spite of Oakeshott’s reticence in acknowledging any Wittgenstenian influence,54 
Luke Plotica has recently compared Oakeshott’s notion of practice to the late 
Wittgenstein’s concept of language-game.55 According to this reading, practices, as 
well as language-games, represent the context that gives intelligibility to individual 
utterances. Both emphasise the social dimension and conventional nature of 
languages. Moreover, according to this interpretation, both thinkers believed that 
the human world is a world of language and, as a consequence, the ‘regularities and 
systematic structures of the world we understand and act within are (intelligible as) 
the regularities and systematic structures of language’.56 Finally, for Plotica, 
language-games as well as moral practice are learned in terms of rules and 
conventional techniques.57 
It is indeed true that between Oakeshott’s notion of practice and that of a language-
game, there may be an important resemblance. In On Human Conduct we read that 
a practice may be recognized as a ‘language of moral converse’ and as 
Composed of conventions and rules of speech, a vocabulary and a syntax, and it is 
continuously invented by those who speak it and using it is adding to its resources. 
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…Learning to speak it is learning to enjoy and to explore a certain relationship with 
others.58 
However, this similarity should not obliterate the profound differences between the 
two thinkers. First of all, in contrast with what is argued by Plotica (and in 
agreement with an observation by Peter Winch),59 Oakeshott does not attribute a 
primary importance to linguistic or moral rules. To focus on rules, he contends, is 
a distortion of moral reasoning, as they merely represent abridgments of a tradition. 
Just as someone may speak a language perfectly without knowing any of its rules, 
so it is possible to enter into a moral conversation without being aware of any of its 
systematic structures and regularities.60 These are rather the results of the reflective 
engagement of theorists, specifically moralists. 
The meaning of moral practice is then a much more elusive concept – one that 
indicates a concrete and historical ‘manner of behaviour’.61 This is fully intelligible 
only in the light of the idealist epistemological principles that are defended by 
Oakeshott (and that I have illustrated in chapters 1 and 2). As reality is the result of 
the activity of mind, and as there is no difference between knowing subject and 
known object, a moral practice or tradition is the result of the understanding of 
individual agents. I will return to this aspect in chapters 5 and 6, while examining 
the nature of customary international law. For the moment, suffice it to say that, 
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like Hegel’s notion of ethical life (Sittlichkeit), Oakeshott’s moral practice is 
inseparable from concrete historical communities.  
It is in this last regard that G.A. Khan has recently compared Oakeshott’s position 
to Habermas’s theory of communicative actions.62 First, both philosophers share a 
critique of the dominance of instrumental or technical reason. As I have already 
pointed out (in chapter 2), Oakeshott’s essays on Rationalism are indeed a critique 
of the prevalence of the scientific or technical manner of reasoning over the 
practical. In Oakeshott, as in Habermas and earlier exponents of the Frankfurt 
School, there is presented a radical critique of modernity, which is seen as 
dominated by the positivist understanding of rationality.63 In this regard, 
Oakeshott’s conception of practical thinking is, as I have illustrated, a reaction 
against the consequences of these dispositions for the understanding of normative 
thinking. 
In spite of such significant similarities between the two thinkers, as I have shown 
in regard to the notion of conversation, Oakeshott’s judgment on modernity is 
contrastingly more faded, and he finds in modern philosophy (in Montaigne, 
Hobbes, and the idealists) the resources to counteract Rationalism.64 
Oakeshott and Habermas seem to propose similar accounts of morality, understood 
as shared background from which practical discourse may arise. I have discussed 
how the ‘pursuit of intimations’ may be considered as a formula that summarises 
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how practical thinking is a non-demonstrative, dialectic form of reasoning that 
starts from common premises. Khan contends that Habermas acknowledges the 
‘embedded element of practical knowledge’ and the ‘context-bound’ character of 
communicative rationality.65 According to this reading, in both The Theory of 
Communicative Action and in Between Facts and Norms, Habermas retains a 
Hegelian element, according to which rationality is not merely subjective, 
dialogical and context-dependent. 66 
However, it cannot be overlooked that, according to Habermas’s theory of 
communicative actions, there is a commitment to consensus that is absent in 
Oakeshott’s theory. For Habermas, agents have to reach a consensus not just on 
positive moral norms and normative obligations that are constructed through 
deliberation, but also on their understanding of their situations.  
On the contrary, claiming that for Oakeshott the starting point of normative thinking 
is a moral practice intended as shared assumptions, means to emphasise the concrete 
historical tradition of a given community. It is from there that the resources of moral 
understanding may be taken and interpreted. This sheds light on what is perhaps the 
most significant difference between the two thinkers. Habermas is indeed an 
interpreter of critical theory as first identified by the early Frankfurt School, and 
retains an emancipatory dimension linked to the model of deliberative democracy 
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where, in ‘an ideal speech situation’, all impeding extraneous factors are absent and 
the guiding force of the better argument prevails.67 
Without considering Oakeshott’s controversial opinions about democracy,68 for the 
moment it suffices to emphasise that, as already recalled in chapter 2, and consistent 
with his theory of modality, he affirms the irrelevance of philosophy for practical 
activity and claims that the objective of the philosopher is to understand the world, 
not to propose changes. Therefore, the philosopher is not a participant in the moral 
conversation of a given community but instead a spectator.69 It is in this light that I 
now want to examine the role that Oakeshott attributed to political philosophy and 
it is to this matter that I must now turn. On the basis of this analysis, the next chapter 
will consider the Oakeshottian contribution to the theorizing of international 
relations. 
Political Philosophy 
The posthumous publication of Oakeshott’s unpublished papers has shown that the 
question of the nature and the role of political philosophy was one of the main 
concerns of his career.70 Indeed, even before the pages of the ‘Introduction to 
Leviathan’ in 1946, the lectures delivered in Cambridge in 1928-29 and in 1929-30 
entitled ‘The Philosophical Approach to Politics’, as well as the essays ‘The 
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Concept of a Philosophy of Politics’71 and ‘Political Philosophy’ (a text written 
sometime between the end of the 1940s and early 1950s), attempted to identify the 
specificity of a philosophical understanding of politics.72  
Luke O’Sullivan suggests the influence of the Cambridge lectures on the 
development of the ideas published in Experience and Its Modes.73 This is, I 
believe, particularly evident with regard to the nature of political philosophy. In 
these early writings, political philosophy was conceived as the attempt to reach 
what is true outside of the contingency of political life. For instance, philosophy 
does not consider ‘what goes to make up this or that “state” at this or that particular 
time’. Instead, it defines what is true ‘at all times’.74 Political philosophy is a 
particular point of view over political life.75  
This is further clarified in Experience and Its Modes, ethical and political 
philosophy are the ‘consideration of valuation and practical judgment from the 
standpoint of the totality of experience’.76 Similarly, in ‘The Concept of a 
Philosophy of Politics’ political philosophy is described as the attempt to 
‘distinguish political life and activity within the totality of experience; and ... to 
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relate them to the totality so that they are seen in their place in the totality’.77 
Political philosophy aims to arrive at concepts that do not presuppose anything 
external.  
As already clarified in chapter 2, for Oakeshott philosophy is coming to know more 
fully what is already known; therefore, the philosophical definition of concepts 
departs from ‘ordinary, everyday knowledge’ and attempts to overcome all 
divisions and all presuppositions. It is once again important to underline that the 
role of philosophy is not limited to the identification of presuppositions, understood 
as foundations. Instead, its aim is to ‘achieve concrete concepts from which the 
division between presupposition and conclusion has vanished’.78  
With these considerations as a background, it is possible to understand the 
definition of political philosophy given by Oakeshott in his ‘Introduction to 
Leviathan’ of 1946, and republished in 1975.  There, it is conceived as the attempt 
to relate ‘political life, and the values and purposes pertaining to it, to the entire 
conception of the world that belongs to a civilization’.79 Or, in other, perhaps more 
elusive, words, political philosophy establishes ‘the connections, in principle and 
in detail, directly or mediately, between politics and eternity’.80 For Oakeshott, the 
values and the criteria that inspire political life and that construct political discourse 
are considered by philosophy from the point of view of the whole and placed on the 
map of human experience.  
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As it does with other modes or forms of experience, philosophy identifies the 
conditions of the possibility of political life and its limited value. At the same time, 
political criteria and concepts are seen sub specie aeternitatis, in the meaning that 
they have for themselves. As I have illustrated over chapters 1 and 2, philosophy is 
indeed the critical activity that attempts to reach concrete thinking and 
unconditionality, departing from the abstractions of the various modes. The purpose 
of philosophy is to unify individual concepts with their broader context. With 
reference to political philosophy, in the ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, Oakeshott 
clarifies: 
The whole impetus of the enterprise is the perception that what really exists is a 
single world of ideas, which comes to us divided by the abstracting force of 
circumstances; is the perception that our political ideas and what may be called the 
rest of our ideas are not in fact two independent worlds.81 
It is in this light that the two ‘ideal characters’ of civil association and enterprise 
association – presented in On Human Conduct to convey Oakeshott’s 
understanding of political life – should be considered. 
As already underlined in chapter 2, they are not an ideal to be fulfilled but instead 
they represent the irreducible modes of relationship that derive from the assumption 
as a postulate of ‘human conduct’. Similarly, the ‘rule of law’ – presented in the 
famous 1983 essay – does not indicate any specific historical experience, but the 
legal order that results from the critique of all unnecessary contingencies that are 
attached to the idea of law. In this sense, the use of the Latin vocabulary in both On 
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Human Conduct and ‘The Rule of Law’ – where Oakeshott writes of lex and cives, 
and not of law and citizens – is meant to underline the distinction between the 
concepts of political philosophy and those of our ordinary experience.82 As it was 
already indicated in the lectures delivered in Cambridge at the end of the 1920s, the 
task of the philosopher is, therefore, to distinguish what law, human association, 
political action, the activity of governing are outside of the various contingencies 
in which they present themselves.83  
I will later discuss the details, as well as the broader implications, of the content of 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy. For the moment, to understand his position, my 
aim is to consider how Oakeshott defines the nature of political philosophy. So far, 
I have clarified that, consistently with the notion of philosophy as criticism that I 
have presented in chapter 2, the purpose of philosophical reflection on political 
association is both to identify its postulates and to define what their meaning is 
outside of the contingencies in which they appear.84 What needs to be explored now 
is its relation to practical experience and normative, practical, discourse. 
For Oakeshott, it is possible to identify different levels of thinking about politics. 
This is expressed in a vast array of writings, from the ‘Introduction to Leviathan’85 
to ‘Political Education’,86 as well as in some posthumously published texts, 87 such 
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as, in particular, ‘Political Philosophy’.88 From one point of view, given the identity 
between reality and rationality postulated by idealist philosophy and defended by 
Oakeshott throughout all his career, political thought may be conceived as what 
‘different peoples, at different times, in different intellectual and physical 
circumstances, engaging in politics in different ways and finding different things to 
think about it’.89 From another point of view, however, there is a distinction 
between three different levels of discourse, on the basis of their degree of criticism: 
the first level is ‘at the service of politics’ and is about the means and ends of 
political action. I have identified this with normative thinking based on traditional 
knowledge. It is unavoidably tentative and it is based on shared assumptions that 
come from those conditional contexts that are traditions and moral practices.  
The second level is explicative and purports the generalization of an experience into 
doctrines. On this aspect, different texts offer different perspectives. In the 
posthumously published typescript ‘Political Philosophy’, Oakeshott emphasises 
their explanatory character as doctrines that aim at extrapolating the tendencies and 
at fixing the elements of a manner of existence of a society. Using the words of 
Oakeshott’s inaugural lecture, they are an ‘abridgment’ of a ‘concrete manner of 
behaviour’.90 
It is in ‘Political Education’, however, that the focus is rather on the critique of the 
role of doctrines as guides to conduct. In this case, they become ideology and they 
claim to be ‘gathered in advance of the activity of attending to the arrangements of 
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a society’.91 In this case, political discourse is conceived as a demonstrative tool 
aiming at showing the coherence between the chosen ideology and the proposed 
action. However, according to the Oakeshottian perspective, this is simply not 
possible. Insofar as ideologies are ‘abstracted’ from the manner in which people 
traditionally behave, they are not independently premeditated. This, once again, 
reiterates the nature of normative thinking and arguments that I have already 
underlined. Indeed, the resources of a political community and of individuals are 
necessary limited to the traditions of moral behaviour or convention in which they 
are situated. In regard of this division, it is once again important to consider 
Oakeshott’s reply to Raphael’s review of Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays. 
There, Oakeshott makes particularly clear that the main distinction is between 
practical and explanatory aims.92 Thus, while practical experience is animated by 
normative considerations and its concepts are unavoidably based on the 
presuppositions of practical experience, political doctrine may be helpful to the 
identification of some of the characteristics of a certain political experience.  
Besides that of political thought oriented towards actions, and of political doctrines, 
there is a third level, which is that of political philosophy.93 This represents a 
specific understanding of politics. It is the activity of criticizing the limited truth-
value of political concepts and, in so doing, of defining their absolute meaning. 
Consequently, even though philosophy departs from the dialectic critique of 
practical ideas, its results are irrelevant to practice, which has its own autonomous 
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standards of reasoning. Philosophical reflection on practical experience is not 
normative.94 However, this distinction does not mean that a text is philosophical 
when it does not contain practical injunctions, but rather that, albeit it often appears 
merged with other considerations, often of more practical sort, political philosophy 
is a well-defined engagement that is independent from practice. 
In the light of this discussion of the Oakeshottian conception of political 
philosophy, it is now possible to consider its place it in the context of the debate 
that followed the analytic critique of normative thought. The theory that was 
implied by Ayer’s version of Logical positivism – according to which normativity 
is reduced to irrationality and political philosophy is considered as part of practical 
conflicts – has appeared to be in contrast with Oakeshott’s positions. For Oakeshott, 
practical experience or human conduct is essentially normative and, albeit not 
absolutely coherent. On the other hand, political philosophy is the activity of 
understanding practical or political experience from a point of view as universal as 
possible. In this, it is radically distinct from normativity.  
However, if classical political philosophy is the research of the best form of 
government, then Oakeshott does not belong to that tradition. In a famous piece, 
Leo Strauss argues that classical political philosophy is concerned with two orders 
of considerations: the nature of political things and the best, or just, political order.95 
Even though political philosophy has its starting point from the ‘questions that were 
raised in assemblies’, it rejects ordinary citizens’ opinions as the ultimate criterion. 
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Instead, it aims at the definition of what is good in all situations and in all contexts. 
Moreover, Strauss affirms the necessity for political philosophy to enter political 
life to be its ‘right guidance’.96  
Oakeshott’s position presents many similarities to Strauss’s in both identifying the 
source of political philosophy in the overcoming of ordinary people’s opinion and 
in considering political arguments as ‘dialectical’, which is to say based on common 
and shared premises.97 Nonetheless, Oakeshott claims the irrelevance of political 
philosophy and the danger of any sort of philosophical ‘blueprint’. In a somehow 
Straussian tone, in On Human Conduct it is asserted the unavoidable conflict 
between the practical man and the philosopher, who in virtue of his knowledge of 
the ‘nature of things’ wants to lead society. 
This, as I have tried to show, is consequent on his broader philosophical theory.  
The philosopher who claims to have a superior experience of the practical man 
commits a profound mistake, becoming a despised ‘preacher’ or ‘theoretician’.98 
The wise man or woman who, in virtue of his experience is able to ‘make friend of 
every hostile occasion’,99 does not follow philosophers in these ‘holiday 
excursions’. Those philosophies that intend to be a voice in the conversation of a 
community – grounding conduct and moral deliberation – lose their peculiar 
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character, becoming instead a persuasive discourse or an ideological justification 
of a certain arrangement within society. Oakeshott’s notion of philosophy as an 
engagement or an activity, but not a body of knowledge, is incompatible with any 
practical engagement or political concern.  
Deeply challenging for those views that argue that to theorize politics means to be 
prescriptive, it is of no surprise, then, that Oakeshott’s position was under attack by 
all those intellectuals and thinkers who wanted philosophy to be relevant on the 
political agenda and in the resolution of normative conflicts.100 In this regard, the 
famous Oakeshottian passage from ‘Political Education’, according to which in 
political activity ‘men sail a boundless and bottomless sea’ in which ‘there is neither 
harbour for shelter nor floor for anchorage, neither starting-place nor appointed 
destination’,101 could appear to many to be an expression of that crisis of political 
philosophy that developed after the Second World War. For instance, Alfred 
Cobban in a 1953 article entitled ‘The Decline of Political Theory’, after referring 
to this sentence from Oakeshott’s 1951 Inaugural Lecture as an analogy that 
camouflages ‘loose thinking’, affirms that what needs to be restored is the 
criteriological role of political theory. Without such help to justify a rational 
political theory, the ordinary man, Cobban tells us, will fall victim to an irrational 
one.102  
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This critique recalls the one already mentioned and advanced by Raphael and others 
that identify a contradiction in Oakeshott’s positions. This objection may be 
summarized as follows: if political philosophy produces arguments against a certain 
political position, then these may be used in political conflicts and, consequently, 
political philosophy is normative. Another of Oakeshott’s contemporaries, J. W. N. 
Watkins, although broadly sympathetic with his positions, argued that a central 
weakness of Oakeshott’s argument is in the lack of acknowledgment of any role of 
philosophical argument and its demotion to ideology. If the cure for the 
consequences of a bad political theory is a good one, then the Oakeshottian 
argument suffers of a sort of circularity.103 
To solve this dilemma, Edmund Neill contends that Oakeshott departed from this 
idea of the practical irrelevance of philosophy following his writings published in 
the 1950s. According to this interpretation, Oakeshott reconceptualised his notion 
of tradition. Instead of just considering traditions as composed of a plurality of 
equivalent intimations, he would represent it in more ‘historical terms’.104 In pieces 
such as ‘The Masses in Representative Democracy’105 and the third essay of On 
Human Conduct he provides an account of the Western European tradition as a 
conflict between opposing moralities, of the individual and of the individual 
manqué, or of societas and universitas. In this, the job of political philosophers 
would be to provide arguments and models that protect and encourage a particular 
moral option. To do so, in ‘On Being Conservative’ and On Human Conduct, 
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Oakeshott would have put forward a ‘proposal for a system of government’.106  In 
short, Neill contends that the distinction between philosophy and politics would 
have been abandoned for an engaged attitude that proposes a particular political 
solution. 
As I have shown over the last few pages, this view may be consistent with 
Oakeshott’s philosophy only insofar as it represents the historicity of decisions and 
actions. In other words, only as long as it conceives that being an advocate of a 
particular political option means to express a preference based on circumstantial 
arguments and is, therefore, radically distinct from the activity of being a political 
philosopher. From the contingent nature that Oakeshott attributes to practical 
reasoning and political arguments, it follows that the criterion of resolution of 
normative conflicts can be nothing else than moral judgments formed through a 
historical moral discourse and departing from certain specific moral resources, and 
not on philosophical arguments.107 This is stated not just in the writings on 
Rationalism – which are designed, among other things, to counteract the idea of 
philosophy’s relevance for politics – but also in On Human Conduct, where the 
choice between different models of legal order, between societas and universitas, 
is considered as a matter of ‘desirability’.108 
In the light of the radical separation between philosophy and practice, it might 
appear plausible to agree with W. H. Greenleaf’s interpretation that sees 
Oakeshott’s critique of the normative role of political philosophy along the line of 
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Weldon’s radical critique of the classical tradition, and of the Logical positivist 
distinction between empirical fact and normative values. In his contribution to the 
volume offered to Oakeshott on the occasion of his retirement, Greenleaf noted the 
similarities between T. D. Weldon’s denial of the possibility of philosophy to 
provide theoretical foundations to political choices and Oakeshott’s controversial 
critique of Rationalism in politics and notion of ‘pursuit of intimations’, according 
to which practical dilemmas can be resolved only through contingent and 
circumstantial arguments.109 In particular, both thinkers believe that reasonable 
opinions may be achieved and justified on the basis of experience and not on 
absolute grounds or metaphysical foundations. In addition, both try to avoid the 
category-mistake; that is, a confusion or assimilation of the concepts appropriate to 
one mode with those of another. 110 Finally, for both Weldon and Oakeshott, 
philosophy is a ‘second-order subject’ dealing with the clarification of the language 
in which first-order activities are carried on, but with no substantial contribution. 
As Paul Franco suggests, this is also very similar to other early analytic 
philosophers’ positions, such as those of Moore, Richard, Carritt, and Ross, as well 
as to those of Russell and Wittgenstein.111 
It is, however, worth underlining some differences between Oakeshott’s notion of 
political philosophy and that argued by the followers of analytic and ordinary 
language philosophers. First of all, for Oakeshott, as it was more broadly for the 
idealists, philosophical definition of political concepts is not reached through the 
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analysis of linguistic, moral, or political conventions. In contrast from the analytic 
philosophers, ordinary concepts are not the source of knowledge. On the contrary, 
concepts are defined when are connected with the widest universality and their 
ultimate meaning lies ‘ahead in what the concept is to become’.112 In the same way 
in which he denies the possibility of an absolute foundation for our political actions 
and deliberations, Oakeshott affirms that philosophy is the effort to reach a 
completely coherent world of ideas. Its method is the criticism and negation of the 
assumption of ordinary understanding, and of the presuppositions that designate 
‘individual ideas’.113  
Secondly, the radical distinction that Oakeshott sees between different levels of 
political thought – and in particular between normative thinking and political 
philosophy – postulates a further difference between the Oakeshottian position and 
the analytic. Weldon’s views entail that political philosophers are political actors, 
being the classical normative approach a form of practical activity. For him, Plato, 
Hobbes, and Hegel started to seem like politicians and actual defenders of a specific 
political order and articulators of a political decision.114 Petri Koikkalainen has 
recently argued that this is the ground of the development of the so-called 
‘Cambridge School’, as represented by Quentin Skinner. According to 
Koikkalainen, it is particularly through the work of Peter Laslett that the texts which 
composed the canon of political philosophy were demoted to the category of party-
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political pamphlets.115 Elaborating also on Laslett, Skinner states that political 
thought should be considered as ‘a polemical intervention in the ideological 
conflicts’ of its time.116 
Nothing could be more foreign to Oakeshott’s position. As I have discussed, 
political philosophy is radically distinct from the normative sphere, and its whole 
history can be understood as the attempt to emancipate thought from the 
contingencies of political conflicts. From a similar starting point to that of the 
philosopher in the Platonic cave, material conditions and practical dilemmas are 
merely the beginnings of philosophical adventures. It is only in this regard and for 
this reason that the history of political philosophy can be defined by its connection 
with the political experience from which it derives.  
In the ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, Oakeshott makes it clear that the theoretical 
foundation of any political philosophy is an idea about the human condition that 
reflects ‘the intellectual achievement of the epoch or society, and the great and 
slowly mediated changes in intellectual habit and horizon that have overtaken our 
civilization’.117 This contingent situation is also composed by the practical dilemma 
and is influenced by the crises that characterize a certain civilization or society in a 
given peculiar moment. However, what unifies the efforts of all political 
philosophers is ‘the revelation of the universal predicament in the local and 
transitory mischief’.118 The understanding that a philosopher has of the nature of 
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human beings, of the normative dilemmas, and of the historical conditions of a 
society is, therefore, the point of departure of his or her intellectual adventure. 
However, it does not constitute its exclusive context.  
With regard to Skinner’s position, this difference is highlighted in Oakeshott’s 
review of The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. According to Oakeshott, 
Skinner’s understanding of the ideological debates in which normative vocabulary 
is used for justificatory or advisory enterprises does not give a full account of ‘the 
whole of political thought’.119 As we have discussed, for Oakeshott, political 
thought is a term with a multitude of referents and it may indicate a variety of levels 
of reflectivity. Consequently, the historical study of political philosophy is not 
concerned with its relations to the ideological debates and vocabulary of the period, 
but rather with its whole history.120  
As I mentioned in the Introduction, Oakeshott claims in the ‘Introduction to 
Leviathan’ that the historical development of political philosophy is structured into 
three dialectically related traditions. The first is distinguished by the ‘master-
conceptions’ of ‘Reason and Nature’; the second by ‘Will and Artifice’; the third 
by ‘Rational Will’.121 These constitute the foundations of the understanding of 
political order and politics. We will return to this triadic conception with regard to 
the various theories of International Relations; however, now I want to stress that 
the character of the historical continuity of political philosophy is suggested by the 
use of the term ‘tradition’. With reference to the history of philosophy, this was 
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already used by Oakeshott in ‘The Concept of a Philosophical Jurisprudence’, 
where it is indicated that: 
[A philosophical tradition] is not something to which we must adhere; it is 
something which provides the starting point and the initiative for fresh enquiry. It 
is no use looking to it for finished conclusions, for settled answers to fixed 
questions, because it is not a tradition of conclusions or even of questions, but of 
enquiry.122   
It is in this manner that Oakeshott characterizes continuity: not as a mere link 
between past and present doctrines, but as constancy in the kind of questions posed. 
The search for unconditional understanding is the kernel of philosophical critical 
activity. 
However, the notion of ‘tradition’ also suggests that current philosophical enquiry 
is the attempt to continue and maintain this critical attitude. This continuity that 
relates all philosophical efforts is also well represented through the concept of 
‘conversation’, which emphasizes the relational character of philosophy. Present 
philosophers draw their resources, arguments, and styles from past ones, to whom 
they are related by being engaged in the same activity. Therefore, Oakeshott 
conceives of philosophy as ‘conversation’ also to indicate the fact that ‘as civilized 
human beings, we are inheritors, neither of an inquiry about ourselves and the 
world, nor of an accumulating body of information, but of a conversation’.123 From 
this point of view, the analytics demotion of the classical tradition (represented, for 
                                                 
122
 Oakeshott 2007: 182-83. 
123
 Oakeshott 1991: 490. 
 96 
 
instance, by thinkers such as Weldon or Macdonald) is, from an Oakeshottian 
position, another result of the rationalistic fashion that characterizes modernity and 
that claims to start a completely renewed philosophy in which ‘what is not certain 
is mere nescience’.124  
In short, Oakeshott’s conception of the nature of political philosophy seems trapped 
in a profound ambivalence. On the one hand, it rejects the Logical positivist claims 
that reduced normativity to non-rationality and political philosophy to polemical 
utterances. For him (as this chapter has clarified) political thought may have 
different levels and political philosophy is different from both normative thought 
and explanatory doctrines. Instead of being either oriented to action, or an 
‘abridgment’ of a certain political experience, political philosophy aims at 
universality through a method of philosophical definition that criticizes the 
presuppositions on which political discourse is constructed. Moreover, his notion 
of the philosophical definition of political concepts is opposed to that of the analytic 
and ordinary language philosophers, because of his conception of the traditional 
character of the history of philosophy.  
On the other hand, in spite of this anti-positivist and idealist approach, Oakeshott 
seems to criticize the idea that political philosophy has any role in the definition of 
a just society. Because it is the criticism of the categories or presuppositions of 
practical experience and is therefore anti-normative, philosophy, as the previous 
chapters have highlighted, is a ‘second order activity’ that has no contribution to 
practical experience. In other words, philosophy does not provide any foundations 
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for practical or normative choices. For this same reason, as I have illustrated with 
reference to Habermas, philosophy has no emancipatory role. 
In this regard, it is essential to remember that the idea of the practical irrelevance 
of philosophy is a constant feature of both the sceptical and the idealist traditions 
to which I have related Oakeshott in the previous chapters. The notions of 
fallibilism and of the limited force of reason that Oakeshott learnt from Montaigne 
and Hobbes find, therefore, a further expression in the impossibility of deducing 
practical positions from theoretical truths. Moreover, both Bradley and Hegel – 
who, as I have already remarked, are the most explicit Oakeshottian sources – do 
not attribute any practical role to philosophy.125   
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the implications of Oakeshott’s epistemology for his 
ideas about the nature of political activity and moral reasoning. To this end, it has 
focused on the notions of moral practice and on the role of political philosophy.  
It has emerged that the Oakeshottian position was developed in contrast to the 
analytic critique of normative thought. As opposed to the accounts developed from 
Ayer’s critique of normativity by Weldon, Macdonald and others, Oakeshott 
claimed both the normative nature of practical experience and its rational character. 
Moreover, he contrasted those positions, such as the behaviourists, that proposed a 
purely deterministic understanding of human actions. This interpretation sheds a 
                                                 
125
 For this reason Hegel is included by Strauss among the forerunners of the crisis of 
classical political philosophy. Strauss 1959: 88. See: Boucher and Vincent 2012: 42; 
Franco 2004: 57 
 98 
 
new light on the Oakeshottian critique of Rationalism presented in his various 
essays collected in Rationalism in Politics and in On Human Conduct. As in 
Experience and Its Modes – in which the autonomy of practical experience is 
defended – these other works also have the purpose of defending the normative 
character of practical thinking as well as its rational nature. 
It is from this interpretative perspective that I have explored how Oakeshott 
theorized the nature of normativity. In particular, I have focused on the notion of 
‘pursuit of intimations’ and of ‘tradition of moral behaviour’ or ‘moral practice’. 
They indicate the persuasive, non-demonstrative, nature of normative reasoning. As 
also suggested by some notes on Aristotle at the Oakeshott Archive, an argument is 
dialectical when it departs from shared assumptions, subscribed to by all 
participants. I have, therefore, interpreted Oakeshott’s traditionalism as a form of 
moral conventionalism in which the ground of normative argument is in the shared 
beliefs of the agents involved. 
With this discussion as a background, I have turned to Oakeshott’s conception of 
the nature of political philosophy. Departing from an assessment of the relevance 
of this theme in his works, I have explained the famous Oakeshottian definition of 
political philosophy given in the ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, in the light of the 
distinction between different levels of political thought. What characterizes the 
philosophical approach to political life is its radical critical nature. However, this 
does not imply that philosophy intends to modify the shared moral assumptions. 
Instead, the goal of its criticism is to reach as universal a point as possible. It is 
distinct and not reducible to normativity. Philosophy aims at defining political 
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concepts as they are outside of their different appearances and not at changing 
political circumstances. 
The irrelevance of philosophy to practical activity represents one of the most 
controversial aspects of Oakeshott’s thought. In this regard, I have highlighted that, 
far from being resolved or diminished in any of his works, it is the expression of 
the idealist and sceptical conception of philosophy as radical criticism that I have 
presented in the previous chapters, and which has in Montaigne, Hobbes, Hegel and 
Bradley its heterogeneous sources. 
As already noticed, Oakeshott’s idea of moral practice has been applied by neo-
English school theorists, such as William Bain,126 and by constitutive theorists, such 
as Mervyn Frost,127 to the understanding of international practices. However, its 
relevance for constructivism and the recent ‘practical turn’ in International 
Relations has not been explored by commentators.128 The analysis that I have 
developed in this chapter has demonstrated that Oakeshott offers a consistent and 
original theory on the nature of moral practices and of their relations to philosophy. 
On this basis, in the next chapter I will present the Oakeshottian contribution to 
post-positivist constructivist theory of international relations. Moreover, in chapter 
5 and 6, I will show that the notions of moral practice and tradition, intended as 
shared moral background, are central in the Oakeshottian understanding 
international society as a rule-based form of association between states. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PHILOSOPHY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
Introduction 
To explore Oakeshott’s contribution to the understanding of international relations, 
in chapter 3 I have discussed Oakeshott’s theory of normative thinking and its 
relation with political philosophy in the context of the intellectual debates of the 
time. I have argued that Oakeshott contrasted those trends in analytic philosophy 
that demote normativity, that is, value judgements, to emotive utterances. As 
intimated by the notion of modality that I have presented in chapter 1, there is no 
hierarchy between normative ideas, which belong to the practical mode, or human 
conduct, and scientific statements: both are equally abstract and valid within their 
own limits. 
Furthermore, Oakeshott’s position contrasted the positivist implications of social 
sciences – in particular, as proposed by behaviourism – that asserted the possibility 
of a purely causal and deterministic study of human actions. One of the main 
purposes of On Human Conduct – I have argued – is a defence of the ‘normative’ 
or ‘practical’ understanding of human actions.  
Besides the considerations regarding the nature of practical thinking, Oakeshott also 
contrasted the analytic approach by conceiving political philosophy as an attempt 
to reach the universal meaning of political concepts. Influenced by Hegel and 
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Bradley, as well as by the scepticism of Montaigne and Hobbes, and consistent with 
his notion of philosophy as criticism, he however denied any practical or normative 
relevance of political philosophy.  
In this chapter, I will highlight the implications of Oakeshott’s epistemology and 
metaphilosophy for the study of international relations and I will show his 
contribution to an interpretative and constructivist theory of international relations.  
Firstly, I will highlight how Oakeshott’s philosophy may shed a new light on the 
so-called second Great Debate between the ‘scientific’ and ‘classical’ approach. I 
will argue that Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism in politics can be understood at 
the international level by showing its similarity with Morgenthau’s critique of 
‘scientism’ and Bull’s aversion to the ‘scientific approach’. Notwithstanding these 
similarities, I will also argue that Oakeshott’s philosophy of history, with its 
distinction between the ‘practical’ and ‘historical’ past, also shows some of the 
possible limitations of the use of history made by both Morgenthau and some of the 
exponents of the English School of International Relations. 
It is on this basis that, elaborating on Chris Brown’s interpretation, which 
acknowledges the importance of the Oakeshottian source for the unfolding of the 
normative turn in International Relations,1 I will outline how the reception of some 
of these instances has been one of the key elements on contemporary theory of 
international relations. In particular, I will show that Oakeshott’s philosophy 
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establish the condition of the possibility of the humanistic and constructivist 
understanding of international relations. 
The ‘Scientific’ and the ‘Classical Approach’ to International Relations 
The first step to understand Oakeshott’s contribution to the metatheory of 
international relations is to consider the implication of his conception of normative 
thinking in the context of the so-called second Great Debate between the ‘classical’ 
and the ‘scientific approach’ that developed in the 1950s and 1960s. Its main 
protagonists were the American positivist and behaviourist practitioners of the 
discipline, and the exponents of the English School of International Relations, as 
well as a significant number of intellectuals working in the USA who were opposed 
to the behaviourist trend in political studies.  
As opposed to what was conceived as the ‘wisdom literature’ of E. H. Carr and 
Hans Morgenthau,2 the ‘scientific approach’ (influenced by the so-called 
behaviourist movement, by game theory and by the quantitative approach in the 
social sciences) attempted to bring International Relations back to ‘facts’.3 Morton 
Kaplan’s System and Process in International Politics4 and the essay ‘The New 
Great Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in International Relations’ represents one 
of the landmarks of this break in IR.5 First, even though it is very difficult to reduce 
to one genus all the great variety of methodological and theoretical perspectives 
that characterize this approach, it is possible to identify a common theme in the idea 
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that political systems can be ‘investigated by scientific methods’.6 In this, they were 
following a neo-positivist trend of considering as the only legitimate knowledge 
what is consecrated through empirical tests. 
The basic assumption is, therefore, that of the unity of sciences and on the existence 
of a unique scientific method. Against the Aristotelian distinction between science 
and art, between certain and probable knowledge, Kaplan underlines that ‘modern 
science insists upon the hypothetical knowledge of all empirical knowledge’.7 What 
the ‘scientific or systems approach’ wants to achieve is not absolute certainty – 
since all conclusions are provisional – but reliable conclusions. This is assured by 
‘formalized scientific procedures’, constructed around models and systematic 
hypotheses that may contribute to overcome what is perceived as the current stage 
of poor development of social sciences.8 In addition, it is important to note that little 
or no role is attributed to philosophy as conceived by the classical ‘normative’ 
tradition, already criticized by the Logical positivists. Kaplan perceived it as a 
synonym for ‘undisciplined speculation’ that addresses questions by means of an 
improper method.9  
On the other hand, the English School of Manning, Wight, Bull and Butterfield 
developed as a reaction against this new ‘scientific approach’.10 In his polemical 
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‘International Theory: The Case for the Classical Approach’, Bull claimed that the 
‘scientific approach’ ‘has contributed and is likely to contribute very little to the 
theory of international relations’.11 In particular, its distance from traditional 
International Relations literature keeps it at distance from ‘the substance of 
international politics’ which, as Bull puts it, are ‘moral questions’.12 As such, it is 
an intractable subject according to the model theory as well as to any attempt to 
reach scientific, objective, truths about it.  
The exponents of the English School were not alone in their aversion to the 
‘scientific approach’. In the USA (where the tide of positivism and behaviourism 
was rising), Hans Morgenthau counteracted the positivist critique to the traditional 
approach in International Relations, and he may be considered as part of an 
‘intellectual irredentism, resisting its own integration into American social science’ 
dominated by behaviourism.13 As Michael C. Williams suggests, crucial to this was 
the attempt to move beyond classical liberalism, which was perceived as bankrupt 
after the success of totalitarianisms, and to criticise its empiricist or pragmatist 
epistemologies and models that, as we discussed, were becoming more and more 
dominant.14 In this light, it appears clear that there is mutual implication between 
the epistemological critique against the American social sciences and the earlier 
against utopianism and liberalism. 15  
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Morgenthau’s Scientific Man Versus Power Politics is of particular relevance for 
the present argument. In this work, he criticises the application of the principles of 
scientific reason to the social world: while the first are ‘simple and consistent’; the 
former is instead ‘complicated, incongruous, and concrete’.16 Morgenthau’s targets 
were those ‘liberal blueprints’ that, on the basis of these abstract standards, 
projected international peace but failed to ‘stand the trial of history’.17 These 
positions are reiterated in a later 1955 article entitled ‘Reflections on the State of 
Political Science’, which was written in the middle of the behaviourist revolution. 
As it had done in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics, Morgenthau contests the 
unity of method postulated by Positivism. He rather states the necessity of assuming 
as a postulate the individuality and the freedom of choice, as opposed to the 
conception according to which human beings are ‘a product of nature’.18 Political 
events, in other words, are determined by ‘historic individuality, rational or moral 
choice’.19 
At the same time, he believed that philosophy should identify the eternal truths of 
politics, and of international politics in particular. The role of political theory is 
indeed to provide a ‘timeless’ map of politics that will tell us ‘what are the rational 
possibilities for travel from one spot on the map to another, and which road is most 
likely to be taken by travellers’.20 It should not be merely descriptive, but should 
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also be normative, insofar as it also shows what is ‘the shortest and safest road to a 
given objective’.21  
To recapitulate, what is usually called the second Great Debate in International 
Relations, which developed mainly after the Second World War, is animated by 
different positions in regard of international relations theory. Especially in the 
American context, this was more and more conceived as the quantitative study of 
the relations between states aiming at objective and reliable laws. As opposed to 
this, the English School of International Relations defended a ‘classical approach’, 
which was mainly animated by history. Even though coming from a very different 
intellectual background, influenced by neo-Kantianism and, as I will further explore 
in chapter 6, by Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, Morgenthau also criticised the 
‘scientist’ and liberal approach to the study of politics. His project, however, was 
more focused on philosophy, to which he attributed the role of identifying the inner 
nature of political life, which is power, and, on this basis, able to provide evaluative 
judgments. 
Rationalism in Politics and the Critique to the ‘Scientific Approach’ 
A first element that shows Oakeshott’s engagement with these themes is his 
discussion of Rationalism, which was developed in a series of writings published 
in the ‘Cambridge Journal’ after the Second World War and which were eventually 
collected in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays in 1962.22 Of course, their 
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immediate context are the political debates that were crossing Britain after the 
Second World War. As already shown, the core of this argument is a theory of 
knowledge that is based on the idealist notion of modality firstly presented in 
Experience and Its Modes and further elaborated in ‘The Activity of Being an 
Historian’ (1958), ‘The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind’ (1959), 
and, albeit with some innovations that I have presented, in On Human Conduct.23  
The critique of ignoratio elenchi in Experience and Its Modes, as well as the 
defence of a sceptical conception of the relationship between the different voices of 
the ‘conversation of mankind’ (which are, as we have seen, different modes of 
experience or imagining) can be considered as the philosophical ground of 
Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism. Rationalism is a conception that sees science 
as the dominant voice over history, arts, and practice. With particular regard to 
politics, the rationalist sees it as a ‘matter of solving problems’ through technical 
knowledge.24 This ‘is susceptible of formulation in rules, principles, directions, 
maxims’ and it ‘can be taught and learned in the simplest meaning of these words’.25 
Moreover, it is applicable in any circumstance and situation, despite its contingent 
character.  
In addition, in the description of Rationalism we may find another sort of argument 
that draws from an interpretation of the history of European modernity. Oakeshott 
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proposes a dichotomised reading of European intellectual history in which 
Rationalism and anti-Rationalism are opposed to one another. Its roots are 
identified in Bacon’s and Descartes’s philosophies, which find their final stage in 
Positivism. Even though this interpretation may be highly contentious (and is in 
fact offered with many qualifications),26 it is important because it shows the core of 
Oakeshott’s critique. According to Oakeshott, Bacon’s Novum Organum and 
Descartes’s Discourse de la Méthode and Regulae attempted to set out fixed 
methodological rules that may be instrumental to the achievement of a scientific, 
objective, truth. They all conceived that the first step of this route to certainty was 
the fight against prejudice and the cancellation of received opinions.  
In short, what characterises Rationalism is the application of the standards and 
criteria of scientific enquiry to practical and political life. For the rationalist, the 
customary and the traditional are reduced to nescience and prejudice, and they are 
criticized as such from the point of view of an alleged fully rational knowledge. 
Thus, the essential normative character of practical experience and of political life 
is obliterated. Instead (as discussed in chapter 3) Oakeshott conceived of practice 
as legitimate, and as rational as science and history. The practical world is 
essentially normative, insofar as it is the transformation of ‘what is’ according to 
an ideal that ‘is not yet’ and ‘ought to be’.27 Moreover, as shown by the notion of 
tradition and even more by that of moral practice, Oakeshott argues that normative 
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thinking is a non-demonstrative from of reasoning that starts from historically 
enacted shared assumption.  
In this light, the ‘scientific approach’ that, on the one hand, claimed the necessity 
of studying politics from a quantitative and scientific point of view and, on the 
other, perceived itself as the aide to decision making, is a clear expression of what 
Oakeshott labelled as Rationalism in politics. A first element that suggests the 
relevance of Oakeshott’s critique to Rationalism for this context is shown by some 
similarities with Bull’s description of the shortcomings of the ‘scientific approach’. 
In Bull’s 1966 essay, we read: 
There is little doubt that the conception of a science of international politics, like 
that of a science in politics generally, has taken root and flourished…because of 
attitudes towards the practice of international affairs…, in particular about the 
moral simplicity of problems of foreign policy, the existence of ‘solutions’ to these 
problems, the receptivity of policy-makers to the fruits of research, and the degree 
of control and manipulation that can be exerted over the whole diplomatic field by 
any one country.28 
An important Oakeshottian text in this regard is the review of Hans Morgenthau’s 
Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (1946),29 which highlights the affinities 
between Morgenthau’s critique of scientism and liberalism, and Oakeshott’s 
interpretation of Rationalism.  
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Indeed, what in Scientific Man Versus Power Politics is called ‘scientism’ is the 
idea that politics, at both the domestic and the international level, can be studied 
after the model of the natural sciences. Instead, for Morgenthau, the scientific mind 
and instrumental reason are inapt to understand the contingencies of human life and 
its characteristic egoistic nature’.30 On this conception of the study of politics, is 
based much of the rationalist understanding of the international arena. Indeed, 
Oakeshott adds that, 
Perhaps it is in the sphere of international relationships that the project of a science 
of politics has made itself most clear. ‘After rationalist philosophy, in its liberal 
manifestation, had passed successfully its domestic trial, the general idea of 
extending those same principles to the international field was transformed into a 
concrete political programme to be put to the test of actual realization’. From 
Grotius to the United Nations a continuous attempt has been made to demonstrate 
Bentham’s proposition that ‘nations are associates not rivals in the Great social 
enterprise’.31 
However, Oakeshott’s account of Morgenthau was not uncritical. Firstly, he was 
loath to identify, as Morgenthau did, Liberalism with a rationalistic form of politics; 
which is to say, with the work of ‘popularly elected parliaments which would be 
subject apparently conflicting views and interests to the test of reason through 
intelligent discussion’.32 Instead, Oakeshott contests this identification and instead 
sees parliamentary democracy as the result of a peculiarly English medieval 
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practice that wanted to limit ‘the exercise of political power’.33 Moreover, as I will 
further explore in chapter 6, he considered the category of ‘tragedy’ as inapplicable 
to political life, being an aesthetic, or poetic, category.34 In addition to these 
differences, he pointed out what he regarded as a failure to distinguish between 
science and ‘scientism’, between reason and ‘Rationalism’. In other words, as 
shown also by the correspondence with Popper,35 what Oakeshott states is not the 
irrationality of practice, nor the legitimacy of a scientific understanding of the social 
world.  Instead, what the critique of Rationalism points out is the legitimacy of a 
non-scientific understanding of political life, and the impossibility of applying 
scientific standards to political decisions.36  
However, the main and more radical difference between the two thinkers lies in 
what they perceived as the purpose of political philosophy. Morgenthau claimed 
that a theory of politics also contains a normative element.37 Moreover, as shown 
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by Seán Molloy, the task of political science is conceived more and more by 
Morgenthau as the identification of an eternal ‘objective’ truth, which is the 
transcendental value of political experience.38 For Morgenthau, theory is not only 
descriptive, but also prescriptive.39 
In contrast with both these aspects, as discussed in chapter three, Oakeshott defends 
the autonomy of practice from the intrusion of philosophy. Philosophical arguments 
and conclusions are of no relevance for actual political life. Philosophy is, in fact, 
the critique of political concepts and, as we find in a text probably written around 
1946 and posthumously published: ‘where there is genuine philosophy there can be 
no guidance; if we seek guidance, we must “hang up philosophy”’.40 What is needed 
in political life is instead ‘nothing higher that the ordinary faculties and ordinary 
knowledge that everyone (even the convinced rationalist) uses every day in the 
conduct of his life and in his relations with other men’.41   
The Use of History and Historical Laws 
So far, I have illustrated that Oakeshott shared the concerns and the perspective of 
some of the critics of the ‘scientific approach’. His critique of Rationalism in 
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politics may indeed be associated with the critique of scientism and liberalism 
presented by Morgenthau and of the ‘scientific approach’ advanced by Bull.  
In the following, I will consider to what extent he may be regarded as critical of 
some of those elements that characterized the ‘classical approach’ of the English 
School and Morgenthau, with particular regard to ideas about the nature and the 
role of historical understanding. I shall argue for the relevance in this context of the 
distinction posed by Oakeshott between the practical and historical past, as well as 
of his critique of the possibility of reaching objective and universal truths. 
Considered by many commentators as one of his constant concerns,42 Oakeshott’s 
theory of historical knowledge is consistent with his idealism.43 He followed F. H. 
Bradley’s critical approach, and in opposition to speculative philosophy of history 
of the likes of O. Spengler and A. J. Toynbee (and of Martin Wight), he conceived 
the philosophy of history as the identification of the condition of the logical 
possibility of historical knowledge.44 His effort is the definition of the conditions 
that make history a specific and identifiable activity. He is concerned to establish 
the differentiae of history in terms of its postulates. Elaborating on Croce and 
                                                 
42
 L. O’Sullivan 2003a: 151-53; see also: Grant 1990: 99. 
43
 For a comparison between Oakeshott and the British idealists on the philosophy of 
history see: Boucher 1984. 
44
 Oakeshott 1999: 6. There we read: ‘I am concerned with what may, perhaps, be called 
the logic of historical enquiry, ‘logic’ being understood as a concern not with the truth of 
conclusions but with the conditions in terms of which they may be recognized to be 
conclusions’. See also, Oakeshott 1991: 165.  On the distinction between ‘speculative’ and 
‘critical’ philosophy of history of particular relevance are two texts by Oakeshott both 
entitled ‘The Philosophy of History’. The first was written in 1928, the second in 1948. 
They are now, respectively, in Oakeshott 2004: 117-32; 201-07. 
 114 
 
Collingwood – who were among his sources of inspiration in this regard45 – 
Oakeshott claimed the irreducible autonomy of historical knowledge. Of particular 
relevance for our argument is the distinction between practice and history, which is 
based on the argument between the ‘historical’ and ‘practical’ past.  
The starting point of his discussion of history is the identification of two different 
meanings of ‘history’. In the first, it is res gestae, which is to say, the events and 
the actions that happened; in the second, it is ‘a certain sort of enquiry’.46 History 
is the result of the activity of the historian; it ‘cannot be a “course of events” 
independent of our experience of it’.47 Consequently, historical knowledge or 
experience is the historian’s present experience (the body of evidence before him 
or her) understood under the category of the past. All experience is present 
experience, and we organise and understand it in terms of categories integral to the 
modes. Against any positivist epistemology, Oakeshott denies the existence of 
‘absolute data’: the truth lies in the coherence of the ‘facts’, where ‘facts’ are not a 
given, but instead are an achievement. They compose a historical account whose 
truth is not determined by a correspondence between historical accounts and the 
‘course of events’.48 
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In short, Oakeshott’s philosophy of history might be summarised as follows: history 
is the historian’s experience; it is the result of the activity of the historian. From 
what is present, the historian infers (constructs) something that happened in the 
past, consistent with the evidence. The historian’s present ‘is exclusively composed 
of object recognized, identified and understood as survivals from past’.49 This past 
‘is composed of passages of related events, inferred from present objects recognized 
as survival from the past, and themselves assembled as answers to historical 
questions about the past’.50 
‘Past events’ as such are ‘dead’; they are not experienced, and they can therefore 
be known because they are inferred by historians: ‘the past in history varies with 
the present, rests upon the present, is the present’.51 Furthermore, historical events 
are considered as the result of human conduct, of ‘past performances’ and not of 
natural processes.52 The relation that the historian argues between the survival, or 
vestiges, of past performance is one of circumstantial contiguity between 
subsequent events. The image that Oakeshott chooses to represent of this sort of 
relation between events is that of a ‘dry wall’: 
When an historian assembles a passage of antecedent events to compose a 
subsequent he builds what in the countryside is called a ‘dry wall’: the stones (that 
is, the antecedent events) which compose the wall (that is, the subsequent event) 
are joined and held together, not by mortar, but in terms of their shapes. And the 
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wall, here, has no premeditated design; it is what its components, in touching, 
constitute.53  
Before moving on and exploring how these ideas show the distance between 
Oakeshott, and both Morgenthau and Bull, it is worth considering some of the most 
common misconceptions about them. The notion that history is a construction of 
the historians does not mean that it can be considered as a mere ‘invention’. In other 
words, asserting the absence of an ‘objective’ – i.e. prior to the activity of the 
historian – series of events does not equate to affirming that history is arbitrary, or 
merely ‘subjective’.  
In the first place, this distinction between ‘objectivity’ and ‘subjectivity’ is out of 
sympathy with the idealist principles entailed in Oakeshott’s position. It recalls 
instead realist and positivist appeals to ‘facts’ and to an ‘objective’ course of events 
that may be rediscovered. As counterintuitive as it may be, the idea that there is not 
an objective criterion does not equate to the claim that historical knowledge is 
impossible or that it falls short of any possibility of achieving truth. 
Another similar, common misunderstanding argues that, for Oakeshott, historical 
accounts are narrations. As Terry Nardin clarifies, however, the fact that they are 
often presented in this form does not imply that history can be associated with story 
telling; for Oakeshott, history is not a fable.54 The distinction between different 
modes, and in particular between poetry and history, suggests instead that the 
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criteria of coherence in a piece of artwork are different from those in a historical 
reconstruction. 
A first element of comparison between Oakeshott and the historians of the English 
School is that of the relations between history and practical activity. The study of 
history was at the top of the research agenda of the British Committee on the Theory 
of International Politics, from which the English School of International Relations 
arose.55 William Bain, as well as Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, identify 
in the writings of Hedley Bull one of the most important exemplars of the 
conception of the historical enquiry in the English School of International 
Relations.56 
Bull’s case is indeed of particular relevance for the argument in this chapter. He 
distinguishes between historical study for its own sake (which is identified with 
International History) and study that is functional to current international politics. 
However, in his famous piece on the condition of the theory of international 
relations – delivered for the 50th year of the Aberystwyth chair in International 
Relations – he admitted that the study of the past has the objective ‘to throw light 
on contemporary interstate politics’.57As Bain argues, Bull believed that history 
‘provides useful knowledge about present events’, and is therefore of practical use. 
More particularly, history provides us with the knowledge of what may or may not 
happen.58 
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A thinker that articulates even more the variety of opinions within the English 
School is Herbert Butterfield.59 He distinguishes between two types of history: the 
technical and the practical. In The Whig Interpretation of History (1931), in 
Christianity and History (1950), and in History and Human Relations (1952), 
Butterfield developed the ideas of German historicists such as Leopold von Ranke 
and F.W. Maitland, claiming that history has the purpose of explaining change in 
human society from the point of view of individuals caught up in unique events. 
Against what he defines as the Whig interpretation of history, historians should 
‘understand the past for the sake of the past’.60 Opposed to the technical, practical 
history aims instead at drawing lessons from the past. The danger that Butterfield 
saw in this was that of giving retrospective moral judgments on past events and 
decisions. 
Even though these two kinds of history are on different levels, Kenneth McIntyre 
argues that Butterfield did not establish a hierarchy between them and, especially 
in later works, he seems to identify a positive value of practical history.61 For 
instance in The Englishman and His History (1944),62 he admits its political 
importance, even though it is composed of what he calls (with a term that will also 
                                                 
59
 Butterfield and Oakeshott were friends and colleagues in Cambridge and the relevance 
of Butterfield’s ideas on Oakeshott are well known. See: Bentley 2011. 
60
 Butterfield 1959: 16-17. See McIntyre 2011. 
61
 McIntyre 2011: 37-39. 
62
 Butterfield 1944. In this regard it is also important his The Origin of Modern Science 
(1949) which interprets the historical development of modern science as progressive; on 
this see: Jardine 2003.  
 119 
 
be used by Oakeshott) ‘abridgments’.63 It is in his The Origin of Modern Science 
(1949) that Butterfield seems most to undermine the distinction between practical 
concerns and the activity of the historian. Indeed, assuming the present point of 
view, Butterfield conceives past scientific theories as wrong and also recognizes 
that the awareness of the past may benefit present scientists.64 In this regard, it is 
also worth mentioning that Butterfield believed that technical history could 
eventually attain a final truth and discover the ‘fundamental human predicament’ at 
the heart of human conflicts.65 
Within the English School Martin Wight represents a peculiar position. His denial 
of the existence of any international political theory is grounded on a speculative 
philosophy of history.66 The reason for the paucity of international theory is 
twofold, and derives from Wight’s definition of political theory as the speculation 
about the State, a political entity that is absent at the international level. Most 
importantly, however, whereas political theory is concerned with the condition of 
the good life and with the changing circumstances of different societies, the 
spectacle that is in front of the eyes of the international theorist is that of recurrence 
and repetition. Those thinkers, such as Hegel and Kant, who instead tried to see in 
history a superior rationality, make, in Wight’s views, the ‘conviction precedes the 
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evidence’.67 In short, the denial of the possibility of international theory is based on 
the idea that international history is dominated by necessity and regularity and is 
out of human control.68 
Clearly influenced by Butterfield, Oakeshott theorises the opposition between 
‘historical’ and ‘practical’ past. They are two categorically distinct past, constructed 
on the basis of different postulates. Practical past is a ‘living past’, related to what 
is happening to ourselves. Its aim is to ‘enable us to anticipate events that have not 
yet taken place’. It is from this point of view that it makes sense to ask ourselves 
about the moral value of past actions, or about the origins of ‘what we perceive 
around us’.69 For this reason, it is a remembered, recollected, and consulted past, 
‘which may be said to “teach by example”, or more generally to afford us a current 
vocabulary of self-understanding and expression’.70 
This (didactic) living past is ‘legenda, what is “read” and what may be read with 
advantage to ourselves in our current engagement’.71 Similar to Butterfield’s  
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considerations in The Englishman and His History, in Oakeshott’s  1983 essays on 
history, he writes that the practical past is: 
An indispensable ingredient of an articulated civilized life. But it is categorically 
distinct both from the survivals which compose the present of an historical enquiry 
and from an historically understood past which may be inferred from them. It is an 
accumulation of symbolic persons, actions, utterances, situations and artefacts, the 
products of practical imagination.72 
Even though, as Oakeshott says, quoting Croce, ‘all history is contemporary 
history’,73 this is true because the historian’s experience can only be present and not 
because history is the expression of historian’s present practical concerns. 
However, it is ‘understood exclusively in terms of its relation to the past’.74 
In a tone similar to Butterfield’s, Oakeshott writes that ‘history is the past for the 
sake of the past’.75 The historian’s attitude is not practical. As affirmed in ‘The 
Activity of Being an Historian’, the historian is rather a translator from the practical 
idiom. Events and happenings that at the time were practical (i.e. that were 
performances) are understood as historical, which is to say, as part of a continuity 
of events of the same sort. In short, what the historian reconstructs in this manner 
is a contextual picture in which individual events are intelligible in terms of their 
relationships with other events of the same kind.  
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Whereas in chapter 3 I argued that human conduct is possible only on the grounds 
of shared assumptions or presuppositions, enacted in a moral practice, it is worth 
mentioning that the purpose of history is to consider individual actions or 
performances in the context of ‘an identifiable practice’ to which agents 
subscribe.76 To understand an event historically is to identify it as an ‘exhibition of 
intelligence’ and to relate it to ‘beliefs, sentiments, understandings’ and to the 
‘practices subscribed to’.77 
In sum, Oakeshott opposed the notion that the results of historical knowledge may 
be considered as the source of practical lessons. At first glance, this may be 
considered similar to Butterfield’s claims against the Whig interpretation of history 
and the identification of its differences from technical history. He even seems to 
share with Butterfield a certain incoherence regarding this distinction. Luke 
O’Sullivan has gone as far as to argue that many of Oakeshott’s works exhibit a 
practical outlook of the past, showing – in place of any progressivism – a 
‘pessimistic and condemnatory’ perspective.78 Indeed, in Oakeshott’s writings, 
there is often a vein of despair and condemnation of the evolution of modern 
European society and political vocabulary. That Oakeshott did not disdain the 
practical use of history is also shown by his conception of political education as 
presented in his inaugural lecture at the LSE. An important part of that education 
should be, as we have seen, historical. However, its aim is mainly practical, being 
that political education, 
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Is not merely a matter of coming to understand a tradition, it is learning how to 
participate in a conversation: it is at once initiation into an inheritance in which we 
have a life interest, and the exploration of its intimations.79 
In short, what is important to underline, however, is that the Oakeshottian 
distinction between a practical and a historical past does not imply a hierarchy 
between the two. Oakeshott is indeed concerned with what is unique to historical 
explanation; he aims to identify the specific character of pure historical activity. 
Even though historians engage in many other things than history (such as moral 
condemnation, or speculation about what may have happened), this is not what 
defines historical activity. The fact that the works of historians have been often 
touched by didactical purposes does not mean that it is impossible to identify history 
as an autonomous form of experience or understanding.  
Besides the categorial distinction between practical and historical past, there is a 
distinction between historical and scientific understanding. In essence, while 
science sees every happening as an element in a necessary process, history 
appreciates the contingent (i.e. not necessary) nature of any event.80  
In this regard, albeit outside of the English School milieu, Hans Morgenthau 
represents an interesting case similar to Bull. For Morgenthau, historical knowledge 
and theory are deeply intertwined. He uses a large number of historical examples 
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to corroborate his own position, and he also adopts a nomothetic outlook. Indeed, 
the repetitiveness and constancy in history can be formulated in ‘objective laws’. 
Thus, Morgenthau seems still to be influenced by positivism and, more particularly, 
by Hempel’s ‘covering laws’ theory of explanation.81 
As Thomas W. Smith clarifies, Morgenthau’s method was twofold. First, theory – 
as we have discussed above – should formulate objective truths that transcend time 
and space. The truths and laws should, in the second place, be tested historically. In 
so doing, it would be possible to give ‘theoretical meaning to the facts of 
international politics’.82 It is worth remarking that there is no contradiction between 
the critique of the ‘scientific approach’ and the claim that objective laws of political 
action could be identified by history and philosophy. Even though they are not 
shaped by the method of natural science, history and philosophy were seen as the 
‘sciences’ that were able to accomplish this task. 
It is in this regard that the differences between Oakeshott and the ‘classical 
approach’ of Wight and Morgenthau are more striking. Indeed, Oakeshott did not 
believe that historical knowledge could find any historical laws, neither in the form 
of ‘universal laws or regularities, which it is the task of the enquiry to ascertain and 
formulate’,83 nor in that deductive-nomological of Hempelian kind.84 
To the task of refuting the nomothetic perspective, as proposed by Hempel and 
Popper, Oakeshott devoted numerous pages in On History and Other Essays, 
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published in 1983.85 He contests the existence of a ‘model of scientific enquiry and 
explanation to which all enquiries must conform on pain of being pronounced 
inadequate or even invalid’.86 
Oakeshott argues against the idea that history should reach the formulation of laws 
on the grounds of the inductive procedure of examining a number of historical 
occurrences (a conception that, even in different forms, was shared by the 
exponents of the ‘classical approach’). For Oakeshott, this position misconceives 
the character of historical understanding, underpinning a realist appeal to already 
understood and explained facts. In particular, it attributes to events ‘that are 
said…to be awaiting explanation in terms of laws’ a fixed and certain character 
which is not their own. Instead of being such ‘reliably reported bygone 
occurrences’, they are the ‘conclusions of inferences from…survival used as 
circumstantial evidence for what has not survived’.87 Moreover, the effort to 
identify regularities cannot derive from the historian’s explanation of the relations 
between events, but is instead the attempt to apply ‘systematically related abstract 
concepts’ to those situations that the historian should instead aim to explain. 
Oakeshott does not see the role of history as one identifying causal relations 
between different events. The relationship between events inferred by the historian 
is not causal and by assuming the existence of this sort of universal laws, historians 
‘have resigned any pretence of being concerned with the conditions of historical 
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understanding’.88 The connections between events cannot be argued from the 
observation of constant conjunctions of events, or from empirical general laws 
inducted from it. This procedure attributes to the not-yet-understood event a role as 
either an effect or a cause. In other words, Oakeshott contests the realist 
epistemology underlining this position. 
Overall, as with the critique against the ‘scientific approach’ dominated by 
positivist reductionism, the differences between Oakeshott’s position and the 
‘classical approach’ are grounded on his theory of modality (according to which, as 
I have illustrated in chapter 1, all modes are equally legitimate and autonomous 
from one another). As historical knowledge is an abstraction, it cannot provide 
ultimate truths; as it is autonomous from science, it cannot provide general laws; 
and, as it is autonomous from practice, it cannot offer moral lessons. Instead, 
historical concepts are relevant only within their own limits. They are the result of 
the historian’s activity that argues a circumstantial and contingent relationship of 
contiguity between events and that identifies them as intelligent subscriptions to 
moral practices. 
The Normative Turn 
So far, I have presented a complex account that shows the relevance of Oakeshott’s 
thought for the debates that were animating International Relations theory after the 
Second World War. It is however also clear that his thought cannot be easily 
associated with any of the various schools or trends that were engaged in those 
polemical exchanges. As shown by the review of Morgenthau and by the essays on 
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Rationalism, Oakeshott’s thought may be compared with those who were engaged 
in the polemic against the ‘scientific approach’. In this respect, his position sheds 
light on the overlap between the critique of positivist political science and of liberal 
utopianism. At the same time, as discussed in chapter three, he shares with the 
positivists the denial of any normative role for philosophy.  
The distinction between the practical and historical past, as well as the critique of 
the deductive-nomological model of historical explanation show that Oakeshott’s 
philosophy of history was distinct from those that underpinned the various trends 
of the ‘classical approach’. If the Oakeshottian influx on the development of this 
debate in International Relations Theory is, therefore, rather indirect and very 
nuanced, it appears much clearer in what has been defined as the ‘normative turn’ 
in International Relations. 
Among the different sources of this turn identified by Brown, there is the 
interpretation of Oakeshott’s philosophy, which, in International Relations, was 
given prominence by Terry Nardin’s Law, Morality and the Relations of States 
(1983).89 I will leave to the next chapters the discussion of Nardin’s contribution to 
the understanding of the English School’s notion of international society. For the 
moment, I wish to remain at the metatheoretical level and to highlight how 
Oakeshott’s notions of philosophy and normativity have influenced contemporary 
international relations theory. 
First, it is of particular relevance Oakeshott’s critique of the analytic attack on the 
rationality of normative thought – which, as I have illustrated in chapter 3, and 
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consistently with the notion of modality, claims the legitimacy and the full 
rationality of practice – as well as his defence (in On Human Conduct) of a 
specifically ‘practical’ or ‘normative’ understanding of human actions and political 
life. This is particularly underlined by another neo-English School writer, Robert 
Jackson, in his The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States 
(2000).90 In an explicit attempt to revitalize the English School, he considers 
‘international studies to be a non-technical, humanist inquiry into a distinctive set 
of questions’.91 It focuses on certain social roles, relations, groups of associations, 
and notions of authority and power. As such, it is different from positivist social 
sciences. The Oakeshottian – and post-Kantian – distinction between natural 
sciences and cultural sciences is particularly relevant because of the identification 
of politics (at any level) as an intelligent, not deterministic, endeavour.92  
Second, it has had a considerable impact the already discussed Oakeshottian 
distinction between three different irreducible, albeit dialectically related, levels of 
political reflections: the one strictly practical; the explanatory; and the 
philosophical.93 In a recent article, Nardin clarifies his debts to Oakeshott with 
regard to the nature of theorizing international law and morality. As Oakeshott 
posed a radical distinction between political philosophy and political activity, so 
Nardin argues for the radical distinction between ‘theorising an idea’ and using it.94 
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Consistent with Oakeshott, Nardin also conceives the aim of international legal 
theorists as that of defining ‘the idea of law in general’, when conceived as 
abstracted from contingencies with the aim of uncovering ‘the presuppositions of 
international law as an idea’.95  
In short, there is a specific, Oakeshottian theory of international relations where 
theory has the aim of questioning the presuppositions of ordinary understanding 
about the relations between states, international law, morality, etc. The attempt is, 
therefore, that of considering practical, normative, elements involved in world 
politics from a point of view as universal as possible, outside of the various 
contingent circumstances that characterize international politics. This, I have 
argued in chapters 1 and 2, is to think about it concretely and not abstractly. 
The notion of different levels of political reflection has been invoked by David 
Boucher to advance an alternative view of the nature, the history, and the theory of 
international relations to that proposed by Martin Wight. In his later writings, Wight 
changed his views about the absence of a tradition of speculation and enquiry about 
the relations between states, and he conceives of international theory as a ‘political 
philosophy of international relations’.96 However, according to Boucher, he does 
not provide a clear definition of what international political theory is, subsuming 
under it everything that has been said on international relations throughout history, 
that is, ideas from all three levels of discourse that Oakeshott identified. Oakeshott’s 
distinction between different levels of political reflection, therefore, may be useful 
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to clarify that there is a distinction between the texts written for polemical or 
mundane purposes and those of higher value.97  
The identification of a perspicuously philosophical level of reflection in 
International Relations has indeed been the ground of Boucher’s identification of 
three dialectically related traditions of reflections on International Relations. In his 
‘Introduction to Leviathan’, Oakeshott conceives of the history of political 
philosophy as animated by three dialectically related traditions each having its own 
master conceptions: they are ‘Nature and Reason’, ‘Will and Artifice’, and 
‘Rational Will’. Elaborating on this, Boucher considers the theories of international 
relations as articulated according to three distinct, but related, traditions, which 
correspond to Oakeshott’s: Universal Moral Order, Empirical Realism, and 
Historical Reason.98 In so doing, he revitalizes the Oakeshottian notion that 
philosophy is a ‘tradition of enquiry’, a particular attitude towards experience and 
not a set of questions or answers and even less of immutable concepts.99 Of 
importance here is the tradition of Historical Reason, to which Oakeshott himself 
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(as I will argue in chapter 5 and 6) may be said to contribute, and which has 
particular relevance to understanding international relations. 
Constructivism: Ontological Questions and the Interpretative Method 
The discussion that I have conducted so far has led to the identification of the 
relevance of Oakeshott’s thought for the metatheoretical debates that have animated 
International Relations since the end of the Second World War. It has emerged that 
Oakeshott’s theory of modality – according to which no mode of experience or 
order of inquiry has a higher value than any other – is the ground for his critique 
against the ‘scientific approach’ and of the differences from the ‘classical approach’ 
as defended by the exponents of the English School and Morgenthau.  
Following Chris Brown’s interpretation, I have illustrated how Oakeshott’s defence 
of the legitimacy of a normative understanding of human conduct, as well of his 
philosophical understanding (discussed in chapter 3) has been central to the so-
called ‘normative turn’ in International Relations, mainly through the works of 
modern English School thinkers such as Terry Nardin and Robert Jackson, as well 
as those of international theory historians such as David Boucher. In short, 
Oakeshott’s epistemological and philosophical theory has offered and may offer an 
original perspective within post-positivist International Relations. What now needs 
to be examined is whether it may be considered as a contribution to the 
constructivist trend in the theory of international relations as it has developed over 
the last three decades. 
According to Christian Reus-Smit, what characterises constructivism is the 
emphasis on the importance of ‘normative as well as material structures, on the role 
of identity in shaping political action and on the mutually constitutive relationship 
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between agents and structure’.100 Within this definition it is possible to include a 
great variety of positions, characterised by a series of very diverse assumptions as 
well as practical commitments. A word of warning to be considered is that 
constructivist theorists, over the last ten years or so, have not developed a great deal 
of metatheoretical work and have preferred to focus on empirical analysis.101 
Indeed, besides Alexander Wendt’s Social Theory of International Politics (1999), 
constructivism is neither grounded on a general theory nor based on a shared 
methodology. However, it is possible to identify some tenets that characterize the 
broad church of International Relations constructivism at both the ontological and 
epistemological level. 
First of all, constructivism may be regarded as a challenge to the ontology of 
positivist theories of international relations. Against the essentialism of both 
neorealism and neoliberalism (which consider that social interactions are based on 
pre-established purposes and interests determined by the fixed nature of the actors 
involved), for constructivists identities and interests are ‘socially constructed’.102 In 
this regard, the constructivist paradigm has been set by Nicholas Onuf’s 1987 work, 
which asserts the need to emancipate International Relations theory from positivist 
materialism and to investigate the ways in which the social world has been 
constructed by the activity of human beings. At the same time, this would allow us 
                                                 
100
 Reus-Smit 2003a: 188. As already mentioned, this constructivism in the context of 
International Relations is therefore very different from ‘political constructivism’ as 
defended in Rawlsian political theory. The latter being a way of justifying political 
principle through a ‘thin’ foundationalism and universalism (Roberts 2007: 137-58). 
101
 Reus-Smit 2003a: 194. 
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 Reus-Smit 2003a: 188. 
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to identify ways of changing the current state of affairs.103 Alexander Wendt aptly 
summarises this ‘turn’ in International Relations by saying that, for constructivism 
‘material resources acquire meaning for human action through the structure of 
shared knowledge in which they are embedded’.104 
In spite of this general understanding, there are three main variants, which address 
differently the nature of their object of study. The first, defended by John Meyer 
and ‘the Stanford School’ of sociology, asserts the ontological priority of social 
structures. The second, influenced by Habermas’s theory of communicative action, 
stresses the importance of moral arguments in the conflict between the norms that 
constitute the social structures.105 Finally, a third trend in constructivism is inspired 
by Foucault’s structuralism. According to the Foucauldian notion of genealogy, 
social norms are the result of a form of power that defines criteria of normality.106 
Here, constructivism may be considered along the lines of critical theory as it 
identifies its purpose in unmasking the relations of power and of the clashes that 
generate current normative structures. 
Even from these brief remarks, it is possible to point out that the relevance of the 
link between constructivism and International Relations critical theory is indeed 
evident.107 Constructivism contributes to the objectives that Andrew Linklater set 
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 Onuf 1987. 
104
 Wendt 1992: 73. See also Wendt 1992; 1999. 
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 Risse 2000. See also Kratochwil 1989; Reus-Smit 1999. 
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 An example of this approach is, among many, Bartelson 1995. 
107
 On critical theory, and also on its relation with constructivism see the essays collected 
in Wyn Jones 2001. For discussion of the kink between critical theory and the constructivist 
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international critical theory: first to advance an inquiry into moral foundations; 
second, to study and identify the genealogy of international institutions; finally, to 
propose emancipatory transformations, in which subdued individuals and 
communities may eventually redeem themselves.108 
It is also the methodological debate characterizing constructivism that shows the 
variety of the positions encompassed. While Wendt, for his emphasis upon 
quantitative analysis, may still be considered as writing in continuity with the 
mainstream positivist paradigm,109  the works of Kratochwil, Ruggie and Neufeld 
show the affirmation of an interpretative paradigm focused on human practices, 
values, and intersubjective meanings.110 The recent ‘practical turn’ in International 
Relations may also be considered as a development of some aspects of 
constructivism. Indeed, it sees the social world as composed of ‘bundles of ideas 
and matter that are linguistically, materially, and intersubjectively mediated in the 
form of practices’.111 
Particularly relevant for the concerns of the present chapter are the recent attempts 
to compare the English School of International Relations to constructivism. A 
significant example here is represented by Tim Dunne, who stresses that both 
perspectives focus their attention on those intersubjective practices through which 
                                                 
turn see: Rengger and Thirkell-White 2007. The paradigm of critical theory in IR was set 
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the relations of states are constituted.112 In this regard, a point to be remarked upon 
is that constitutive theorists such as Chris Brown and Mervyn Frost share some of 
the constructivist concerns. As constructivists themselves, they indeed argue for the 
interdependence between individuals and their social contexts.113 
If these comparisons have the merit of identifying a connection between sectors of 
the study of international relations that have developed autonomously they also 
underlines differences. The most important among these is the relevance for 
constitutive theorists and neo-English School writers of normative concerns that are 
relatively absent in the works of constructivist writers. In other words, one of the 
key concerns of thinkers such as Bull, Vincent, Jackson, Mayall, Wheeler and 
Nardin, but also Brown and Frost, is the relation between international order and 
justice.114 An issue that is not often considered by constructivists.115 
Oakeshott shares with constructivism the idea that world politics is the result of the 
rational activity of individual agents, sharing common presuppositions that evolve 
throughout history in virtue of agents’ actions and understanding. Human conduct 
is the intelligent response to an understood situation, and it is shaped by the 
interpretation on those shared belief, which are composed by the moral practices in 
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which the agent is situated. However, differing from the assumptions of 
constructivist theorists, for Oakeshott, this position is grounded on philosophical 
idealism.  
As I have contented in chapter 1, Oakeshott subscribes to the principle according 
to which reality and mind are interrelated. There is no object independent from a 
knowing subject. There is no reality outside of our knowledge of it. Therefore, 
practical experience or human conduct is a form of thinking, a particular mode of 
experience. It is, as I have shown in chapter 3, normative reasoning, a non-
demonstrative form of discourse that starts from shared assumptions as historically 
embedded in a tradition or moral practice. The notion that the meaning and value 
of individual practical ideas is therefore related to their context (which is to a 
tradition or moral practice) is consistent with the methodological holism that I have 
illustrated in chapter 1. 
In addition to this, Oakeshott also agrees with the interpretative or humanistic 
methodology that animates much of the body of constructivist works. In this regard 
it is of particular significance, as it anticipates many of the constructivist concerns, 
the history of the modern European state that Oakeshott offers in On Human 
Conduct. This is indeed a reconstruction of the beliefs about the nature of the 
activity of government and of the authority of the law that have characterized 
modern Europe. For Oakeshott, the political history of Europe is a history of 
political thought, an investigation into intersubjective beliefs, into the ‘European 
political consciousness’.116  
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He also defends, as I have also shown in chapter 3, the possibility of a philosophical 
reflection on the practical world and human conduct (which includes political life) 
intended as the search of the presuppositions of political concepts and of their 
universal meaning. As I have discussed, and as I will illustrate in the next chapter, 
the philosophical theory of political life is articulated by Oakeshott through the 
identification of the postulates and of the characteristics of two opposed ideal 
characters (civil association and enterprise association). They are universal 
concepts as they represent the two irreducible modes of human association 
considered independently of the various historical and contingent circumstances of 
political life. 
Even though Oakeshott is indubitably concerned with the study of moral 
foundations, his position is distant from one that attributes an emancipatory role to 
theory as that of those constructivist theorists more influenced by critical theory. 
As I have argued over the last three chapters, Oakeshott radically distinguishes 
philosophy from practical activity. In other words, to identify the practices that are 
assumed as the starting point of normative reasoning, and to consider them in terms 
as universal as possible, is a different engagement from that of proposing particular 
practical arrangements. This dissimilar perspective is not, however, simply a 
diverse preference regarding the nature of philosophy’s role. Instead, it is the 
consequence of a theory of modality, according to which, practical experience or 
human conduct is based on autonomous presuppositions, and according to which, 
any change of the current political arrangements is only made possible by departing 
from those shared assumptions and actual circumstances from which normative 
reasoning develop. As it considers concepts outside of their immanent context and 
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criticises their assumptions, philosophical criticism is irrelevant to practical 
activity.117 
Conclusion 
With the discussion developed over the first three chapters as a necessary prelude, 
in this chapter I have claimed that Oakeshott’s philosophy (with particular reference 
to his theory of modality and of criticism) may be placed in the context of the 
debates that have animated International Relations Theory in the post-1945 era. 
In the first place, I have shown that the critique of Rationalism in politics has clear 
analogies with the opposition to the ‘scientific approach’ that characterized the 
second Great Debate in International Relations. Grounded on his idealist theory of 
modality, and on the sceptical model of the conversation of mankind, Oakeshott’s 
essays on Rationalism may be considered alongside Morgenthau’s Scientific Man 
vs. Power Politics and Bull’s defence of the ‘classical approach’. However, 
differently from Morgenthau, he does not consider philosophy a normative activity 
with the aim of prescribing certain arrangements in world politics. As already 
discussed in chapter 3, Oakeshott considered philosophical activity irrelevant to the 
practical. Indeed, it criticises the assumptions that ground normative reasoning and 
attempts to identify the universal value of political concepts, which is to say, what 
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 This attitude is not however completely out of touch with contemporary international 
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some special knowledge which enables them to solve the difficult moral dilemmas of the 
day’ is unsustainable. Their contribution to the debates can only be ‘in virtue of their role 
as citizens who happen to have thought about a particularly difficult issue for longer than 
most of their fellows’ (1992: 3). 
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they mean when considered outside of the contingent circumstances and of the 
shared assumptions from which they were constructed and justified. 
In spite of the defence of the legitimacy of a non-scientific understanding of human 
conduct, Oakeshott’s philosophy of history is in contrast with the historiographical 
positions of many exponents of the English School and, in the American context, 
of Morgenthau. In particular, the attempt to find universal or covering laws through 
historical knowledge is considered by Oakeshott a residue of the realist and 
positivist epistemology that he wanted to undermine. Even though he shared with 
Herbert Butterfield a certain inconsistency between his activity as historian and his 
methodological and epistemological doctrines, Oakeshott’s philosophical defence 
of the autonomy of history – once again based on his conception of modality – is a 
powerful argument against ‘wisdom literature’ and the didactic use of history, 
which is so characteristic of traditional international relations theory.  
To sum up, by means of the comparison with some of the most relevant ideas of the 
debates about the nature of the theory of international relations that occurred after 
the Second World War, I have argued that Oakeshott defends a peculiar and original 
position, which is against a purely quantitative study of world politics, but also 
‘sceptical’ about the possibility of finding eternal truths or objective laws through 
historical enquiry.  
In addition to this reconstruction, this chapter has elaborated on Chris Brown’s 
claim that Oakeshott’s thought can be considered one of the sources of the 
normative turn in International Relations. I have stressed that Oakeshott’s ideas are 
important as they have influenced a genuine philosophical study of international 
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relations, as recently advanced by some neo-English School writers such as Terry 
Nardin and Robert Jackson. At the same time, Oakeshott’s definition of philosophy 
has also contributed to the historical study of the reflection on the conduct of states 
with the notion of the three traditions advanced by David Boucher elaborating upon 
the model of Oakeshott’s ‘Introduction to Leviathan’. 
With this long discussion as a background, and in the light of the argument that I 
have developed in the previous chapters, I have eventually contended that 
Oakeshott’s philosophy may also be regarded as a contribution to contemporary 
constructivism in International Relations. Even though his theory developed from 
different philosophical foundations, Oakeshott shared with the constructivists not 
just the notion that political life and social reality are a construction, that is to say, 
the result of the activity of mind, but also the interpretative methodology. Indeed, 
consistent with Oakeshott’s notion of modality, the social world may be regarded 
not just from the point of view of science, but also from that of history, which places 
individual identities and performance in the context of moral practices intended as 
shared assumptions. It may also be considered from the point of view of philosophy, 
which seeks to look at human life from a universal point of view. On the ground of 
these considerations, over the next chapter I will argue that Oakeshott’s political 
philosophy may be the ground for an understanding of international society where 
customary international law is its constitutive practice. It is on this ground that in 
chapter 6 I will address the normative questions about the relation between morality 
and justice in international society. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CIVIL ASSOCIATION AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER 
 
Introduction 
At the outset of chapter 1 I suggested that those international relations theorists such 
as Nardin, Jackson, Rengger and Frost – who have applied some of Oakeshott’s 
notions at the international level – have not explored a comprehensive 
understanding of the implications of Oakeshott’s political philosophy at the 
international level, nor have they discussed the broad philosophical meaning of 
those ideas. At the same time, constructivist theorists, while presenting, as I have 
shown over the last chapters, many similarities with Oakeshott’s broad 
epistemological assumptions, have instead referred to other philosophical sources.   
Over the last four chapters, I have discussed Oakeshott’s philosophical idealism; its 
implications for the understanding of normative thinking and political philosophy; 
as well as its relevance for the metatheoretical debates in the history of the theory 
of international relations. In particular, in chapter 3, I have shown that Oakeshott 
conceives practical experience as a world of value judgments. In Experience and 
Its Modes and in On Human Conduct, practical experience, or (as it is called in the 
later work) human conduct, is seen as the result of human intelligence and 
rationality. Philosophy is a critical activity insofar as it identifies the postulates and 
the meaning that concepts have when considered outside the contingent 
circumstances in which they are situated. Philosophical criticism moves from the 
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current and ordinary understanding of political and legal concepts to a definition 
that may be as universal as possible. 
As I have claimed in chapter 4, when applied at the international level this position 
has profound implications. On the one hand, it is a radical critique of an exclusively 
quantitative or systemic understanding of international relations, as proposed since 
the 1950s by the followers of the scientific approach. In this regard, the critique 
against Rationalism in politics is of particular relevance because it associates 
Oakeshott with the anti-positivist strand in international relations. 
On the other hand, however, Oakeshott’s position cannot be identified with those 
of the defenders of the classical approach. In particular, his philosophy of history 
distinguishes the concerns of the historian from those of the practical man. For 
Oakeshott, historical knowledge provides neither lessons, nor objective laws. If, as 
such, Oakeshott’s thought may be used as a critical tool against the main tendencies 
of the so-called second Great Debate, his ideas have animated a distinctive approach 
in the so-called normative turn. Oakeshott’s analysis of human conduct and political 
life has been the starting point for an understanding of the moral and normative 
nature of international law and morality. Moreover, Oakeshott’s positions have 
influenced those theorists that conceive of theory of international relations as an 
explanatory activity, as a tradition of enquiry lying not in a certain set of questions 
and answers, but rather in a manner of questioning the presuppositions of relations 
between states.  
In short, the previous chapter has demonstrated that Oakeshott’s philosophy may 
be considered an original voice in the context of contemporary International 
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Relations Theory. As it argues for the normative nature of the social world – which 
is therefore conceived as a creation of human activity based on shared assumptions 
which are part of a moral practice – and it defends the legitimacy of its historical 
and philosophical understanding, Oakeshott may be considered as a proponent of a 
form of constructivism. 
As already recalled, neo-English School theorists have already applied Oakeshott’s 
notions to the understanding of international society. In particular, Terry Nardin has 
proposed a ‘practical’ conception of international society constituted by customary 
international law.1 More recently, Nicholas Rengger has interpreted the evolution 
of international order in the light of Oakeshott’s dichotomy between civil 
association, or nomocracy, and enterprise association, or teleocracy.2  
Elaborating on these contributions, as well as on David Boucher’s triadic 
conception of the philosophy of international relations,3 I will argue in the following 
that from Oakeshott’s civil association it is possible to construct a theory of 
international society. To this end, I will first discuss how Oakeshott presented what 
he conceives as two opposite ideal characters of intelligent human relationships that 
he discussed in relation to understanding of the modern European state, namely, 
civil association and enterprise association. The analysis will be centred upon the 
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 Nardin 1983. 
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 Rengger 2013. In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott uses the dichotomy between civil 
association and enterprise association and the one between societas and universitas. The 
opposition between nomocracy and teleocracy is only mentioned once in On Human 
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Thought (2006: 469-97). 
3
 Boucher 1998. 
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concept of authority and its relation with morality, also in the light of Oakeshott’s 
indebtedness to Hobbes. On this ground, I will analyse Oakeshott’s texts to offer a 
comprehensive account of his ideas about international relations. I will show that, 
particularly in On Human Conduct, we may find considerations about European 
expansionism, and war, as well as on the nature of international society as a whole. 
I will then discuss Terry Nardin’s Law, Morality and the Relations of States,4 and 
Christian Reus-Smit’s criticism of the attempt to theorise a ‘practical international 
society’.5 I will argue that international society may be conceived as a moral 
association in terms of recognized and authoritative non-instrumental laws. What 
will emerge is that Oakeshott’s theory of the rule of law illuminates the possibility 
of an international legal order without a central legislative office. This is of 
particular importance, not just because of the Hobbesian influence on Oakeshott’s 
theory of civil association, but also because it sheds light on the historical nature of 
the criteria of conduct and on the obligations that states acquire in their relations 
with other states and their population. The heuristic validity of this perspective will 
be finally discussed with reference to the role of the codification of customs in 
international law. 
Civil association and Enterprise association 
As I have argued in previous chapters, Oakeshott contends that philosophy 
conceives political concepts not in relation to the normative conflicts in which they 
are situated, but instead ‘outside of the contingencies and ambiguities of actual 
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goings-on in the world’.6 With particular reference to political life, once we assume 
that it is an intelligent normative engagement, that is to say, it is a human 
construction and not a given material, 
The task of the theorist is to discern the mode of intelligent relationship it 
postulates. And by a mode of relationship I mean a categorically distinct manner 
of being related which, while it may subsist in conjunction with other modes of 
relationship, cannot be reduced to any other.7  
It is in this respect that the negative or critical method that I have discussed in 
previous chapters is applied. Oakeshott identifies the distinguishing features of 
autonomous and irreducible modes of human relationship from the contingent 
character to which they are circumstantially related.  
This is evident in both On Human Conduct and in ‘The Rule of Law’, where civil 
association and the rule of law are distinguished from other forms of relationship. 
For instance, he aims to define what law is besides the various occurrences to which 
it is attached. It is for this reason that, for example, he uses Latin terms for the 
concepts he is defining. These words, such as respublica, cives, and lex, ‘being 
somewhat archaic, are more easily detached from contingent circumstances’.8 To 
achieve this result, his theory constructs ideal characters, which are a composition 
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Roman republican tradition represented one of the most significant points of reference for 
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of elements abstracted from ‘actual goings-on in the world’.9 Consistent with the 
theory of truth that I have examined in chapter 1, their coherence depends on certain 
postulates or unavoidable assumptions, which are investigated by philosophy.  
As already clarified in chapter 3, Oakeshott’s theory does not attempt to propose a 
solution to political conflicts. Rather than being normative models to be put into 
practice, or solutions to practical dilemmas, ideal characters are instruments of 
identification. As such, they are theoretical devices useful to understand the 
different, irreducible, forms of human association on the grounds of the 
understanding of their participants. Of course, this is not to deny that philosophical 
concepts may have a normative relevance, but to state that those who engage in 
such an effort temporarily abandon their philosophical commitment to become 
participants in the practical debate.  
The first of the two ideal characters identified by Oakeshott in his understanding of 
political life is enterprise association, or teleocracy. It is a ‘relationship in terms of 
the pursuit of some common purpose’,10 intended as a substantive condition of 
things to be procured. Its defining element is the goal common to the members of 
the association, which can be identified as a ‘community of wills’, or of ‘choices’. 
Agents are related to one another in making decisions oriented towards the pursuit 
of a purpose.  
Consequently, it is also a relationship in terms of ‘the management’ of the activities 
oriented towards the common purpose. The activity of governing is based on 
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‘power’ (dominium) imposing actions in order to obtain the expected 
consequences.11 Laws are therefore ‘commands’, calling for obedience, and for a 
particular response to particular situations from assigned agents. They are 
instrumental to the purpose concerned, which constitutes the normative criterion for 
judging the propriety of the rules, and individual actions and choices. 
The second mode of human association is civil association, or nomocracy.12 As 
distinct from ‘enterprise association’, which is teleologically constituted by the 
common goal of the associates and by the management of its pursuit, civil 
association is a relationship identified by the rules commonly subscribed to by 
agents. These rules do not ask for specific action or outcomes, but only for 
recognition. Thus, they are ‘moral’ and not instrumental.13 If instrumental rules are 
the efficient means of achieving a purpose, moral or civil laws are the conditions 
for individual enactment and are ‘indifferent to the success or to the failure of the 
substantive enterprises being pursued’.14 They are purely adverbial and 
indeterminate, setting the procedural conditions that individuals have to take into 
account when they act.  
Civil law establishes the autonomy and completeness of the political order with 
regard to any external features, being without superior terms of reference, such as 
the substantive, absolute goal set by ‘enterprise association’. What civil association 
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conceptualises is not just the ideal of law as a limit to politics,15 but also the 
autonomy of politics from any comprehensive ethical conceptions that impose an 
end from outside the moral and legal system of a political community. There is no 
external criterion that legitimates and authorises the rules in terms of which the civil 
relationship is constituted.  
The distinction between civil association and enterprise association is between a 
relationship which is constituted by non-instrumental rules and one that is based 
instead on the pursuit of a common purpose. While the source of political obligation 
in enterprise association is this common end, in civil association it is the recognition 
and acknowledgment of the authority of law by all agents who fall under its 
jurisdiction.   
Before offering a comparison between enterprise association and civil association 
on the nature of authority, it is worth underlining that both civil association and 
enterprise association are socially constructed human relationships, they are not a 
given, independent of the actors involved and from their understanding of the 
situation. Beliefs about authority and order, goals and purposes are the result of a 
normative, practical understanding of the agents.  
Given this broad assumption, the difference between the two is that civil association 
breaks the connection between authority and purposiveness. Civil law is not 
authoritative because of its instrumental value, its expected outcomes or its 
desirability. However, this does not imply that purposiveness is eliminated from 
political life. Indeed, first of all, when the legal order is understood as a civil 
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association – which is to say, when there is not any overarching final end to be 
reached or providing the final criterion for all possible actions – it is possible to 
have ‘an unregulated variety of self-chosen purposive associations’.16 Civil 
association is a way to regulate and order different associations and individuals 
acting according to competing and often conflicting purposes and values.17 
Moreover, civil association has its own purpose: to establish that small amount of 
‘compulsory civilization’, without which the pursuit of individual endeavour would 
be impossible.18  
This, however, does not equate with saying, as suggested by David Mapel, that all 
laws are purposive and that the distinction between instrumental and civil law is 
blurred.19 Instead, while the purpose of instrumental law is to ask individual agents 
to fulfil certain actions functional to the pre-established goal, civil association does 
not prescribe actions to agents, but aims at providing those conditions based on 
which particular ends may be achieved.    
This is evident also from Oakeshott’s account of the history of the modern European 
state, where he explores how the ideal characters of enterprise associations and civil 
associations may be used to understand European political history. There, the 
contraposition between civil association and enterprise association is that between 
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societas, or nomocracy, and universitas, or teleocracy.20 The two ideal characters 
never appear in their pure form, but they are found together, contingently related.  
It is relevant to our investigation that, in Oakeshott’s account, European states 
emerged from medieval realms as different societas. The many communities and 
corporations, which pre-existed the state, were united in their acknowledgment of 
a superior, royal, authority. Its purpose was to establish peace and legality, while 
being indifferent to the goals of the various groups that were unified.21 In the third 
essay of On Human Conduct this is once more explained in relation to Marsilius of 
Padua. He identified as the purpose of a realm ‘human well-being, peace, 
tranquillity, and… a concern for the “health” of the human condition’. 22  However, 
this does not equate the realm with an enterprise association insofar as rules ‘do not 
prescribe wants to be chosen or actions to be performed’, but only ‘conditions to be 
subscribed to in self-chosen transactions of individual agents’.23As this example 
shows, civil association can be considered as having a specific moral purpose: the 
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achievement of the minimum conditions required for the possibility of civil order 
and human interaction.  
A second point to be remarked is that the elimination from the definition of 
authority of any conceptions of the good intended as the final summum bonum of 
the legal order indicates Oakeshott’s indebtedness to Hobbes. As for Hobbes, also 
in civil association there is no external criterion that may provide the ground for the 
authority of the legal order. Law is authoritative neither because of its expected 
outcomes, nor because of the approval by the members of the association. In 
Hobbes, it is through the covenant that individuals recognize the authority of a 
sovereign legislative office as the sole author of valid laws, renouncing the 
possibility of other sources of moral obligation.24 In Oakeshott’s civil association, 
laws are self-authenticating, their authority ‘is recognized in terms of the rules 
which permit them to be made’.25 Authoritative law are those enacted by a 
previously recognized legislative office, which act according to a pre-established 
procedure. 
However, it is important to underline that differently from Hobbes, Oakeshott does 
not see the origin of authority in the act of will of the subscribers to the covenant, 
and law as the expression of the will of the sovereign authority. On the contrary, 
for Oakeshott, expressions as ‘covenant’ or ‘contract’ represent that ‘civil 
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association’ is an engagement and a relationship between individual intelligent 
agents.26 They may indicate the day-to-day bargaining between different parties of 
society, and it may depict the intentionality that animates these acts. The notion of 
covenant may indeed represent the evolving nature of political criteria and the fact 
that it is the result of historical human inventions. In short, even though we can say 
that law is independent of any other source that makes it authentic, for Oakeshott it 
represents and reflects the evolution of the relationship between the agents 
involved. 
This difference is clarified in relation to the triadic conception of the history of 
political philosophy which is presented in the ‘Introduction to Leviathan’, and that 
may be considered to understand different theories about the source of political 
authority.27 The dialectical opposition between the three traditions of ‘Reason and 
Nature’; ‘Will and Artifice’; and ‘Rational Will’ provides a framework for the 
understanding of the theories about the origin of political order and authority. While 
the first conceives of the principles of political order as natural and discovered by 
reason (as in Plato’s Republic); the second (with Hobbes) thinks of them as the 
result of human creation and will. Finally, the followers of the third tradition believe 
‘that in it the truths of the first two traditions are fulfilled and their errors find a 
happy release’.28 Most importantly, just as in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, they see 
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the world ‘on the analogy of human history’ and the authority of the law as the 
result of historically evolving relationships.29  
Therefore, the difference between Hobbes’s and Oakeshott’s ideas about the 
authority of law is one about its origin. Whilst for Hobbes, the creation of the civil 
order is the result of an act of will, for Oakeshott, it is the outcome of historical 
moral relationship, of an evolving practice of civility. The creation of a system of 
civil law is not only the outcome of an act of will on the part of its participants. The 
recognition of the authority of the law is diffused throughout time, and is situated 
in an evolving relationship between the various agents involved.30  
To recapitulate, Oakeshott’s political philosophy identifies the postulates or 
presuppositions of two opposite ideal characters that designate two 
incommensurable and irreducible modes of relationship between individual agents. 
While enterprise association is a transactional relationship composed of rules 
instrumental to the achievement of a pre-established goal, civil association is non-
purposive: it is a legal order constituted by a system of non-instrumental rules. 
Insofar as it excludes any considerations about a higher ethical or normative ground, 
Oakeshott’s conception may be considered in continuity with Hobbes and with the 
legal positivist tradition. Indeed, it identifies authority with authenticity, excluding 
any further considerations from law. However, as opposed to Hobbes, he does not 
identify the origin of authority in an act of will, but it is instead the recognition of 
an existing and evolving moral relationship. 
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The History of the Modern European State and International Order 
In the third essay of On Human Conduct, Oakeshott applies the dichotomy between 
civil and enterprise association to the understanding of the history of the modern 
European state. Anticipating many of the constructivist considerations, Oakeshott 
offers a history of the beliefs about the authority and the engagement of 
government, of the nature of law.31 It is a history that, consistently with the idealist 
tenets that ground his position, focuses on human’s self-understanding, on the 
history of thought. Thus this history is developed through opposition between those 
that have understood the State as a societas (civil association), or as a universitas 
(enterprise association).32 
It often goes unnoticed by readers and commentators that in this text Oakeshott 
presents some ideas that are relevant to International Relations and are part of his 
broader argument. In particular, he identifies in the international sphere some of the 
circumstances that favoured the increasing success of the teleocratic understanding 
of the state.  
The first of these is colonialism. The initial colonial settlements were indeed 
‘corporate undertakings, communities of persons modelled upon the constitutions 
of churches or religious sects’.33 As such, they understood their activity of 
government as that of a teleocratic enterprise. One consequence of this was the 
success of the disposition ‘to regard the office of government as the exercise of 
seigneurial management’. In particular, even in those cases in which the states 
                                                 
31
 Oakeshott 1975: 189. 
32
 Oakeshott 1975: 185-326. On this se: L. O’Sullivan 2000. 
33
 Oakeshott 1975: 270. 
 155 
 
regulated their internal affairs through the rule of law, in their colonial adventures 
their style was teleocratic. The purpose of those early settlements was indeed the 
exploitation of resources, the increase of trade and the diffusion of a faith. 34 
Quoting Burke’s famous description, in the colonies the state was ‘disguised as a 
merchant’.35 
As well as colonialism, another element that enhanced the teleocratic understanding 
of the activity of government was, as Nicholas Rengger has recently highlighted, 
war. It is interesting to note that Oakeshott – who served in Continental Europe 
during World War II – also devoted some of his notebooks to this theme.36 Even 
though they are scattered over many years, the bulk of these reflections is in one 
notebook, entitled ‘A Conversation’, begun in 1944. There, we may identify the 
three main themes of Oakeshott’s discussion of war: its centrality in modern 
history; its deleterious impact on liberty and on the organization of society; and the 
evolution of its role.  
In On Human Conduct, Oakeshott characterizes European modernity as dominated 
by continuous threats of war and by the consequent necessity of providing 
protection from external invaders.37 The success of the teleocratic understanding of 
the role of the office of government was supplemented by the ‘great threat of extra-
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European invasion’ and by the continuous state of war within Europe.38 It is indeed 
in the protection of the interests of the state, and in the care of its relations with 
other states, that the teleocratic character of governing emerges more clearly.39 The 
Latin motto Inter arma silent leges is so re-interpreted: when a state is menaced 
‘with dissolution or destruction’ it becomes predominantly an enterprise 
association, and civil law tends to disappear.40 As W.H. Greenleaf notes (following 
this Oakeshottian idea) the total mobilization, the degree of destruction, the level of 
homogeneity achieved by propaganda, and the exploitation and management of 
resources reached after two world wars have been decisive in the affirmation of the 
belief that the State is a form of enterprise association, oriented towards a common 
purpose, and directed by the government.41 In short, war shapes the nature of the 
state and changes our understanding of what political association is. 
Finally, especially in his notebooks, Oakeshott reflects on the nature of war. In 
some of his notes, he seems to distinguish between a classical and a ‘gnostic’ 
conception of war, with the prevalence of the latter starting, according to Oakeshott, 
after 1918. This change is emphatically described by Oakeshott as the most 
important ‘in European civilization’, as the change ‘which marks the twentieth 
century’.42 War changed from being a regulatory mechanism within the European 
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state system, to an instrument for the establishment of a radically reformed world 
order. 
To argue that there is a relation between enterprise association and the state of 
continuous belligerence that characterised the modern European state system does 
not equate to a version of the democratic peace thesis. He gives short and rather 
cursory considerations to the idea that the constitutional form of government has 
implications for the persistence of war in history. In On Human Conduct we read, 
Kant and others conjectured that a Europe composed of states with republican 
constitutions would be a Europe at peace. This absurdity is often excused on the 
ground that it is a plausible (although naïve) identification of war with so-called 
dynastic war, but it is in fact the muddle from which Montesquieu did his best to 
rescue us, the confusion of a constitution of government (republican) with a mode 
of association (civil relationship).43 
In other words, what matters is not the constitution (monarchic or republican; liberal 
or non-liberal) of the office of government, but instead the beliefs about the nature 
of the association, that is to say the moral self-understanding, of the members of the 
association. The self-understanding that the members have of their reciprocal 
relationship is the ‘moral essence’ of the association  
When, at state level, individuals understand themselves to be members of a 
collective enterprise for the achievement of a goal, or for the enactment of 
substantial conceptions of the good or moral values, war is more likely.44 What this 
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argument highlights is not just that the teleological style of politics and the 
teleological understanding of the state produce a mind-set and a kind of government 
that are part of the conditions of war; it also states that the condition of war forces 
the establishment of a teleocratic form of government in which all material 
resources, as well as all individuals, cooperate in the achievement of the final goal. 
As Oakeshott writes, 
And although, even in these circumstances, the rule of law may (as Hobbes 
thought) be formally rescued by invoking such legal doctrines as that of the 
‘eminent domain’ of a government to be exercised ex justa causa, this is only 
another way of saying that necessity knows no law.45 
When the state is perceived under mortal threats, when an attack is feared, when 
the necessity of moving to war is felt, the office of government assumes its 
teleocratic appearance and the authority of its acts derives from the final end to be 
achieved: victory (which in the twentieth century has been the annihilation of the 
enemy). 
However, it is not only the case that enterprise association has become dominant in 
the understanding of the state: it has also been victorious in the self-understanding 
of the society of the state as a whole. Although only in a footnote, Oakeshott extends 
his diagnosis of the history of the modern European state to the international level: 
It is perhaps worth notice that notions of ‘world peace’ and ‘world government’ 
which in the eighteenth century were explored in the terms of civil association have 
in this century become projects of ‘world management’ concerned with the 
                                                 
45
 Oakeshott 1999: 178. 
 159 
 
distribution of substantive goods. The decisive change took place in the interval 
between the League of Nations and the United Nations.46 
Even though Oakeshott may be wrong and, as Rengger suggests, this change 
occurred much earlier, and in fact represents the modern understanding of world 
politics,47 what is important for our concerns is that, as with the domestic level, 
Oakeshott identifies two possible opposite understandings of world politics, one 
inspired by civil association, the other by enterprise association and concerned with 
the distribution of goods.48 
To sum up so far: in contrast with how it may first appear, Oakeshott’s distinction 
between two modes of human relationship, between civil association and enterprise 
association, has important implications at the international level. First, he identifies 
war – along with colonialism – with one of the elements that contributed to the 
success of the teleocratic understanding of the state. War, and the state of 
continuous belligerence that characterized European modernity, has been one of the 
defining elements of the sovereign state as an enterprise association. Secondly, 
international society as a whole has been increasingly understood as a universitas, 
that is to say according to a solidarist paradigm conception of relations between 
states. This is shown by the transformation of war from a regulatory device to an 
instrument of creation of a new world order and by the establishment of purposive 
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international organisations such as the UN and the EU, which are mainly concerned 
with the re-distribution of resources and the achievement of substantive goals 
through a prevalently instrumental international law.  
Be that as it may, in the rest of the chapter I will contend that, even though 
Oakeshott is rather assertive in his denial of an international civil association, his 
theory may open the way to an original interpretation of international society 
conceived as moral association based on the common acknowledgment of the 
authority of international law.  
Practical and Purposive International Society 
In his contributions to Diplomatic Investigations, Bull presented one of the first 
versions of his notion of international society, which was later advanced in The 
Anarchical Society (1977). In that paper, entitled ‘Society and Anarchy in 
International Relations’, Bull follows Martin Wight’s triadic conception of the way 
in which international relations have been theorized. According to Wight, the realist 
view of the international system, in which world politics is a relationship based on 
power, is opposed to the rationalist notion of international society, in which the 
world is governed by human institutions which arise from human co-operation and 
interaction. Finally, there is the revolutionist tradition, which, while despising the 
current state of affairs, believes in the unity of humankind which can be achieved 
through a world society. 49   
Along these lines, Bull distinguishes between three different traditions: a realist 
one, whose understanding of international relations is shaped by Hobbes’s notion 
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of the state of nature;50 a Kantian, universalist one which demands ‘that the 
international anarchy be brought to an end’ by achieving a transnational 
community;51 and a Grotian or internationalist tradition, according to which the 
absence of a supranational government (i.e. anarchy) does not exclude cooperation 
framed by international law.52  
The Grotian is the idea of international society defended by Bull, and one that 
became the distinctive idea of the English School. The cooperation of states under 
a recognized international law represents a via media, a middle-ground, between 
the realist and the revolutionist traditions.53 International society is a critique 
against both the realist view that the world comprises anarchic states in an anarchic 
power relationship with each other, and the universalist view that argues that the 
world is a single society.54  
This notion finds its final systematisation in The Anarchical Society, where 
international society is grounded on the consciousness of ‘certain common interests 
and common values’, 55 which, historically, can be found in ‘common culture or 
civilisation’.56 As such, international society has some goals: the preservation of 
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order; the maintenance of the independence or external sovereignty of individual 
states; peace; the limitation of violence, the keeping of promises and the 
stabilisation of possession.57 As summarised by Alan James, international society 
is a society of notional persons (the states) with a body of rules that define proper 
behaviour for its members. These rules are protocols, morals, and law.58  
In another of his contributions to Diplomatic Investigations, entitled ‘The Grotian 
Conception of International Society’, Bull distinguishes between two ways of 
interpreting the concept of international society. Even though there are many 
possible doubts about the methodology that underpinned Bull’s discussion – which 
resembles, as David Boucher suggests, Arthur Lovejoy’s unit ideas59 – his 
consideration of the Grotian and internationalist traditions is very relevant to our 
argument.  
First, there is the pluralist conception (such as that of Oppenheim), where various 
states with different goals and conceptions of the good recognise that they are bound 
by a minimal code of coexistence. States agree on certain minimal rules, which are 
recognition of sovereignty and non-intervention. By contrast we have the solidarist 
conception (such as that of Grotius) which argues instead for a collective will of the 
society of states.60 In this regard, Bull points out two possible manifestations of 
collective will, related to the enforcement of international law: the first concerns 
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‘police action’, where states respond to law-breaking; the second concerns the 
monitoring of the way in which states treat their own citizens.61 
As such, Bull claims, the solidarist strand of the internationalist tradition damages 
international order. It indeed prescribes much more than the society of states is able 
to deliver. Bull finds examples of the detrimental influence of the Grotian 
perspective on international order on several occasions in the twentieth century: the 
actions of the League of Nations against Italy in 1935; the trials of the International 
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and of the Far East on charges of having begun an 
unjust war; and the Korean War, conducted in the name of the UN.62 Bull argues 
that these acts burdened international law and institutions for the limitation of 
conflict with a weight that was for them impossible to bear, and this has led to them 
becoming ineffective.  
Over the past decades, this distinction between solidarist and pluralist conceptions 
of international society has shaped a great variety of positions, with particular 
regard to humanitarian intervention, collective security, and issues of distributive 
justice.63 As such, the two perspectives differ from both the realist view, which 
negates any sort of possible meaningful cooperation, and from the revolutionist or 
cosmopolitan views, which instead aim at the construction of a world unity. 
However, they differ from each other in arguing that cooperation may achieve at 
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best a minimal order – as the pluralists suggest – or a cohesive collective will, as  
the solidarists argue. 
Elaborating on the English School notion of international society and on the 
dichotomy between solidarism and pluralism, Terry Nardin has considered 
Oakeshott’s theory in the attempt to find a middle ground between the idea that 
international order is absent, and that it can only be achieved through a world 
society. In particular, Nardin argues that there exists a practical or moral 
understanding of international society, a universal community where members are 
not persons but states, which understand themselves to be bound by non-
instrumental rules, and not by common purposes.64 
At the outset, it is indeed worth underlining once again that, as in much of the 
modern literature in international relations and in sympathy with Bull, Nardin 
conceives states as individual agents. Thus, he develops his notion of international 
society by analogy with the relations between persons in civil society.65 The 
members, the individuals (or using the Oakeshottian terminology, the personae) 
related by the recognition of a system of non-instrumental rules are, at the 
international level, the sovereign states. They are formally equal because the rules 
are specified in the same terms for all, even though they do not have the same 
opportunity to use the resources of the law, and to pursue their chosen purposes. 
Following Oakeshott, Nardin conceives international society as an ideal character, 
that is to say as a composition of characteristics detached from the circumstances 
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of the world.66 In so doing, he distinguishes between different conceptions of 
international society: practical and purposive. As enterprise and civil association 
are the exclusive manner by which the relationship between individual intelligent 
agents may be understood, practical and purposive society are two modes of 
international society. According to the purposive conception, different states are 
united by shared values and purposes, while for the practical they are united by the 
subscriptions of a set of custom and practices. In the former case, international law 
is the instrument for the achievement of the common purpose, while in the latter 
‘rules constrain the conduct of states pursuing different and sometimes 
incompatible purposes’.67  
This distinction seems to reiterate that between solidarism and pluralism. 
Oakeshott’s political philosophy provides an argument that asserts the self-
contradictoriness of purposive or solidarist international society. Indeed, Nardin’s 
point is not just about the distinction between these two modes of international 
society, but much more about the logical priority of the practical form over the 
purposive. Elaborating on an aspect that was merely hinted at in Oakeshott – 
according to which enterprise association entails a moral practice68 – the pursuit of 
shared purposes presupposes procedures to which agreement may be achieved. The 
legal order understood as a system of non-instrumental rules makes possible a vast 
array of purposive associations organised through treaties, contracts, and stable 
                                                 
66
 Nardin 1983: 34. 
67
 Nardin 1983: 187. 
68
 ‘This mode of association [enterprise association], of course entails moral relationship, 
but with that and with any other adverbial or rule-like conditions it may involve we are not 
now concerned’, Oakeshott 1975: 114. 
 166 
 
organisations.69 In short, the purposive conception is not autonomous, and is self-
contradictory insofar as it presupposes the existence of a practical society, 
constituted by a set of laws, customs and practices, recognized by different states.  
In other words, it is possible to conceive international law as a moral practice 
constraining the conduct of states which are pursuing different goals. In particular, 
it is customary international law which is relevant. Indeed, it is neither the result of 
a central legislative authority nor of the command of the sovereign, nor of an 
agreement between states.70 Instead, it is ‘based ultimately on the practice of its 
users’ and contains the authoritative rules according to which the conduct of states 
is directed and judged. Therefore, the first level of international society would be 
represented by customary international law and would correspond to the ‘practical 
conception’. States are associated by their participation in a common set of rules. 
Besides this, there is the political level, in which a multitude of purposes are shared, 
and in which interests either converge or clash.  
In opposition to Nardin’s conception of practical association, Christian Reus-Smit 
has claimed that ‘all historical societies of states have begun … [as] communities 
of states, linked by common sentiment, experience and identity’.71 It is this 
intersubjective common belief – Reus-Smit argues – that represents the moral 
purpose of the state and of international society. In this regard, it is worth recalling, 
as already stated above, that to say that a political association is based on the 
subscription to rules indifferent to any particular moral goals does not equate with 
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saying that purposiveness is absent or eliminated. On the contrary, Oakeshott’s 
distinction between enterprise and civil association is all about the nature of 
authority and governing. In enterprise association, authority of the law is based on 
its relations with the pre-established goal, which is intended as a substantive state 
of affairs to be attained. Governing is the activity of managing individuals towards 
this goal through the coercive apparatus of power. Civil association instead simply 
denies that the legal order should be at the service of any super imposed goals.  
The shared values that Reus-Smit identifies as constituting various historically 
international societies are not substantive purposes, but procedural constraints.72 In 
this regard it is enlightening that as an example of his understanding of moral 
purpose, Reus-Smit quotes Aristotle’s famous sentence from the Politics (1.I, 57): 
‘Observation tells us that every state is an association and that every association is 
formed with a view to some good purpose. I say good because in all their actions 
all men do in fact aim at what they think good’.73 It is significant to note that 
Oakeshott is inspired precisely by Aristotle’s Book I of the Politics in conceiving 
his model of civil association.74 What is important, however, is that for Aristotle 
the ‘good life’ is not a substantial state of things to be achieved but instead a formal 
condition. To behave according to this ideal is not to do certain specific actions but 
to act ‘while subscribing adequately to considerations of moral propriety or 
worth’.75 
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Thus, the notion of civil association offers a new perspective on Bull’s key idea that 
international society is grounded on common values and interests. A perspective 
that moves beyond Nardin’s interpretation, and that sheds light on the constructivist 
attempt to identify the moral ground of international society. Different from Reus-
Smit’s constructivism, Oakeshott’s perspective clarifies that these common values 
and interests are not conceived as the result of a common will or as the coercive 
imposition of particular actions to individual agents, but they are a common 
concern. This is manifested in the subscription to the adverbial constraints to 
conduct prescribed by the law and not in the pursuit of some common enterprise.76 
As such, and insofar as it reflects the evolution of the relationship between 
individual agents, it is a ‘relationship of civility’.77 As the notion of civil association 
wanted to offer the solution to the possibility of a legal order ‘in conditions of 
cultural and social diversity without imposing coercive constraints on individual 
freedom’,78 so, when considered, at the international level it shows the possibility 
of coexistence based on a legal system even without an overarching conceptions of 
the good to be pursued. 
The Rule of Law, Customary International Law, and Historical Reason 
So far, I have argued that the opposition between civil and enterprise association 
may be applied at the international level to understand the difference between 
pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international society. While practical 
international society is based on the acknowledgement by the various individual 
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equal agents (the states) of a system of non-instrumental rules, purposive 
international society is concerned with the pursuit of a shared goal. Against Reus-
Smit’s criticism, I have shown that the model of civil association allows us to 
conceive of international society as one based on shared values, and not as a 
common enterprise for the achievement of a substantive state of affairs. In the 
following, I want to claim that this relationship of civility is based on the 
recognition of customary international law, which is understood as the codification 
of the existing practices between states. As such, it challenges the Hobbesian and 
legal positivist idea that international law is impossible because of the absence of a 
supra-national sovereign power.  
Previously, in the light of Oakeshott’s triadic conception of the history of political 
philosophy, I have already underlined some similarities as well as some differences 
between Hobbes and Oakeshott on the nature of the authority. In particular, I have 
claimed that even though in civil association authority, as for Hobbes, equates with 
authenticity; it does not arise from an act of will (a covenant) but rather from the 
evolving practice subscribed to by various agents. A similar difference between 
Oakeshott and Hobbes may be seen at the international level.  
On the one hand, it is true that Oakeshott considered law as resulting from a 
legislative office. As legal positivism (exemplified by Hobbes and Austin) and well 
summarised in the dictum ‘whatever the sovereign permits, he commands’, 
Oakeshott sees customary law as an indirect mode of legislation. When custom is 
considered as law, we read in ‘The Rule of Law’, ‘its authenticity derives from a 
presumption that it cannot resist appropriation, rejection or emendation in a 
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legislative enactment’.79  It may therefore be argued that even though customary 
international law has some analogies with Oakeshott’s rule of law, it cannot be 
considered as the same thing because of the absence of a supra-national absolute 
legislator, who is able to enact, amend and reject laws.80 From a Hobbesian 
conception of authority would follow a Hobbesian position, in which international 
relations are similar to the ‘state of nature’.  
On the other hand, however, Oakeshott distinguishes considerations about the 
authority of the law – which, as we have seen, are identified with those about its 
authenticity – from others concerning its interpretation and enforcement.81 The 
theory of civil association identifies, as the sole terms of the relationship between 
individual agents, ‘the recognition of the authority or authenticity of the laws’, and 
this is independent of considerations about the nature of the legislative office.82 In 
short, Oakeshott’s position suggests a way in which the theme of obligation and 
authority is distinct from that of the enforcement of law and from the constitution 
of the legislative office. Asking what is the relationship between different 
individual agents, and whether this relationship is based on the pursuit of a shared 
goal or, on the contrary, on the recognition of non-instrumental moral rules, is a 
very different question from that about the instruments of power. As already pointed 
out, Oakeshott’s theory about the authority of law and the origin of the legal order 
attempts to overcome the voluntarist paradigm as inaugurated, in modern 
                                                 
79
 Oakeshott 1999: 151. 
80
 For discussion see: Nardin 1983: 115-86. 
81
 Oakeshott 1999: 157. 
82
 Oakeshott 1999: 149. 
 171 
 
philosophy, by Hobbes. Instead, consistent with his idealism according to which, 
as I have illustrated in chapter 3, will is reason and is grounded on shared 
presuppositions, for Oakeshott authority is an evolving moral relationship between 
intelligent agents. 
Oakeshott’s triadic conception of political philosophy – that I have considered to 
identify the difference between Oakeshott and Hobbes on the nature of authority – 
has been applied to the theory of international relations by David Boucher in his 
Political Theories of International Relations. There, Empirical Realism is 
analogous to Oakeshott’s Will and Artifice and encompasses those thinkers such as 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Hobbes that separate international relations from 
morality or equate political conduct with expediency.  
In opposition to Realism and equivalent to Oakeshott’s Reason and Nature, there is 
the Universal Moral Order tradition. Even though sharing with Realism the idea 
that humanity is deprived and corrupted, it is more optimistic about the possibility 
of human self-improvement. The various exponents of this tradition – such as the 
Stoics, Aquinas, Vitoria, Gentili, Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke and Vattel – postulate 
the existence of a higher moral law, ‘discovered by right reason, or inferred a priori 
from indubitable data, or even a posteriori from observing the common practices 
of nations’.83  
As in Oakeshott’s model, these two opposite traditions are superseded by a third, 
‘Historical Reason’ in which criteria of conduct emerge from historically evolving 
moral practices, resulting from intelligent responses to changing circumstances. 
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What characterises the thinkers of this tradition (such as Burke or Hegel) is that the 
conduct of states is not capricious but regulated by principles. However, these are 
not objective truths – either intuitively known or constructed by right reason – but 
criteria justified as responses to changing historical circumstances.84 
My contention is that Oakeshott’s political philosophy identifies in customary 
international law the constitutive practice of international society. It may be 
associated to the tradition of Historical Reason, one of whose exemplars is Edmund 
Burke. 
Burke indeed, considered Europe as a society of states, a Commonwealth, 
expression of civilized manners and common sympathy organised by regulatory 
principles. Formal treaties and national interests are not the defining element of 
European society. Its nations are instead united by bonds such as common law, 
religion, customs, habits and the manners of a gentleman. They are regulative 
devices that maintain the integrity of the European Commonwealth. As is well 
known, for Burke, the most important among them is the customary law of the 
balance of power (with the related ‘principle of interference’ and ‘right of 
vicinage’), which represents the common law of Europe.85 
As for Burke, the Oakeshottian theory of international law focuses on customary 
international law. Indeed, from the perspective that I have presented, whenever two 
or more states enter into relations with one another, the emergence of a custom, 
which makes this interaction intelligible, is unavoidable: it is in virtue of their 
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reciprocal understanding as participants in those practices that they have the 
possibility of engaging in mutual relations. The continuity of purposive transactions 
between agents creates new practices in which these specific actions may be 
understood, and which are not themselves purposive. States with very different and 
divergent goals, contrasting values, conflicting interests are nonetheless united by 
law. In spite of all the apparent problems of enforcement and adjudications, this law 
exists because it is nothing more than the institutionalisation of already existing 
rules created by actual interactions.  
Customary International Law in World Politics 
I have suggested that, as with other exponents of what Boucher has called the 
‘Historical Reason’ tradition, Oakeshott identifies as the foundation of  
international legal order, neither certain absolute principles, nor the will of a 
legislator, but instead the evolving practices resulting from the relations of states. I 
have then suggested that customary international law is the institutionalisation of 
those practices. I want now to consider in more detail how Oakeshott’s theory of 
law and of civil association sheds light on the relations between customs or moral 
practices and law. I will then highlight its relations for the understanding of 
customary international law in world politics. 
James B. Murphy has recently identified a philosophical tradition of reflection upon 
customary law, and has argued that custom is ‘intelligible only in relation to basic 
norms of objective morality or natural law’.86 While suggesting that the role of 
custom in legal order shows the inadequacy of the dichotomy between nature and 
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convention in the analysis of human social institutions,87 Murphy claims, following 
Aristotle, that customs ‘turn our natural propensities into complex conventions’.88 
There are certain natural goods to which we are led by different customs.89 In this 
reading, also voluntarism appeals to natural law. Francisco Suarez is the 
paradigmatic example of that theory. He has indeed defended a view in which law 
is the result of the activity and intentions of a lawgiver (be it human or divine),90 
and in which the law of nations is not different from it. This is because it rests upon 
consent, considered as the expression of the will of both the people and the 
legislator.91 However, even in Suarez’s case (which will shape subsequent 
theorising about customary international law), the grounds on which to identify 
whether or not a custom creates obligation are the ‘traditional criteria of objective 
morality and prudential judgment’.92 For example, he presupposes that the will of 
the divine legislator is rational and just, or that valid law cannot violate natural 
law.93 Finally, we might consider the so-called Historical School as exemplified by 
the American jurist James C. Carter. Law, Carter argues, is the custom of the 
courts.94 However, objective standards and criteria are needed to identify which 
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customs are law, and Carter specifically stresses the importance of human freedom 
as foundational value.    
Although mainly focused on the relation between custom and law in the domestic 
case, Murphy’s interpretative framework is also of relevance to international order. 
In Murphy’s neo-Aristotelian interpretation, customs are the expression of the fact 
that man is ‘a conventional animal and social conventions are how we actualize our 
natural potential’.95 As they are something tacit, unexpressed and evolving without 
clear design and reflecting our innate propensities, they are our ‘second nature’.  
In contrast to Murphy’s interpretation, my contention is that Oakeshott’s theory of 
practice and normative reasoning – which I explored in chapter 3 – points the way 
towards a theory of customary law which does not refer to any objective, natural, 
criterion. Instead, legal obligation arises from existing social practices, or custom. 
These are created by relations between actual states, which have obtained formal 
recognition through existing and previously recognised procedures.  
A first point that needs to be clarified is whether Oakeshott considers customary 
law as proper law. As already pointed out, Oakeshott follows the legal positivist 
idea that sees customary law as indirect legislation. Customary law is valid law 
because it cannot resist modification through a previously recognized procedure. 
Notwithstanding this, he does not see a substantial difference between customary 
and statuary law. Both are moral practices. As I expounded in chapter 3, 
Oakeshott’s conception of a moral practice is a relationship between individual 
agents composed of a set of considerations that are the ‘by-product of 
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performances’.96 It provides shared assumptions to be taken into account while 
acting. As such, they shape the deliberations and the broader conduct of their 
subscribers. They are not causes but normative engagements. Customs should not 
be identified with mere habitual conduct but rather with a moral convention, 
interpreted as a coherent set of moral constraints. Just like habits, moral practices 
are often based on tacit, shared moral assumptions or presuppositions, which are 
only unveiled by critical reflection. However, unlike habits, moral practices are 
learned conventions; they are ‘understood relationships’.97 Therefore, even without 
entering into the debate about whether custom should be considered as one among 
the various sources of law or as law itself, it suffices to emphasise that, for 
Oakeshott, custom and law are both moral practices. A system of law is a moral 
practice (or custom) which has obtained formal recognition and is authoritative. It 
is composed of a set of evolving criteria, which form a system of beliefs about the 
moral constraints that qualify an action as good.  
As both civil law and customs are moral practices, and since a system of law is a 
moral practice that prescribes obligatory conditions to be subscribed to by agents, 
there is no substantial difference between customary (international) law and 
statuary law. Both are frameworks that regulate existing activities and that provide 
social coordination. 
The similar nature of customary law and statuary law is further shown by the 
contrast between Oakeshott’s and Hart’s reading. For Hart, custom is composed 
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exclusively of primary rules, with no secondary rules to govern the creation of 
norms.98 In Oakeshott’s view, ‘a procedure of legislation’ – itself part of the system 
of rules – is among the conditions of civil  association. This is ‘a procedure in which 
response may be made to notable changes of belief or sentiment about the desirable 
condition of civil conduct’.99 However, there are no rules solely concerned with 
recognition of the authority of other rules.100 They all qualify conduct. Therefore, 
also in this regard, there is no substantial difference between customary and statuary 
law.  
Throughout the various chapters of this thesis I have contended that Oakeshott’s 
philosophy is a form of constructivism, given that it considers world politics as a 
normative activity and international society as a moral relationship between states 
based on shared values, which are interpreted as commonly recognised constraints 
(and not as purposes). I have gone on to argue that his theory of non-instrumental 
law as a moral practice, or tradition, sheds light on the fact that obligations stem 
from social interactions. It is from the recognition of certain moral practices as 
authoritative that law arises. In this, statuary law is no different from customary 
law. I now want to argue that Oakeshott’s theory sheds light on the role of 
customary international law in the constitution of international society. 
The traditional doctrine that sees custom among the sources of international law is 
exemplified in Article 38(1) (b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which also identifies well-established criteria according to which 
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international custom may be recognised as law. These are consistent practice (usus) 
and the acceptance of the practice as obligatory (opinio juris). Usus distinguishes 
custom from ‘merely ideal standards’; while opinio juris identifies legal custom 
from mere regularities or routines. A further relevant element in this regard is that 
also the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY); the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) has been elevated into a norm of customary 
law.101 
Moreover, on the ground of two important decisions made by the ICJ (Barcelona 
Traction and North Sea Continental Shelf), treaties, also, have been considered as 
a source of customary norms, when signed by a considerable number of states. In 
the North Sea Continental Shelf case, for example, the ‘widespread and 
representative’ adoption of the rule over ‘a short period of time’ by states which did 
not sign the conventional relevant treaty was considered as valid grounds for the 
establishment of customary norms. For example, treaties on the prohibition of 
torture, genocide or slavery, albeit not signed by all states, may be considered as 
customary norms, binding all international actors.102  
Once a custom is recognised as law, it also applies to states that have previously 
protested against it, or that did not exist when the law arose.103 This is also the case 
when there exists a ‘persistent objector’, that is, a state which consistently objects 
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to the formation of a new customary law and, therefore, claims to be exempt from 
its authority. As underlined by Martin Dixon, the changes in the international 
context have led to the acknowledgment of a newly recognised law by countries 
that previously objected to it, be they minor (such as decolonised states that aimed 
to be exempted from some disadvantageous norms in matters of compensation) or 
great powers (as shown by the acceptance by the UK of the extension of the 
territorial sea).104 
That customary international law applies to all states and international actors is of 
particular relevance in the case of humanitarian law. This importance is exemplified 
by the ‘Martens Clause’, which appeared in the preamble to the 1899 Hague 
convention with respect to laws and custom of war on land. It states that: 
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High Contracting 
Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted 
by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of 
the principles of international law, as they result from the usages established 
between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and the requirements of the 
public conscience.105 
As shown by Peter Sutch, the clause has consistently been used in international 
treaties and in the work of jurists in various international tribunals, such as the 
Nuremberg Tribunals, the ICJ, and the ICTY, and has been accepted as a norm of 
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customary international law.106 Its purpose is to remind all belligerents that there 
are established customs that have an obligatory character.107 
In this context, an element that Oakeshott’s perspective illuminates is the 
‘intelligent’ nature of law. Consistent with the broader contribution to 
constructivism that I have illustrated throughout this thesis, customary international 
law has to be considered as the result of human interaction, social practices and 
deliberative thinking.  
As argued by Gerald J. Postema, once we consider that law arises from actual moral 
practices, and that its recognition is the result of a discursive and interpretative 
argument, the traditional doctrine that sees the establishment of customary 
international law as a combination of objective (usus) and subjective (opinio juris) 
elements is undermined.108 The identification of a customary law is a matter of 
judgment shared among the participants. Both usus and opinio juris are normative 
elements. From this point of view, regularity of behaviour is not a simple material 
fact; it is more than merely an example of empirical evidence. As I have underlined, 
it is the result of the persistent subscriptions to the conditions prescribed by the 
practice. It is the result of a normative engagement. This is further exemplified by 
the fact that, as argued by Postema, customary norms are transmitted not by 
repetition or imitation, but ‘in virtue of their integration into the discursive 
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network’,109 for their being part of the system of conditions that are taken into 
account while acting. As such, as pointed out by Boucher, customary international 
law has progressively emancipated itself from any fixed criteria, such as those 
provided by principles of natural law.110 As in the case of Oakeshott’s interpretation 
of the domestic rule of law, customary international law forms the grounds of the 
moral relationship between agents that constitutes international society.  
I have illustrated that a key element of the philosophy of customary law is the theme 
of consensus. In Suarez’s paradigmatic account, the law of nations is authoritative 
because it is expression of the consent of the sovereign and of the people. As I have 
discussed above, in both On Human Conduct and in ‘The Rule of Law’, the 
subscription to moral practice is based not on consent, nor on expectations about 
the outcomes of laws.111 When the authority of law derives from considerations 
about its effects or from the consent of its subscribers, it unavoidably acquires an 
instrumental character. Instead, authority is the attribute that a system of law 
acquires when it is recognised by its subscriber, regardless of any other 
considerations. This circularity reveals that Oakeshott argues for the autonomy of 
the legal order and denies the existence of any foundation external to the authority 
of the law. This is further exemplified by the following passage from On Human 
Conduct:  
And should it be asked how a manifold of rules, many of unknown origin, subject 
to deliberate innovation, continuously amplified in judicial conclusions about their 
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meanings in contingent situations, not infrequently neglected without penalty, 
often inconvenient, neither demanding nor capable of evoking the approval of all 
whom they concern, and never more than a very imperfect reflection of what are 
currently believed to be ‘just’ conditions of conduct may be acknowledged to be 
authoritative, the answer is that authority is the only conceivable attribute it could 
be indisputably acknowledged to have.112 
By denying any external foundation to the authority of the law, and to the origin of 
obligation, the Oakeshottian perspective identifies from inside the actual practice 
subscribed to by the states the ground of their reciprocal obligations. International 
law makes obligatory moral claims that are immanent in international society.113 
Against any rationalist project of reforming international laws or world institutions 
departing from objective principles (considered either as a moral reality to be 
discovered, or as principles constructed or deduced by right reason), the 
Oakeshottian model once again considers political activity and legislative 
innovation as the ‘pursuit of intimations’, as the slow change of current 
arrangements according to a normative ideal and an existing morality. The classical 
question about the origin of law and its relation to custom is solved in the 
Oakeshottian perspective without appealing either to the will of a ‘legislator’, nor 
to the ‘so-called dictates of Reason’.114 There is no ‘ready and indisputable 
criterion’ for determining the desirability of a certain change. Customs and 
customary law are not the product of explicit design, but rather the by-products of 
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intentional performances. Following Postema’s ‘normative practice account’,115 I 
have suggested that the test that identifies the relevance of a customary norm is that 
of integration, or, to use the idealist idiom: coherence. The evidential and 
circumstantial argumentative discourse that attempts to define the emergence of 
new authoritative rules aims at considering the coherence of the emerging norms 
with those assumptions and considerations already in place.  
This is shown by requirements identified by the Statute of the ICJ. They entail a 
certain degree of flexibility, as well as the possibility of a case-by-case decision by 
the Court – for instance with regard to how many states need to participate before 
a general practice can become law, or to the length of time required. This shows 
that the recognition of already existing practices is not a matter of sharp criteria or 
deterministic processes, but the result of an evidential, discursive and interpretative 
argument.116 
To sum up, customary international law reflects actual practices of states, and 
declares those moral constraints to conduct that are already acknowledged by states. 
According to this perspective, new norms are recognized as part of the system of 
law not in virtue of their expected outcomes, nor of their conformity with some 
absolute principle, but instead because of their coherence with the already existing 
rules.  
As contended by David Boucher, that customary international law reflects and 
declares slow changes in international society is illustrated by its role in the 
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advancement of humanitarian justice. For instance, the actual advancement in the 
recognition of human rights is not made in virtue of declaration or treaties. Instead, 
what has been essential – as in the case of the establishment of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Court – is 
customary international law.117 A further significant example in this regard is the 
progressive codification of customary International Humanitarian Law (IHL) by the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) that aims to identify norms that 
bind all states in the conduct of war and protect its victims.118 Moreover, rules of 
jus cogens, such as the prohibition of genocide, have emerged as fundamental rules 
of customary law. These examples show that the cogency of international 
obligations derive from the recognition and codification of already existing norms 
of conduct in the relations between states. Advancement in the recognition of 
human rights and humanitarian principles derives from the fulfilment of these 
intimations and not from the success of some rationalistic project.  
Moreover, this is also illustrated by the progressive codification of customary 
practices – a process that occurred after the establishment (in 1947) of the 
International Law Commission. Since then, customs and practice have increasingly 
taken written and codified forms. This shows one of the ways in which customary 
practices have obtained formal recognition in international society. However, it 
does not deny the priority of customary law over treaties. Indeed, where a treaty 
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covering the same content as a customary international law ceases to exist, for 
whatever reason, the customary law remains binding.119 
Notwithstanding these analogies, it is possible to raise objections to this 
identification of customary international law with an Oakeshottian rule of law. In 
particular, the justification of customary international law is often based on the 
protection of convergent interests. Indeed, it appears that new customary law is 
established as a response by emerging economic interests (for instance in the law 
of the sea, or in the norms of the continental shelf), where divergent interests and 
distribution of resources may not be efficiently regulated by treaties.120 Moreover, 
they require specific actions by all international actors, and cannot be considered 
independent from the substantive conditions of things to be attained.  
In addition, when certain fundamental humanitarian rights are considered as part of 
customary law, this social recognition is justified ‘on the ground that they contribute 
to the common good of global society’.121 Once again, the whole point is to consider 
this common good not as a substantive state of affairs to be reached, but as a 
conditional constraint on the conduct of states. I will return to this aspect in the next 
chapter; for the moment, what is important to underline is that Oakeshott’s model 
highlights the declaratory and evolutionary nature of international law, its 
independence from a supra-national authority, as well as its moral value. 
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More problematic for this way of understanding international society is the 
increasing importance in international relations of non-state actors.122 The 
emergence of outlaw agents – in addition to outlaw states – such as the Islamic 
State, Boko Haram, and Al Qaeda in disregard of international norm, and dismissive 
of the rule of law poses new challenges for the international community. Without 
denying the increasing relevance of these agents – and therefore the highly 
problematic nature of their exclusion from discourses about international order – 
what this approach wishes to stress is the legal primacy and the logical priority of 
the relations between states.123 It argues that NGOs, non-state actors and 
International Organisations pursue their divergent goals in a world that is framed 
and shaped by the relations between states; relations that have their logical roots in 
the recognition of an international rule of law. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that Oakeshott’s theory of civil association offers a 
constructivist understanding of the moral nature of international society.  
Oakeshott’s conception of philosophy as criticism, which I discussed in chapter 1, 
finds in his political and legal philosophy one of its finest results. The aim of his 
theory is indeed to distinguish and define the postulates of political life, and to 
identify the essential elements of political and legal relationships. He identifies two 
fundamental and mutually exclusive modes of relationship – enterprise association 
and civil association (or the rule of law) – that are distinguished by the nature of 
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their rules and their authority, and the relationship between individuals that they 
entail. While in enterprise association individuals commonly pursue a pre-
established end, and rules are instruments to those goals, in civil association 
individuals are united by common recognition of a system of non-instrumental 
rules.  
The possibility of applying Oakeshott’s theory to our understanding of international 
relations is based on the assumption, or the postulate, that there is a logical priority 
and an actual primacy of the sovereign state as the principal actor of world politics. 
In this regard, as I have discussed, Oakeshott’s theory can be seen – and it has been 
conceived by Nardin in this manner – as a further contribution to the English School 
notion of international society.  
At the international level, civil association theorises a rule-based form of 
relationship between formally equal agents, united by common recognition of 
procedural constraints to their actions. Against Reus-Smit’s criticism, I have shown 
that this common recognition may be conceived as shared values or belief. This, 
however, should not be identified with a common purpose aiming at the 
construction of a substantive state of affairs.  
In this regard, an initial element of interest has been Oakeshott’s explicit 
consideration of the historical evolution of the modern European state and of 
international society as a whole. Elaborating on Rengger’s account – as well as on 
W.H. Greenleaf’s discussion of the collectivist tradition – I have pointed out that 
Oakeshott identifies in some specific aspects of the relations between European 
states (colonialism and the state of belligerence) one of the key elements in the 
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affirmation of a teleocratic understanding of the role of state government. 
Moreover, Oakeshott argues that international society as a whole has become more 
and more teleocratic, seeing war, international institutions and laws as instruments 
to achieve particular goals.  
The fact that Oakeshott is very critical of the current state of affairs in world politics, 
as well as of international organisations, does not imply that from the theory of civil 
association it is impossible to conceptually identify the conditions of the possibility 
of an international rule of a system of non-instrumental laws. From Oakeshott’s 
theory of the rule of law or civil association, it is indeed possible to construct a 
notion of international society conceived as a relationship based on customary 
international law, understood as a system of non-instrumental rules. Therefore, 
Oakeshott may be associated to those thinkers (such as Burke) who conceive the 
conduct of states as regulated by historically emerging criteria.  
Conceived of in this manner, international society represents the framework in 
which different actors of international politics may pursue their different goals and 
cooperate with each other. As such, international society is based on the recognition 
of shared rules and moral constraints. As for the constructivists, this perspective 
focuses on the relationships between different actors. They are understood 
relationships, they are not a natural given, but the result of the normative reasoning 
of different actors. It is on the ground of these continuous relationships that forms 
of co-operation can be pursued and that criteria of justice can be enacted.  
In particular, Oakeshott’s position contributes to the constructivist paradigm 
because it identifies in customary international law the constituting moral practice 
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of international society. I have illustrated that, insofar as customs emerge without 
design and are a by-product of actual states relations, customary international law 
may be considered as a system of moral (non-instrumental) rules. In other words, 
international society is a community constituted by a particular moral practice: 
customary international law. According to Oakeshott’s perspective, its authority is 
not grounded on expected outcomes or on the ‘dictates’ of right Reason, but instead 
on its recognition by international actors. In sum, the Oakeshottian perspective 
underlines the declaratory and evolving nature of international society and shows 
how principles have acquired legal force as they arise from actual moral practices, 
binding the conduct of states and providing criteria for judging their actions.
 190 
 
CHAPTER 6 
LAW AND MORALITY IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I have argued that Oakeshott’s political and legal theory 
may be seen as the basis for an understanding of international society as a rule-
based form of moral association between states. In spite of the mixed character of 
the real world legal order, and of the varying circumstances in which the ideal 
characters of civil association and enterprise association may appear, Oakeshott’s 
theory offers an account in which the existence of international law is not 
undermined by the lack of a supranational power. Instead, as I have argued, it is 
based on the codification of state practices. As such, international law reflects the 
evolving nature of international society. When customary international law is 
conceived as a system of non-instrumental rules (whose authority depends neither 
on the outcomes of rules, nor on the consent of its subjects), it represents the ground 
of the relations between states.  
On the basis of David Boucher’s triadic conception of the philosophy of 
international relations, I have included Oakeshott among those theorists, such as 
Burke, who understand the society of states as a relationship of civility based on 
common morality and shared values, resulting from historical human actions.  
These shared values – I have argued against Reus-Smit’s criticism of the 
Oakeshottian position as expressed by Nardin – should be understood as a common 
subscription to moral constraints and not as a common purpose. 
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I want in this chapter to further consider the relationship between law and morality, 
and explore how Oakeshott’s theory of civil association and international society 
addresses issues of justice. Even though over recent decades (especially after 
Charles Beitz’s Political Theory and International Relations) the debate on 
international justice has been dominated by concerns of global redistribution, it is 
possible to frame the discussion of justice around the question of international 
legality.1 This was, for instance, the question that animated the discussion of 
international jurists and of philosophers, who attempted to identify the legal limits 
to the conduct and causes of war.2 
In other words, whereas in the previous chapter I have examined the ontology of 
international society, and I have argued that it is based on the authority of customary 
international law, in this I want to explore normative questions of justice. In 
particular, I will explore how the Oakeshottian perspective on international society 
justifies constraints on the conduct of states.  
To this end, I will consider Oakeshott’s position in the context of the triadic 
conception of the philosophy of international relations as presented by David 
Boucher in his elaboration of Oakeshott’s understanding of the history of political 
philosophy.3  
Firstly, I will show both the similarities and differences between Oakeshott and a 
realist conception of the question of international justice. As Chris Brown and more 
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 Nardin 2006: 455. 
2
 See Boucher 2012c; Rengger 2013. 
3
 Boucher 1998. 
 192 
 
recently Sean Molloy have pointed out, it is no longer permissible to consider 
realism as a theory in which ‘moral judgments have no place’. 4  Instead, it should 
be regarded as a critique of a particular kind of moral thinking, arguing for the 
existence of overarching moral codes. In this regard, I will recall some of my earlier 
considerations about Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism in politics and show some 
of its similarities to Morgenthau’s aversion to international liberalism. However, I 
will contend that Oakeshott offers a different and less essentialist conception of 
human nature, as well as a theory of law that is distinct from and critical of the 
instrumentalism implied in Realist legal theory. 
Secondly, I will consider Oakeshott’s critique of the Natural Law tradition and of 
those theories that posit absolute principles of justice. In particular, I will contend 
that Oakeshott defends an embedded notion of practical rationality, in which criteria 
of justice are constituted by the moral tradition in which the agent is situated. An 
example of this is Oakeshott’s aversion to the rationalist interpretation of human 
rights that conceive them as a-historical criteria of justice. 
Thirdly, I will show the similarities between Oakeshott and the tradition of 
Historical Reason. Whereas in the last chapter I claimed that, from an Oakeshottian 
point of view, international society is constituted by customary international law, 
here I will argue that considerations about justice are developed through a practical, 
normative discourse, which is constructed from evolving shared moral 
assumptions. 
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 Beitz 1999: 15. For a discussion of this sort of critique of realism, see, Molloy 2008: 83-
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Law and Morality in the Philosophy of International Relations 
I have illustrated in chapter 3 that philosophy is conceived by Oakeshott as the 
unconditional understanding of the ‘standards and valuations of our civilisation’, 
and the restoration of the unity between those criteria and ‘the rest of our ideas’. 
The triadic conception of the history of political philosophy presented in the 
‘Introduction to Leviathan’ provides a framework in which the various 
philosophical definitions of the criteria of conduct are related to each other, and are 
seen outside of the historical circumstances in which they were presented.  
As already discussed, it has been further elaborated by David Boucher to explain 
how political philosophers have reflected on international relations. Boucher 
identifies the three traditions of Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order, and 
Historical Reason, which correspond to the Oakeshottian Will and Artifice, Nature 
and Reason, and Rational Will. Of course, this representation of the history of 
philosophy is not to say that there are fixed doctrines which are consistently 
reinterpreted throughout history. What the notion of tradition suggests is that it is 
possible to identify some characteristics that, when composed, create a more or less 
stable identity.  
To place Hobbes in the tradition of Will and Artifice, as Oakeshott does, means to 
identify in these two master conceptions the key elements of his system. In so doing, 
it is related to the history of philosophy and emancipated from the historical 
vicissitudes of its times.5 From this perspective, in Hobbes’s Leviathan, criteria of 
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 Of course, there would be a lot to say about Oakeshott’s contextualism, and I have already 
discussed it in chapter 3. Further discussion is in Boucher 2007; Thompson 2012. 
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justice are the creation of human beings, and political order is based on an 
agreement that offers a remedy to the predicament of humankind.6 
At an international level, the Empirical Realist tradition conceives of human nature 
as self-interested and unconstrained by any higher moral laws. As no superior 
power can govern states, actions are guided by national interests, and morality is 
identified with expediency and prudence.7 For this reason, Realism often advances 
a critique of Utopianism, and of those theories that defend a supremacy of ethics 
over politics. In short, the history of international relations shows the weakness of 
international law, as well as the counterproductive effect of any project attempting 
to govern world anarchy.  
Empirical Realism was also strongly present in the work of some of the theorists 
writing in the same period as Oakeshott. Of the English School, besides E.H. Carr’s 
critique of utopianism in The Twenty-Years Crisis, Martin Wight famously sees 
international politics as the site of constant war and conflict.8 In international 
politics, no progress is possible and, as Wight famously put it, if some people from 
the distant past returned to present and looked at international affairs, they ‘would 
be struck by resemblances to what they remembered’.9 Hedley Bull maintains a 
much more nuanced attitude and, in some respects, may be considered a defender 
of a neo-Grotian position claiming the existence of a universal moral order, and 
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 Wight 1966: 26. 
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therefore opposed to realism.10 However, as Chris Brown has pointed out, he 
maintained a radical scepticism towards solidarist projects as well as a deep 
awareness of the limits of political action, and, in The Anarchical Society, Bull 
indeed postulates the priority of concerns about order over those of justice.11  
Realism in international relations has been very successful in America, and not just 
the structural realism inaugurated by Waltz’s Theory of International Politics 
(1979), which was highly influenced by positivist methodology and in which 
international politics was seen as determined by the anarchical structure of the 
international system.12 Earlier in the twentieth century, the works of Niebuhr and 
Morgenthau introduced Realism into the academic study of international relations 
through a more classic and humanist style.  
In this context, an important role was played by the reception of Carl Schmitt’s 
philosophy. As is well known, in his The Concept of the Political (1927), Schmitt 
develops a theory clearly influenced by Hobbes, and argued that politics is the realm 
of power. To deny the role of power and decision is to deny the essence of ‘the 
political’ itself. Given the predicament of human nature, Schmitt sees in the role 
that fear plays in Hobbes’s state of nature a key to the understanding the nature of 
politics. As the Leviathan offers an escape from the constant threat of death, so the 
authority of the State, for Schmitt, derives from his ability to protect the citizens, 
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 On the ambiguity of Bull’s interpretation of international society, see: Wheeler and 
Dunne 1996. Cf. Bull 1979. 
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 Bull 1979: 90-94; Brown 1998: 104. 
12
 See: Waltz 1979. 
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who, in return, give their obedience.13 International relations are politics at its 
highest, it is indeed in the relations between states that the centrality of power is 
seen more clearly. As Hobbes, the German sees the international realm as one 
characterized, not by actual war, but by a constant state of belligerence, in which 
the world is divided along the lines of friend/enemy.14 In short, there is no 
distinction between politics and war, as both are constructed around the ‘amity 
line’; in both a key role is played by power and decisions. Ultimately, it is at times 
of war, in moments of exception, that the real nature of politics reveals itself.  
Hans Morgenthau interpreted Schmitt’s political philosophy in the context of the 
post-war American International Relations and, as his teacher, argued against 
liberalism, whose fault was not to acknowledge the centrality of power in politics 
and the ubiquity of evil in the world. Elaborating on Schmitt’s notions of ‘the 
political’, Morgenthau asserts that current international law merely codifies states’ 
mutual self-interests and, for this reason, it may be called ‘non-political law’. As 
such it is different from ‘political law’, which instead derives from the power and 
the decision of a sovereign (which of course is simply missing at the international 
level).15  
Terry Nardin, following Martti Koskenniemi,16 shows that Morgenthau’s 
Schmittian notion that laws are authoritative only when they are the expression of 
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 Schmitt 2008a: 52. Schmitt late came to change his mind about Hobbes in response to 
Leo Strauss’s criticism of his interpretation. See: Schmitt 2008b.  
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 Schmitt 2008: 37.  
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 Morgenthau 1940. For discussion Reus-Smit 2003b: 596-97. 
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power has inspired more recent legal theorists (such as Myres S. McDougal and 
Richard Falck), who see international law as the legalisation of the actual relations 
of power and supremacy in world politics. It is this aspect that is picked up by 
postmodernists and critical theorists who, inspired by Foucault’s Nietzschean 
concept of genealogy, see law as the codification of a system of power in which 
liberal democratic countries have the monopoly of normative discourse and of the 
definition of what is just conduct.17 For them, as famously stated by Foucault in 
Society Must Be Defended, politics itself is the continuation of war by other means, 
and normative frameworks and legal orders are structures of dominations which 
perpetuate the struggles between different groups within society.18  
To recapitulate, the thinkers encompassed in what Boucher has called the tradition 
of Empirical Realism ground their argument on a pessimistic conception of human 
nature, and on the idea that international politics is essentially characterized by 
anarchy and war. Their positions often present a critique of utopianism and of the 
idea that international politics may be constrained by law or ethical principles. 
The existence of immutable and knowable moral absolutes that define what is 
justice is what characterises the tradition of the Universal Moral Order. According 
to Oakeshott, the root of this tradition is in the Platonic notion that the just city 
should reflect a metaphysical idea of justice to be discovered by reason through 
dialectic.19 For Oakeshott, it is Stoicism – and later Christian philosophy – that 
further develops ‘the doctrine that the cosmos was governed by a natural law’ and 
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that human beings can know it and are ‘able to construct human societies whose 
law and organization are a reflection of this natural law’20. 
At an international level, the notion that there are universal and immutable moral 
principles that can be known by reason to shape political institutions and 
international order is further explored by Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, Vattel and 
Kant.21 Again, there are of course a good many internal differences, and some of 
these thinkers (for instance Kant) present elements from other traditions, but it is 
possible to identify some common tenets. There is a much more optimistic 
conception of human nature that, even though regarded as a ‘crooked timber’, is 
considered capable of redemption in social life. Moreover, the action of states and 
individuals are justified by the appeal to objective principles that are either inferred 
from Natural Law, or constructed by Right Reason.  
Even though declining in contemporary philosophy, the idea that universal 
principles or human nature should ground international order is still present in the 
debate. For instance, some human right theorists (such as Michael J. Perry) identify 
a religious foundation of human rights. Similarly, the Catholic Church continues to 
appeal to natural law or a higher law to develop moral considerations about world 
affairs. Universalism may also take on a more formal or procedural character. For 
example, Martha Nussbaum grounds her universalism on some conception of 
                                                 
20
 Oakeshott 2006: 163. 
21
 Boucher 1998: 32-37. 
 199 
 
humanity or on some fundamental universal moral characteristics that are realised 
in different ways according to the various cultural context.22 
Including and overcoming elements of both Realism and Universalism, the 
Historical Reason tradition conceives criteria of justice as embedded in historical 
moral practices. While the classical exponents of this group of theories are 
Rousseau, Herder and Hegel, in more recent times this sort of approach has been 
developed by a variety of thinkers of different persuasions.  
Michael Walzer summarises the historical reason tradition in his Spheres of Justice, 
where he conceives of justice as the product of ‘particular political communities at 
identifiable times’.23 Similarly, Rawls’s position as expressed in The Law of 
Peoples, as well as David Miller’s civic nationalism, may be considered as stating 
the moral priority of autonomous states over the broader international community.24 
There is therefore not a single conception of justice that transcends the 
circumstances of human existence, but rather different ones according to various 
social systems and historical situations.25 
Constitutive theorists offer another interpretation of Historical Reason. Against 
what they perceive as the reduction of society to its economic element, constitutive 
theorists such as Mervyn Frost and Chris Brown have contended that the state and 
social contexts are the constitutive ground for individual morality, identity and 
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 Valentini 2011: 25-32. 
 200 
 
rights.26 In Brown’s theory, political structures, and in particular the state, play a 
vital role in the moral development of the individual and in the development of their 
ethical perspectives.27  
According to Frost, this kind of state is an autonomous one in which the law is 
constituted by the people and constitutive of the people.28 The criteria defining the 
conduct of states and individuals may only grow out of a specific community.29 At 
an international level, society is composed of autonomous sovereign states. It is this 
sort of community that, for Frost, represents the ground for settled norms of 
international conduct.30 
Just like the state, global civil society is a fundamental authoritative practice: they 
both constitute individuals by setting commonly accepted ideas that are the context 
of what individual agents do.31 Without appealing to the teleological and 
speculative philosophy of history underpinned in that theory, Frost finds in Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right an account of how ‘free and rational’ human beings ‘are 
constituted as such within a set of social practices’ organized in a complex 
hierarchy.32 Elaborating on Hegel, then, Frost identifies this hierarchy of 
                                                 
26
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foundational practices: from the family through civil society and the state, to the 
system of states. As particular citizenship is important in establishing individual 
freedom and rights, so the recognition of the state by other autonomous states is 
essential to this.   
What is crucial is that, for Frost, both the state and the system of state represent 
constitutive practice, that is to say, a set of evolving norms ‘adherence to which is 
required of anyone wishing to be considered as an actor in good standing within 
that practice’.33 Therefore, for Frost, the ground of any considerations about justice 
at an international level must have as a starting point the historically determined 
relevance of the autonomous sovereign states, and the actual conditions of their 
relations. 
Recent constructivist theories may also be regarded as further interpretations of the 
Historical Reason tradition. The work of Christian Reus-Smit is of particular 
relevance here, not just because it considers, as have other constructivists such as 
Wendt, the centrality of intersubjective beliefs in international relations, but also 
because it offers an account of the diachronic development of international society. 
In his The Moral Purpose of the State, Reus-Smit elaborates on Bull’s notion of 
international society to offer an account of the various ‘constitutional structures’ 
that have grounded certain historical international societies.34  These structures are 
‘coherent ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms’.35 They 
represent the context in which human intentions and actions are embedded. 
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Historical changes in the various constitutional practices constituting actors and 
criteria of action are explained through a theory inspired by Habermas’s theory of 
communicative action. On this basis, Reus-Smit’s constructivist theory shows 
different reasons given by the actors involved in order to reach an agreement 
regarding these diachronical changes. 
As noted by Boucher, the Historical Reason tradition does not necessarily equate 
with a form of statism.36 As with the Universal Moral Order and the Empirical 
Realist tradition, this also cannot be identified with a settled doctrine but rather with 
a distinct conception of the nature of human agency, of moral reasoning and of 
value. The key tenet of this tradition is not the a-historical priority of the state but 
that criteria of justice are not identified on the ground of some essentialist 
arguments, such as a negative conception of human nature and the pervasiveness of 
conflict (as for the realist), or the existence of a higher immutable moral law (as for 
the universalist). In contrast, criteria of justice are related to an evolving moral 
discourse, which is itself related to varying historical circumstances.  
War, Law, and Human Nature 
I have already argued in chapter 4 that Oakeshott’s arguments shared many 
similarities with the critique of international liberalism presented by Morgenthau’s 
Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. The notion that it is possible to know objective 
principles on the basis of which a just international order could be constructed is 
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associated by both Morgenthau and Oakeshott with the follies of European 
modernity.37 Furthermore, in the last chapter I showed that he considered war to be 
a central and characterizing element of the history of the modern European state, as 
well as of the development of the state itself. More specifically, one of the reasons 
for the success of the teleocratic understanding of the state is the state of continuous 
belligerence that has characterised European modernity.38  
The similarities of Oakeshott’s work to the Realist tradition also lie in his reflections 
on the human condition. As indicated by Rengger, Ned Lebow’s discussion of 
tragedy in the realist theory of international politics is particularly relevant.39 
Morgenthau’s (as well as Schmitt’s) ideas may be considered as tragic, insofar as 
the nature of human beings is always and necessarily imperfect, and no political 
arrangement can overcome this predicament.40 In his review of Scientific Man vs. 
Power Politics Oakeshott comments on this, stating that the argument owes 
something to the anti-Pelagianism of Augustine and Hobbes and that  
The human race lacks what would be required to abolish ‘power politics’; and all 
that distinguishes ‘scientific man’ is his illusion of possessing what is wanting to 
the human race.41 
Even though Oakeshott ‘does not offer any criticism of this argument’, it is possible 
to highlight some differences between the two thinkers. In his account, Rengger 
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focuses on Oakeshott’s aversion to the definition of this condition as ‘tragic’, not 
just because it is a category which is pertinent to the world of poetry and not to that 
of practice – which are autonomous from each other – but also because human 
fallibility and imperfection is not a negative condition.42 In the same review the 
imperfectability of human beings 
Is not tragic, nor even a predicament, unless and until it is contrasted with a human 
nature susceptible of a perfection which is in fact foreign to its character....And 
only a rationalistic reformer will confuse the imperfections which can be remedied 
with the so-called imperfections which cannot, and will think of the irremovability 
of the latter as a tragedy. The rest of us know that no rationalistic justice (with its 
project of approximating people to things), and no possible degree of human 
prosperity, can ever remove mercy and charity from their place of first importance 
in the relations of human beings, and know also that this situation cannot properly 
be considered either imperfect or a tragedy.43  
My point is that the ground of this conception is in a theory of agency which is fully 
developed in On Human Conduct. There, human interactions are described as 
hazardous and immersed in contingency, as ‘a movement about a world where 
achieved satisfaction breeds wants, a world habitable only when the energy of 
pursuit is prudentially mixed with nonchaloir in respect of the outcome’. It is 
important to point out that Oakeshott links to this understanding of the human 
condition a sceptical ethics that he derives from Montaigne. The acceptance of the 
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role of contingency and fortune in human life is associated with the idea that the 
sage acts with the awareness that the accomplishment of the teleological design of 
conduct is beyond his/her full control, as it depends mainly on the responses of the 
other agents involved, and on ultimately uncontrollable circumstances. 44  
Oakeshott seems also to follow Montaigne’s sceptical model in its characterization 
of moral autonomy and in the idea that the value of action and agents is not 
determined by the full realization of their goals. Besides the recognition of the 
importance and relevance of an individual’s autonomy in the face of both external 
authorities and human vicissitudes Oakeshott also argues actions do not benefit 
from any ‘model of self-perfection’ as they are as provisional and temporary as 
anything else.45 
Merely hinted at in the above quoted passage from the review of Scientific Man vs 
Power Politics, the idea that human action is by definition fallible and that there is 
not a model of justice to be achieved through political action is developed by 
Oakeshott in various works. I suggested in chapter 3 that normative political 
thinking is considered by Oakeshott to be the ‘pursuit of intimations’, developed 
through a non-demonstrative moral reasoning starting from the shared assumptions 
of a certain political community. It is not a demonstrative reasoning that can reach 
a moral absolute through a necessary argument modelled on the criteria of truth 
proposed by natural science. In other words, to assert – as Oakeshott famously does 
in ‘Political Education’ – that in political activity ‘men sail a boundless and 
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bottomless sea’ in which ‘there is neither harbour for shelter nor floor for 
anchorage’, and in which ‘the enterprise is to keep afloat on an even keel’, is not 
just (as I have argued in chapter 3) a way of denying a normative role to political 
philosophy; it is a restating of that supremacy of expediency and prudence in 
politics that characterises the Realist tradition.46  
However, as I shall discuss again below, this statement of the imperfection of the 
human condition in which no action and no political project can redeem humanity 
from injustice is not, as for many realists, based on an essentialist notion of the 
human being.47 
Moreover, the exclusion of any ethical notion from normative principles of rules 
and governing seems to eliminate any moral considerations from the legal order. At 
an international level, when the society of states is conceived as constituted by 
customary international law it excludes any substantive goal from being a 
teleologically normative principle in the legal system. As at a domestic level, civil 
association is indifferent to the variety of purposes pursued by individuals and 
groups, so an Oakeshottian understanding of international society is deeply 
pluralist, and indifferent (within the framework of constraints whose authority 
states acknowledge) to any substantive conception of the good. 
Furthermore, it is worth restating that, as I discussed throughout chapter 5, the 
Oakeshottian legal theory – while criticizing the current state of international law 
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by considering it as an expression of power – admits the possibility of a non-
instrumental legal order which is logically prior to the conflict of power and the 
representation of interests. Contra Schmitt’s understanding and that of legal 
positivists, Oakeshott sees law as radically distinct from the command of a 
sovereign. Firstly, as already discussed in the last chapter, law – for Oakeshott - 
cannot be considered an act of will, nor do individuals accept the authority of the 
law for its expected outcomes (such as protection). Instead, Oakeshott conceives 
law as a moral practice that has become instituted through a previously recognized 
procedure.  
Moreover, a command is addressed to ‘an assignable agent’, while the set of non-
instrumental rules that for Oakeshott comprise the law is addressed to an unknown 
audience. In addition, a command is an ‘action in response to a particular situation’ 
that demands the performance of a substantive action. Instead, law – when it is 
understood as practice – provides the conditions to be subscribed to by agents 
pursuing their self-chosen actions.48 In sum, Oakeshott objects to the identification 
of the authority of law with the expression of power; as I have argued, this is 
particularly relevant at the international level, since customary international law 
may represent a legal order which is independent of any sovereign authority. 
Natural Law, the Unity of Humankind and Universalism 
So far, I have claimed that Oakeshott’s political philosophy has many important 
similarities – as well as very significant differences – with some of the themes of 
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Empirical Realism. I want now to further explore the Oakeshottian critique of any 
universal or transcendental criteria of justice in the conduct of states. 
I have argued in chapter 3 that Oakeshott defends an embedded conception of 
practical rationality in which normative criteria are the result of the moral traditions 
or practices in which individuals are situated. Oakeshott’s discussion of the doctrine 
of Natural Law may be understood in the context of his broader distinction between 
technical and practical knowledge, between knowledge based on principles to be 
applied to political activity and evaluation of just conduct and knowledge based on 
a practical and embedded notion of practical reason. 
In essays such as ‘Rationalism in Politics’ and ‘Political Education’, which were 
written when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was elaborated and 
adopted by the newly constituted UN, Oakeshott criticizes the notion that the idea 
of Natural Law and of Natural Rights may ground political activity.49 With 
reference to the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man (part of which he reproduces 
in the appendix of his Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe),50 
Oakeshott contested the idea that the system of rights and duties and the scheme of 
ends encompassed in that document were the codification of the principles of 
natural law needed to inform the new political order. Instead, it should have been 
considered as an abridgment of the ‘the common law rights of Englishmen, the gift 
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not of independent premeditation or divine munificence, but of centuries of day-to-
day attending to the arrangements of an historic society’.51 
What Oakeshott is criticizing is not the actual idea of rights, but rather the tendency 
to conceive them as premeditated and immutable ends to be pursued in politics.52 
In one of his most engaged texts of the time –‘The Political Economy of Freedom’ 
(1948) – Oakeshott identifies the liberal (which he calls libertarian) tradition with 
three particular kinds of freedom (of association, the right of private property, and 
of speech).53 These freedoms, however, were not declared or set as final ends, but 
were rather enjoyed, and constituted a historically enacted ‘method of 
government’.54 
What Oakeshott’s theory contends is that rights are social and not natural; that they 
derive from the place of individuals in a society; of their recognition of the system 
of law in which they are situated. There cannot be rights without historically 
situated society. In short, like Burke, Oakeshott criticized the abstractness of the 
idea of identifying true principles upon which to base laws and institutions without 
regard to historical and shared experience.55 This same position was also shared by 
British idealists such as Henry Jones and D.G. Ritchie,56 who understood rights as 
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eminently social and not natural and Oakeshott draws upon that philosophical 
school to develop his arguments. 
With reference to the debate around the UDHR this same idealist and historicist 
argument was advanced by Benedetto Croce in his reply to Julian Huxley’s 
invitation to participate at the 1948 UNESCO symposium on Human Rights. In that 
text, the Italian idealist and liberal thinker affirms that, instead of a universal 
declaration of timeless principles, what is possible is a declaration ‘of certain 
historical and contemporary rights’; the Rights of Man are rather the rights ‘of the 
historical man’.57  
Oakeshott indeed grounds his theory on the idealist theory of individuality that I 
presented in chapter 1. At the political and social level, it argues for the priority of 
the whole over the individual. As I shall discuss further below, this argument may 
be indeed compared to constitutivist and constructivist claims that the state and the 
broader social and moral context have a moral priority in the constitution of 
individual identity, and should be taken into account when defining justice. 
For the moment, it suffices to show the arguments deployed by Oakeshott to defend 
the idea that individuality is not an absolute, a-historical, criterion. The essay ‘Some 
Remarks on the Nature and the Meaning of Sociality’ (1925) is particularly 
relevant. There, as well as in some other pieces from Oakeshott’s Archive and 
others recently published,58 he addresses the issue of moral individuality in terms 
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similar to those of Absolute idealists such as F.H Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet.59 
In that early text, he underlines the moral and relational character of social and 
political life. In particular, he stresses that the self and society are not distinct, but 
rather that they compose a single whole. This social whole is a unity of mind in 
which the self participates.60  
In another piece that Oakeshott wrote in his twenties, entitled ‘The Authority of the 
State’ (1929), he again follows Bosanquet and Bradley, defining the state as ‘the 
social whole’, and as a ‘totality’.61 The authority of the law does not derive from a 
natural or external obligation (such as power), nor from consent or utility; rather, it 
is ‘moral’. It derives from the ‘internal’ recognition of the will of the state. In other 
words, the moral nature of the social life lies in the unity between the self and the 
State, between the individual and the community.62  
It is true to say that in the texts published after the Second World War Oakeshott 
develops a political philosophy that is committed, as noted by Noel O’Sullivan, to 
identifying the conditions of the coexistence between authority and individual 
freedom and seems to defend the priority of the individual.63  As is well known, the 
theory of civil association is also a powerful critique of those political arrangements 
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that limit the pluralism of values, individual liberty and human eccentricity by the 
imposition of a goal to be reached through the coercive apparatus of the state.64 
However, in these texts the individual is not a metaphysical absolute or an entity 
which derives its value from itself. First of all, the free individual is fully realised 
throughout history. It finally emerged in the Renaissance and, from then on, it has 
constituted the starting point of the ethical theories of Hobbes, Spinoza and Kant. 
It is therefore a historical realisation, a historical identity and not a metaphysical 
absolute.65 
Moreover, the theory of civil association that offers a reinterpretation of the idea 
that individual rights are unavoidably related to the recognition of the authority of 
the rules. To say that a person has rights equates to saying that the whole of society 
has the obligation to respect these rights.66 This obligation, for Oakeshott, is 
grounded on and derives from the recognition of the authority of the system of non-
instrumental rules, which is civil association. As I have discussed in chapter 5, civil 
association affirms the absolute autonomy of the legal order from external 
considerations and values; therefore, to have an obligation to recognise and respect 
rights is to acknowledge the authority of the rules that prescribe it.67 There is 
therefore a logical priority of the whole over the individual.  
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It is therefore not correct to say (with Jens Meierhenrich)68 that Oakeshott grounds 
his theory on methodological individualism. Rather, he maintains an idealist holism 
which states the interrelatedness and dependence of individual will and actions on 
the social whole. The self’s identity and actions can be understood exclusively in 
the light of ‘morality’. A practice in which it is situated and that provides the 
resources and the procedure that the individual takes into account while acting. This 
morality is an identity which has a continuity between past, present and future that 
overcomes the finitude of individual identities, providing the moral resources for 
their enactment.69  
To recapitulate the analysis so far. Differently from the Empirical Realist tradition, 
Oakeshott’s theory admits the possibility of rule-based international legal order. 
However, he shares with that tradition the critique of universal and immutable 
criteria of justice that need to be taken into account in the conduct of states as well 
as in the design of international institutions. Indeed, he argues against the logical 
possibility of conducting political activity on a priori principles and on the use of 
Right Reason. Instead, as discussed in chapter 3, he defends an embedded 
conception of practical reason. The human condition is characterized by the 
supremacy of contingency and uncertainty. Politics is not the overcoming of this 
predicament but it is rather an activity governed by expediency and prudence.  
Differently from both Realism and Universalism, he criticizes the idea of a-
historical criteria of conduct grounded on a universal moral nature. Even though he 
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can indeed be considered as one of the most intransigent theorists of individual 
freedom, Oakeshott considers the individual to be a historical realisation and 
achievement. As already discussed in chapter 1, far from being a subscriber to 
methodological individualism, he theorises the logical priority of the whole over 
individuality. In other words, individual morality and will are grounded on a shared 
and common historical morality. 
Historical Reason 
The analysis of how Oakeshott’s political philosophy may refute the main 
conception of the Empirical Realist and Universalist tradition points the way to the 
existence of historically situated criteria of conduct. Differently from the Realist, 
as illustrated in the previous chapter, Oakeshott shows that law may be authoritative 
even without a sovereign legislator. At the same time, excluding from consideration 
about the law any concern regarding a final end or a summum bonum does not mean 
that law and morality are two incommensurable spheres.70 Instead, for Oakeshott, 
the so-called ‘moral neutrality’ of the rule of law is nothing more than a ‘half-
truth’,71 and law is itself a ‘kind of morality’.  
There are indeed some moral conceptions that are endorsed by law. Indeed, for 
Oakeshott it should be non-instrumental, neutral between persons and interests and 
should exclude outlawry and privilege.72 As I have highlighted in the previous 
section, in contrast with universalism, Oakeshott contests the idea that abstract a 
priori principles may be the ground for the construction of political institutions and 
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international order. Therefore, the moral ideas that are enacted by the system of law 
are not moral absolutes but are instead realised through history in particular, 
contingent situations. In this regard, the history of the modern European state as a 
societas that is presented in the third essay of On Human Conduct may also be read 
as the history of how an understanding of the nature of law and government activity 
animated by these moral ideals emerged and developed. It shows how it has been 
interpreted by different thinkers at various times, and how it has been opposed and 
contrasted by its contrary, universitas.  
Most importantly for our argument, both law and morality are what Oakeshott calls 
a ‘practice’. As already mentioned in chapter 3, the concept is developed by 
Oakeshott in the first essay of On Human Conduct as a re-interpretation of that of 
tradition presented, in particular, in ‘Political Education’. As I argued, neither 
practice nor tradition prescribe which course of action should be followed in a 
particular case or what ideals should be enacted, but rather how the individual 
should behave. They are not prudential, they intimate the considerations that we 
should take into account when acting. As noted by Mervyn Frost with reference to 
Oakeshott’s notion of practice, participation in moral practices ‘gives to the 
participants access to a whole range of values which are internal to the practice in 
question’.73 
In short, by saying that both law and morality are a practice, Oakeshott wants to 
stipulate that they are not concerned with the specific outcome of individual 
performances (i.e. they are not instrumental or prudential) nor with the particular 
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transactions between agents, but instead specify the conditional context in which 
these intercourses may take place.74 Moreover, both law and morality are the result 
of human intelligence: the relationships that they define can be enjoyed only by 
virtue of having being understood, acknowledged and recognized.75  
Therefore, even though we can say that law is independent of any other source that 
makes it authentic, for Oakeshott it represents and reflects the evolution of a ‘moral 
tradition’. Whereas morality is a practice concerned with the conditions of ‘good 
and bad’ conduct,76 law is the imposition of some of these conditions, seen as ‘just’. 
What is prescribed by the law reflects the conditions of moral-legal acceptability 
expressed in the evolutionary criteria of the ‘moral-legal self-understanding of the 
associates’.77 Law is ‘declaratory’ of what is immanent in the moral practice of a 
community. A system of non-instrumental laws is a morality that has become an 
institution though a previously recognized procedure.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that customary international law may be 
considered a codification of existing moral practices between states. As such, it 
aptly represents the declaratory nature of the legal order, according to which the 
value of legal constraints is grounded on their coherence with the actual moral 
beliefs of a given community or, as in the international case, of the society of states. 
Thus, the conduct of states may be considered just when it is pursued in respect of 
the conditional constraints imposed on these codified practices. 
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The relationship between legal order and moral values is further clarified by 
Oakeshott in his 1983 essay ‘The Rule of Law’. There, the judgment about the 
justice of a law is composed of ‘beliefs and opinions invoked in considering the 
propriety of the conditions’ that law prescribes. Considerations about justice are not 
only related to the authenticity of the laws – their being the result of a previously 
recognized procedure, as it is for legal positivism – but also to  
a particular kind of moral considerations: neither an absurd belief in moral absolute 
(the ‘right’ to speak, to be informed, to procreate and so on) which should be 
recognized in law, nor the distinction between the rightness and wrongness of 
action in terms of the motives in which they are performed, but the negative and 
limited considerations that the prescriptions of the law should not conflict with a 
prevailing moral educated sensibility. 78 
The prevailing moral sensibility of a given community and, at the international 
level, of the society of states represents the boundaries of the political and moral 
imagination of the various actors involved.  
In chapter 3, I argued that practical discourse is an argumentative, non-
demonstrative form of reasoning radically distinct from the demonstrative or 
‘scientific’ form. Of course, this does not mean that for Oakeshott there is no 
criterion in practical reasoning, and that practical activity is the ‘pursuit of what 
recommends itself from moment to moment’.79 Instead, moral reasoning should 
also be coherent with the shared moral assumptions provided by the prevailing 
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moral practice, which, even though contingent (non-necessary), is not arbitrary. 
Therefore, to judge the justice of the conduct of states is a prudent, phronetic 
discourse concerned with the compatibility between the conduct of states, 
international law and evolving international morality. Philosophical understanding 
cannot provide an account of the reasons for the changes in the criteria of justice, 
nor can it offer a solution to current practical dilemmas. Instead, it aims at 
explaining current arrangements as coherent as possible.  
At the outset, I suggested that the discussion about justice concerns the 
identification of moral constraints to the actions of states. As pointed out by 
Boucher, the case of customary humanitarian international law is of particular 
significance, because it prescribes legal constraints in the conduct of conflict, for 
instance by forbidding the use of poisoned weapons, or by protecting non-
combatants without appealing to Natural Law.80 That considerations about 
international justice do refer to a broad international morality is shown, for instance, 
by the ‘Martens clause’ in the 1899 Hague conventions with respect to the laws and 
customs of war on land. The clause admits that the laws of war are, and will be, 
incomplete and insufficient to the regulation of conduct and, therefore, the 
constraints to the actions of the belligerents should also include ‘the requirement of 
the public conscience’.81 According to Theodor Meron, this role of the public 
conscience in moving government to acknowledge certain practices as law was, for 
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instance, recognized in the Rome Conference on the Establishment of the 
International Criminal Court.82 
Therefore, the first important contribution of the Oakeshottian approach that 
differentiates it from more recent post-structuralist approaches is that it retains the 
normative and interpretative character proper to human conduct, as opposed to any 
causal and determinist interpretation.83 As I have underlined in chapters 3 and 4, 
Oakeshott’s theoretical understanding of human conduct and political life is not 
concerned with the identification of causes, but with an understanding of the 
postulates of concepts and of their broader meaning. 
For this acknowledgment of the moral foundation of international society, the 
Oakeshottian perspective may be similar to the one defended by Reus-Smit, who 
argues that institutions reflect the values and practices of a society. Indeed, as it is 
for Reus-Smit’s constructivist interpretation of Bull’s notion of international 
society, the international order embodies some specific moral values that change 
through time.  
For example, the practice of Renaissance diplomacy was embedded within the 
practices of fifteen-century Italian society, and in the moral purpose of the state: 
‘civic glory’.84 As clarified in the last chapter, however, this moral purpose should 
be considered not as a teleological end, but rather as a set of moral, non-prudential, 
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values. Thus, in the example considered, ‘civic glory’ does not prescribe specific 
actions in certain circumstances; it does not suggest what to do, but it provides the 
standards and the criteria that determine the manner in which actions are performed. 
At the outset, I suggested that recent constitutive theorists such as Frost and Brown, 
as well as the communitarism of Walzer and Miller, may be regarded as part of the 
tradition of Historical Reason because they identify in the historically evolving 
conditions of the moral context the ground for the identifications of international 
norms. In the manner of constitutive theorists, Oakeshott does attribute priority to 
the social whole and to moral practices in the constitution of identity and of the 
moral world of individuals.  
Being critical of any construction of shared and homogeneous values and 
principles, and describing the history of the modern European State as that of a 
‘mixed and miscellaneous collections of human beings precariously held 
together’,85 Oakeshott’s theory of civil association is however opposed to any form 
of nationalism. This critique is not just valid for its most extreme expressions that 
crossed Europe over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but also for David 
Miller’s ‘civic’ version, in which the bounded community is not just grounded on 
shared values, but is also conceived as a purposive ‘cooperative venture for the 
mutual advantage’ in which to apply rules of redistribution.86  
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On the contrary, as David Boucher has pointed out,87 and is also evident in some 
loose notes in Oakeshott’s Archive that demonstrate his study of Cicero’s De res 
publica,88 Oakeshott’s conception of the state understood as a civil association is a 
form of Republicanism inspired by Cicero and by the Roman political experience. 
For instance, he uses the Latin word respublica to describe the sort of political 
association that he had in mind, differentiating it not just from the nation-state, but 
also from any close identification with liberal democracy. For Oakeshott, 
respublica is ‘the public concern or consideration’ prescribed by the legal order to 
all individuals.  
In On Duties, Cicero considers that natural human sociability implies the existence 
of ‘several degree’ of fellowships: from the ‘vast fellowship of the human race’ to 
the confined and limited one of marriage, brotherhood, etc. 89 Of these, reason tells 
us that none is more serious or dearer to us than that with the republic.90 Similarly, 
Mervyn Frost notes there is sometimes a conflict between equally authoritative 
practices, as what is preeminent in the considerations of justice are both obligations 
prescribed by the domestic institutions and by international society. Both are 
‘foundational practices’ as what they prescribe ‘trumps’ any other allegiance.91 In 
Oakeshott there is neither a doctrine of the natural sociability of men, as we find in 
Cicero, nor a neo-Hegelian teleological doctrine, as we find in Frost. Individuals 
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are situated within a complex web of moral relationships, each implying some sort 
of moral obligation.92  
Once again, there is no easy solution, and the priority of one over the other is 
dictated not by necessary considerations, but by the historical circumstances in 
which the individual is situated and by the evolving moral practices that constitute 
the assumption of this practical reasoning. Even though we may reasonably argue, 
as Boucher has done, that Oakeshott was a ‘committed patriot’, a lover of his own 
country,93 his theory, as those of earlier idealists such as Bosanquet,94 does not close 
the door to the progressive extension of obligations beyond the state to a more 
inclusive moral community. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter has been to consider Oakeshott’s political thought in the 
context of philosophical reflections on international relations and international 
justice. Whereas in chapter 5 I contended that his theory of civil association may 
represent the ground for an understanding of international society as a rule-based 
association between states constituted by customary international law, in this 
chapter I have considered how this theory explains the existence of moral 
constraints on the actions of states.  
In other words, the question that I have tried to answer through analysis of 
Oakeshott’s political and legal philosophy is that of the existence of criteria of just 
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conduct at the international level. To this end, I have placed his political philosophy 
in the context of the history of reflection on the conduct of states. Invoking 
Boucher’s triadic conception, I have compared Oakeshott with the traditions of 
Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order and Historical Reason. What has 
emerged is that Oakeshott retains and criticizes elements from all these traditions, 
but that, in common with Historical Reason, he identifies criteria of just conduct in 
a historical discourse related to changing sets of assumptions and criteria. 
In particular, like the Realists, he criticises Universalism and the existence of 
immutable principles of justice, on the grounds of a negative conception of human 
nature and political activity. However, for Oakeshott, human nature is not a fixed 
entity; the human condition is not essentially a predicament. Instead, it is what it 
becomes throughout history; it is the result of human creation. This creation and 
invention is not arbitrary, but is consistent with an evolving morality resulting from 
the conduct of individuals and transcending them, as it is a continuity between past, 
present, and future. In Oakeshott’s hands, the tradition of Historical Reason is thus 
a form of Humanism, which (I have incidentally shown) is also associated with a 
sceptical ethical doctrine of self-acceptance and self-construction. 
Similarly, for Oakeshott politics and practical reason are phronetic, prudential 
activities. Once again, politics is not merely to follow one’s will; it is not just power, 
but it is the ‘pursuit of intimations’ coming from a tradition.95 It is based on a 
historically evolving moral practice that offers contingent criteria of choice. 
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As also shown by the differences between Oakeshott and Schmitt and Morgenthau, 
to say that Oakeshott is critical of universal and immutable principles is not to say 
that he denies the existence of moral considerations in international politics. Rather, 
Oakeshott’s theory of civil association leads to a form of internationalism in which 
states are the main actors and where their relations are regulated by law. Since law 
is understood as a system of non-instrumental rules reflecting the evolving moral 
practices of states, it does not offer substantive and absolute criteria of justice, but 
rather constraints upon the conduct of states and individuals. These are the results 
of practical and prudential discourses developed from a common set of assumptions 
expressed in international morality and codified in international law.  
In this regard, Oakeshott’s political philosophy of international relations may be 
associated with a form of constitutive theory, according to which, moral practices 
provide the normative horizon for individual choices and identities. Against any 
methodological individualism or any anti-historical conception of individuality, 
Oakeshott recognizes the constitutive and normative role of moral practices. 
However, he does not identify a hierarchy between global civil society and the state. 
His scepticism and the radical separation between philosophical and practical truths 
implied by his theory of modality lead him to consider the solution of this dilemma 
as based on circumstantial arguments, whose only criterion of truth is the coherence 
with the given assumptions and current understandings. 
Even though, for these same reasons, Oakeshott does not share the emancipatory 
and genealogical efforts of Habermas-inspired theories, his perspective may be 
considered similar to constructivism, as it shows the moral and intersubjective 
foundations of political order and institutions. However, in contrast to Reus-Smit, 
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he interprets this moral foundation not as a purpose but rather as a condition – as a 
conditional constraint on agents’ choices and their courses of actions. 
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CONCLUSION 
Over recent decades, the scholarship on Oakeshott has grown exponentially and his 
thought has been considered from many, often divergent, perspectives. However, 
in spite of his work exerting a certain influence on neo-English School writers, 
international historians and constitutive theorists, as well as displaying some 
important similarities with constructivism, no study has ever attempted to discuss 
the implications of Oakeshott’s political philosophy for the understanding of 
international relations. Even in the growing literature on the impact of 
contemporary philosophical thought on International Relations theory (to which 
thinkers such as Heidegger, Habermas, Gramsci, Foucault and others are often 
considered to contribute), references to Oakeshott are very rare. 
In this thesis, I have offered a comprehensive interpretation of Oakeshott’s thought. 
I have shown its contribution to constructivist theories of international relations, 
and to the understanding of the nature of international society and morality. What 
emerges is the conclusion that his philosophical idealism is the basis for an 
understanding of international society conceived as a rule-based association 
between states constituted by customary international law. This international rule 
of law is the institutionalisation of an existing evolving moral practice constructed 
by the states throughout history. 
Following an Oakeshottian approach, which invites the reader to consider 
philosophical texts in the context of the whole history of philosophy, I have 
identified the epistemological grounds of Oakeshott’s position by exploring its 
relations with the British idealist tradition.  In chapter 1, this study highlighted not 
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just the consistent relevance of Bernard Bosanquet’s and F.H. Bradley’s Absolute 
idealism to Oakeshott’s works, but also the broad epistemological and ontological 
assumptions at the root of his theory. Most important among these is the identity 
between epistemological and ontological issues; in other words, for Oakeshott, 
questions about the nature of things are unavoidably related to those about our 
manner of understanding. World politics, for example, is not an object that waits to 
be apprehended by a knowing mind equipped with the correct, scientific, 
methodology. Instead, its nature is defined by the diversity of approaches that look 
at it. 
The difference between these various forms of knowledge, with their divergent 
claims about truth, is interpreted by Oakeshott through his theory of modality, 
which represents one of the constants in his thought, notwithstanding numerous and 
significant terminological evolutions that I have discussed in the chapter. 
Oakeshott’s theory of modality is developed in continuity with F.H. Bradley’s 
position, Oakeshott conceives of various modes of experience (history, science, 
practice and art) as autonomous from each other and abstract in respect of the 
whole, of truth.  
As I have illustrated, this theory has profound methodological implications. To 
understand the meaning and value of individual concepts, it is necessary to consider 
their relations to other concepts of the same sort, which share the same foundations. 
These foundations, it is important to stress, are not a metaphysical given, but are 
instead the result of the activity of mind throughout history. Against any 
methodological individualism, for Oakeshott, individual concepts are not the 
criterion of truth, as this lies instead in the whole, in the unity between a concept 
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and its context. Oakeshott therefore subscribes to a methodological holism in which 
the truth of the particulars depends on their relations with the whole, with the 
universal. 
In this context, philosophy is criticism. It shows the presuppositions of various 
forms of understanding and their limited value. At the same time, it attempts to 
reach concepts that are as universal as possible, that is to say, that are true outside 
of the circumstances and of the context from which they are generated. 
Philosophical activity is the unremitting criticism of all concepts in the attempt to 
reach a definition of things as universal as possible. In contrast to other 
commentators, however, I have argued that at no stage of his works does Oakeshott 
see philosophy as the actual achievement of a positive body of absolute knowledge 
– one that overcomes concepts from the various modes. 
These modes, instead, maintain their relative validity, granted by their coherence to 
their postulates. The image of conversation, I have argued, far from representing a 
departure from idealist logic, illustrates the autonomy and the reciprocal 
irreducibility of the various forms of knowledge. At the same time, it shows that 
philosophy is not the teleological end of knowledge.  
While the first two chapters of the thesis mainly considered the epistemological and 
metaphilosophical assumptions of Oakeshott’s works, chapter 3 focused on their 
implications for the understanding of political life. The most important among these 
consequences is that, contra the Analytic critique of normative thinking, practical 
experience or human conduct is as rational and as legitimate as any other form of 
thinking. On this fundamental assumption, I have therefore examined the 
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Oakeshottian theory of normativity, which is well summarised by the famous and 
very controversial notion that practical activity is the ‘pursuit of intimations’ 
coming from a tradition of behaviour or, as it is called in On Human Conduct, a 
moral practice. 
Against D.D. Raphael’s critique, I have argued that, for Oakeshott, normative 
reasoning is not merely the justification of what one happens to believe. As 
intimated by Oakeshott’s notion of modality, practical reasoning is grounded on 
current understanding and on coherence with a moral practice, which is a 
conventional background composed of ‘shared assumptions’. 
Consistently with the notion of modality and of philosophy as criticism, the role of 
political philosophy is not to offer guidance or the solution to practical dilemma. 
Instead, it considers normative reasoning, political values and institutions in a 
context as universal as possible. This is, I have argued, the meaning of ‘ideal 
characters’ such as ‘civil association’, ‘enterprise association’, and ‘the rule of law’. 
Oakeshott’s conception of the relation between political philosophy and normative 
thinking is therefore highly controversial and shows a deep ambivalence. Indeed, 
Oakeshott is not just critical of the analytic methodology and of the demotion of 
normative thinking to irrationality; he is also distant from the classical conception 
of political philosophy as the search for the best form of government. 
Neither Oakeshott’s conception of normativity nor his broad metaphilosophical 
reflection have been considered in the various debates that have characterized the 
history of International Relations. Chapter 4 demonstrated that instead they may be 
placed in the context of the second Great Debate between the classical and scientific 
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approach, and may be regarded as contributions to post-positivist theories of 
international relations. In particular, Oakeshott’s critique of Rationalism in politics 
may be considered alongside the classical approach, which was defended by the 
exponents of the English School and, in the American context, where positivism 
was very successful in shaping the discipline, by Hans Morgenthau. 
However, this does not mean that Oakeshott may be simply considered among the 
defenders of the classical approach. Indeed, albeit not without ambiguities and 
inconsistencies, he does not agree with many exponents of the English School in 
regard to the practical use of history; nor does he agree with Morgenthau about the 
normative role of philosophy. In particular – again, consistently with his theory of 
modality and his metaphilosophy – Oakeshott is sceptical about the possibility of 
identifying objective laws through historical or philosophical inquiry.  
If the Oakeshottian influence on the so-called second Great Debate in International 
Relations is controversial and can only be inferred, that on the ‘normative turn’ is 
much clearer. Neo-English School thinkers such as Nardin, Rengger, and Jackson 
as well as constitutive theorists such as Brown and Frost have indeed applied many 
of the concepts of Oakeshott’s political philosophy to the understanding of 
international relations. Moreover, Oakeshott’s triadic conception of the history of 
political philosophy has been essential in tracing the history of the philosophical 
reflection on the conduct of states by Boucher.  
It is on these grounds that I have argued, in spite of the differences in regard of the 
critical and emancipatory role of theory, that the Oakeshottian position may be 
regarded as a contribution to constructivism and to the recent practical turn in 
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International Relations. Oakeshott’s idealism contends that world politics is the 
result of normative reasoning developed within moral practices, and that it evolves 
throughout history in virtue of agents’ actions and understanding. 
This articulated discussion of Oakeshott’s epistemology and metaphilosophy has 
represented the ground for my argument regarding the relevance of Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy to understanding the nature of international society and of 
issues of international morality and justice. 
In chapter 5, I claimed that the difference between the two ideal characters that 
Oakeshott identifies for understanding political associations and the state 
(enterprise association, or teleocracy, and civil association, or nomocracy) is 
difference in terms of the nature of law and of its authority. While, in enterprise 
association, rules derive their authority from a pre-established goal, which is 
conceived as a substantive state of affairs to be attained; in civil association, the 
authority of rules stems from their recognition as conditions to be observed while 
acting. Therefore, in enterprise association, rules are instrumental, while civil 
association is constituted by non-instrumental, moral, rules, which are indifferent 
to the self-chosen goals of its members.  
As is well known, and anticipating many of the constructivist positions, Oakeshott 
employs this dichotomy to interpret the history of the modern European state as an 
opposition between two self-understandings of the nature of the activity of 
governing. What has less often been noted, and what I have examined here, is that 
this history contains important implications for the understanding of the relations 
between states. First, Oakeshott identifies at the international level some of the 
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circumstances that favour the success of a teleocratic conception of the activity of 
governing. These are European colonialism and, most importantly, the state of 
belligerence that has characterized European modernity. The constant threat of war 
has indeed contributed to lead the European consciousness to understand the State 
as an enterprise association, which manages all the resources and guides the 
association toward a final substantive end: victory. However, the relationship 
between the self-understanding of the association and international relations is 
mutual. In a world composed of enterprise associations, war is more likely. In 
addition, it is the nature of war itself that has conferred the success of a teleocratic 
understanding of international order. In particular, war has moved from being 
understood as a regulative device in the service of the European balance of power 
(as it was for Burke), to being an instrument for the establishment of a new world 
order, of a new state of affairs in international relations. Overall, in Oakeshott’s 
international thought, the society of states has become more and more understood 
as an enterprise association.  
Even though Oakeshott’s political philosophy of international relations asserts the 
teleocratic character of the society of states, I have contended that from his theory 
of civil association it is possible to construct a different interpretation of 
international society. It is to this end that I have considered Hedley Bull’s notion of 
international society and in Terry Nardin’s Oakeshottian opposition between 
practical and purposive international society. Like civil association, Nardin’s 
practical international society is composed of non-instrumental rules.1 Against this 
                                                 
1
 Nardin 1983. 
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position, Christian Reus-Smit has instead contended that no historical international 
society has ever existed without shared moral values.2 To solve this dilemma, my 
argument has shown that civil association, and by implication international society, 
is indeed based on a shared morality, which has to be understood as a coherent set 
of conditional constraints on actions, and not as a substantive state of affairs to be 
achieved and enforced. Therefore, the Oakeshottian understanding that I have 
advanced offers a new interpretation of the idea of international society, which is 
understood as a civility based on shared moral assumptions. 
On this ground, I contended that the model of civil association offers an 
understanding of the nature of international law which authority derives not from 
the command of a sovereign (which is absent at the international level), but from 
the recognition of existing moral practices between the states. Thus, international 
society is constituted by customary international law. This is of particular interest 
because Oakeshott develops his theory on the Hobbesian notion according to which 
a law is authoritative when it is the result of a previously recognized procedure. 
However, in Oakeshott, the considerations about the authority of law are distinct 
from those regarding its enforcement and the constitution of the legislative office. 
In sum, the only necessary condition for the authority of law is its being recognized 
as such by the agents involved.  
Elaborating on Boucher’s triadic conceptions of the political theory of international 
relations (which is itself a further elaboration of Oakeshott’s triadic view of the 
                                                 
2
 Reus-Smit 1999. 
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history of political philosophy),3 I have contended that this view of international 
society may be regarded as similar to that of Burke, as it attributes a constitutive 
role to customary international law. Even though not all customary international 
law may be regarded as non-instrumental, the model that I have presented offers an 
understanding of the role played by customary international law in world politics, 
with particular reference to humanitarian law. As illustrated by the meaning of the 
‘Martens Clause’, by the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and by the 
establishment of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and of the 
International Criminal Court, customary international law has indeed been central 
in the codification of existing practices within international society. The emergence 
of international obligations derives from the recognition and codification of already 
existing criteria in the relations between states. 
Therefore, my argument points the way to analysis of the relation between 
international law – conceived as a system of authoritative non-instrumental laws – 
and morality. In chapter 6, I have addressed this theme by placing Oakeshott’s 
political philosophy in the context of the triadic conception of the political theory 
of international relations elaborated by Boucher. The comparison of Oakeshott with 
the Empirical Realist, the Universal Moral Order and the Historical Reason 
traditions has illustrated some key elements, and has placed his thought in the 
context of the history of philosophical reflection on international relations.  
In particular, I argued that his understanding of the relations between law and 
morality may be regarded as a further interpretation of the Historical Reason 
                                                 
3
 Boucher 1998. 
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tradition, according to which, criteria of conduct are the result of historically 
situated practice.  
Indeed, while sharing with classical realists such as Schmitt and Morgenthau a 
critique of liberal internationalism, in sympathy with contemporary constructivists, 
Oakeshott is against the essentialism that is underpinned in many of the realist 
positions. In particular, I argued that Oakeshott defends a version of humanism, for 
he conceives of human nature as the result of human creation and not as a datum. 
A creation that is the result of an understanding of the moral practices in which 
individuals are embedded. At the same time, since he does not consider law as the 
command of a sovereign, but the result of its recognition by the various agents 
involved, Oakeshott also opposes the classical legal positivist ‘command’ 
argument. At the same time, because of his theory of normativity, and of 
individuality, he rules out the relevance of any transcendental principle of justice, 
as defended by the Universalist tradition. 
This, I reiterate, does not imply the absence of any moral criteria in the conduct of 
states. To conceive, as I did, international society as constituted by a non-
instrumental system of law, as represented by customary international law, is itself 
to acknowledge a moral character to international order. Not only is there some 
inner moral conception embedded in the notion of non-instrumental law; but this is 
also an institutionalised moral practice. Indeed, as law is not the result of the 
command of a sovereign, nor is it the manifestation of absolute and transcendental 
moral principles, it is an understood ever-changing relationship. Moreover, it is not 
concerned with the specific outcome of individual performances; instead it specifies 
the conditional context in which actions may take place. As a consequence, law, at 
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both the domestic and international level, is the institutionalisation of a moral 
practice of a tradition of morality, and it prescribes some of the conditions of good 
conduct as ‘just’.  
Even though the Oakeshottian perspective does not offer an account as to the 
reasons why a certain sort of moral belief has prevailed, merely acknowledging that 
this is the result of normative thinking; the idea that customary international law is 
the institutionalisation of the morality of states further contributes to constitutive 
and constructivist theories of international relations. Indeed, he identifies in the 
practices established by the historical relations between states the moral 
foundations of international society. However, departing from recent constructivist 
accounts, he underlines the conditional, non-instrumental, and non-prudential 
character of this international morality. 
Overall, this thesis argues that Oakeshott’s theory of civil association offers an 
understanding of international society as constituted by an international rule of law 
– a system of non-instrumental rules that is the institutionalisation of a common 
international morality. These shared moral values are not, however, a-historical, 
transcendental principles, nor substantive state of affairs to be achieved and 
enforced, but rather components of an evolving practice which prescribes, to those 
states and other actors, conditions to be observed while acting.
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